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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays in the
Political Economy of Development
by
Patrick A. Testa
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Professor Stergios Skaperdas, Co-Chair
Professor Daniel Bogart, Co-Chair
This dissertation consists of three essays in the political economy of development. It uses a
combination of empirical methods and microeconomic theory, utilizing both historical and
contemporary data.
The first essay examines the long-run effects of forced migration on the origin economy,
using Czechoslovakia’s expulsion of 3 million Germans after WWII. For identification, I
use the discontinuity at the border of the “Sudetenland” region where Germans lived, as
made formal with the Munich Agreement in 1938. Since Germans had similar socioeconomic
characteristics to Czechs, this bypasses factors that might drive effects elsewhere, such as
differences in human capital and geography. The expulsion produced differences in popu-
lation density, sectoral structure, and education between neighboring municipalities, which
persist 70 years later. I trace effects to a selective resettlement of affected areas, generat-
ing de-urbanization and human capital decline. Empirical and historical evidence suggest
ix
agglomeration economies and extractive institutions as two forces driving this response.
The second essay examines how formal institutions influence local recovery to population
shocks, using a model with multiple regions and increasing returns to economic activity
within regions. Extractive institutions crowd out productive activity, making its spatial
coordination more difficult in the aftermath of large, negative shocks. Given this, I show
that when one region experiences such a shock, extractive institutions can hinder recovery,
ensuring a redistribution of productive activity away from that region over the long-run.
The third essay considers the conditions under which nondemocratic regimes invest in
public education. Nondemocratic regimes face a tradeoff when investing in public education.
Education promotes human capital acquisition, expanding the tax base. Yet it also enhances
political sophistication and participation, at a cost to nondemocratic regimes. To relax this
tradeoff, a regime can disseminate propaganda through its education system. I show that
even Bayesian citizens can be influenced by propaganda. By deterring political opposition,
propaganda can induce nondemocracies to invest in education when they otherwise would
not, improving social welfare. When propaganda is too strong, however, it can generate a
backlash. Using cross-country and survey data, I find evidence consistent with the predic-
tions.
Key words: political economy; development; human capital; migration; institutions; nation-
building; European economic history
x
Chapter 1
The Economic Legacy of Expulsion:
Lessons from Postwar Czechoslovakia
1.1 Introduction
Between 1945 and 1947, 3 million Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia, in one of
several forced migration events that transformed postwar Europe. Yet such is hardly unique.
Jews, Greeks, Turks, and countless others were uprooted during the 20th century in the
process of nation-building, and more recently, civil and ethnic conflict have driven large-
scale population outflows in places like Uganda, Bosnia, Syria, and Myanmar. A large
literature has documented the impact of such events, both on forced migrants, who often
experience continued persecution abroad as refugees, and on their host economies (Ruiz and
Vargas-Silva, 2013; Becker et al, 2019).
What, however, becomes of the places left behind? Comparably little work has been done
to understand the effects of forced migration on the “origin economies” in which the displace-
ment occurred. In this paper, I examine such effects over the long-run, using Czechoslovakia’s
expulsion of 3 million Germans after WWII. This event has several features which are well-
suited for identifying the effects of a forced migration event in ways that prior literature
has not. Following the rise of nationalism and the collapse of Austria-Hungary into nation-
states in 1918, those still identifying as German within the Czech lands (i.e. the modern
day Czech Republic) were concentrated in one region – the borderlands, or “Sudetenland”
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– distinguished by a distinct “language border”. Yet after centuries of coexistence and com-
mon rule, during which language had held little economic or social significance among the
masses, Germans and Czechs were relatively similar in terms of their occupational and cul-
tural characteristics (Zahra, 2008). This boundary was made formal in 1938 with the Munich
Agreement, which enabled Germany’s annexation of the majority-German borderlands, fol-
lowed by its occupation of the remainder of the Czech lands shortly thereafter. It was in
response to this that Czechoslovakia expelled nearly all of its German population in 1945.
My identification strategy exploits the discontinuity in exposure to the expulsion at this
boundary to identify its local relative effects over the long-run, using a spatial regression
discontinuity (RD) design.1 To do this, I first construct a new dataset of municipal- and
district-level data spanning 90 years. Using directories of Czech villages from during the war,
I divide the Czech lands into a “borderlands” treatment region exposed to the expulsion and
an “interior” region not exposed. I then examine economic outcomes in the borderlands,
relative to interior areas only a few kilometers away. To the extent that ethnic differences
were uncorrelated with relevant factors prior to the expulsion, any long-run differences must
be driven by the expulsion and its subsequent channels, as opposed to differences in factors
such as geography and human capital that often distinguish displaced populations and might
therefore drive effects in other settings. Accordingly, long-run effects in this setting are ex
ante unclear (i.e. path dependence versus steady state reversion).
I then combine data on a large set of socioeconomic variables from the interwar period
with existing historical evidence to show that places with Germans and nearby places without
them were indeed indistinguishable prior to the expulsion on a number of relevant dimensions,
such as population density, literacy, and sector composition. This is true even if one omits
segments of the language border around which the borderlands was more ethnically mixed.
Next, I document a large divergence in development today between neighboring mu-
1Use of ethnic boundaries in spatial RD follows a literature on ethnic conflict and institutions, including
Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), Grosfeld et al (2013), and Moscona et al (2018).
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nicipalities on either side of the former German language border,2 including differences in
both the intensity and the composition of economic activity in a municipality. As of 2011,
borderland municipalities had lower population density, higher unemployment, smaller skill-
intensive sectors, and lower educational attainment relative to nearby interior municipalities.
The magnitude of differences is robust to numerous specifications and sample restrictions.
Lastly, studying a historical expulsion allows me to shed light on the precise channels
through which such differences emerged. I show that the borderlands underwent a de-
urbanization after the expulsion, with a relative decline in population density and a shift
in sectoral structure toward agriculture. This originated from a selective initial migratory
response to the expulsion. Contrary to policymakers’ expectations that former-German areas
could be quickly and voluntarily resettled by Czechs from nearby interior areas, interior
population outflows did not match overall losses in the borderlands by the time its initial
resettlement had wound down in mid-1947. These differences were larger for more urban
sectors, such as business and transportation. This in turn gave rise to differences in human
capital acquisition between the regions. I document relatively lower levels of enrollment
in advanced secondary, technical, and tertiary schooling in the borderlands in mid-1947,
despite there being a similar or greater supply of education at these levels as measured
in schools and teachers per pupil. I then discuss potential mechanisms though which the
expulsion generated these short-run effects. Using data and historical evidence, I argue for
(i) agglomeration economies and (ii) extractive institutions as two compelling forces driving
these patterns. I also consider how other factors such as natural geography, central planning,
and Cold War geopolitics may have mattered for long-run effects.
The borderlands’ decline was initially not intended by Czechoslovak policymakers, for
whom the region had great economic importance. Yet the expulsion of the Germans had a
persistent impact on the places in which they had once lived, relative to non-German places
2Effects are relative due to spillovers across regions over time. Aggregate effects would likely be even
larger, since the interior was negatively affected via out-migration, while the borderlands has likely benefited
from market access spillovers in areas near the former German language border.
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nearby. These findings provide valuable new insight into the economic effects of forced
migration. While voluntary migration has been the subject of vast research and debate (Bell
et al, 2013; Abramitzky et al, 2014), migration occurring as a result of expulsion as well
as violence and disaster is increasingly relevant, with UN estimates placing the number of
forcibly displaced people at nearly 70 million worldwide.3 Moreover, forced migration is often
followed by expropriation and conflict. Hence, it may have effects that differ from those of
voluntary migration.
This paper contributes to the literature on forced migration in two ways. First, whereas
existing research has focused largely on the effects of forced migration events for host coun-
tries (Hornung, 2014; Johnson and Koyama, 2017; Michalopoulos et al, 2019) or on migrants
themselves (Bauer et al, 2013; Becker et al, 2019), less work has been done to study their
effects on the origin countries overseeing such displacement (Becker and Ferrara, 2019). The
findings in this paper suggest that forced migration may not only affect migrants and their
host economies but contribute to persistent geographic inequality within the origin econ-
omy. This is most similar to Chaney and Hornbeck (2016), who find delayed convergence
following the Spanish expulsion of the Moriscos between former Morisco and non-Morisco
districts. As in their paper, studying a politically-motivated expulsion yields advantages for
identification here, to the extent that it is less likely to be associated with loss of physical
capital or selection within the targeted group, relative to war or natural disaster.4
Unlike this paper, however, existing research has focused on forced migrations involving
relatively skilled or otherwise differentiated groups (Waldinger, 2010; Acemoglu et al, 2011;
Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel, 2015; Pascali, 2016). To my knowledge, this paper provides the
first evidence that a forced migration can have persistent local effects even when displaced
populations are not compositionally distinct in relevant ways from those remaining. The
existence of effects independent of relative composition suggests that expelling even relatively
3See https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2017.
4An estimated 7000 German civilians were murdered by Czechs during the expulsion, with expellees being
allowed only 100 lbs of property to take with them (Gerlach, 2017).
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low-skilled groups may have growth-inhibiting effects locally, raising concerns about economic
arguments for mass deportation and forced emigration policies more generally. It also mirrors
a large literature on the benefits of population inflows, of refugees and other immigrants
(Foged and Peri, 2016; Rocha et al, 2017; Droller, 2017; Murard and Sakalli, 2018; Sequeira
et al, 2019). Finally, it adds to a body of research examining the economic consequences of
the postwar German expulsions specifically (Schumann, 2014; Semrad, 2015; Braun et al,
2017; Becker et al, 2019).
Lastly, this paper speaks to broader questions in development and urban economics
regarding the importance of historical shocks for long-run development. Empirically, it
contrasts with Davis and Weinstein (2002; 2008), who argue against the empirical relevance
of multiple equilibria in economic activity, citing the relatively quick recovery of Japanese
cities after WWII. Yet unlike many of the shocks studied in this literature, expulsion often
occurs in weak or repressive institutional settings, and its effects may be contingent upon that
context. In particular, an expulsion may be more likely to also generate spatial variation in
fundamentals, such as local institutions and culture. This potentially suggests an alternative
explanation for the differential effects of population shocks as noted in Acemoglu et al (2011),
who attribute the Holocaust’s persistent effects in Russia to structural changes stemming
from compositional differences between expellees and non-expellees. Rather, the persistent
effects of shocks may have more to do with how they interact with or shape institutions and
culture, as in Chaney and Hornbeck (2016) and Nunn (2007; 2008).5
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 provides historical
background. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 describes identification and results.
Section 1.5 considers possible channels. Section 1.6 concludes.
5See Acemoglu et al (2002), Tabellini (2010), Dell (2010), and Acemoglu and Dell (2010) for more on
history, institutions, and development. Also see Maloney and Caicedo (2015), Jedwab et al (2019), Dell and
Olken (2019), and Testa (2019) for examples of how agglomeration economies and institutions may interact
to shape spatial development.
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1.2 Historical background
The origins of the “Sudeten” Germans in the Czech borderlands can be traced to the 12th
century, when early Bohemian kings opened them up to immigration by German-speaking
artisans (de Zayas, 1989). They would pay taxes but trade relatively freely, diffusing their
language and culture in the process (Agnew, 2004).
After the Thirty Years’ War, the Czech lands underwent further “Germanization” under
Habsburg rule. During this time, more German speakers moved into the borderlands, creat-
ing vast German language frontiers (Daneˇk, 1995). Yet despite growing German hegemony
among the elite, German and Czech speakers coexisted peacefully at the local level, where
identity depended more on local kinships than on language (King, 2002; Tampke, 2003).
German industries attracted Czech speakers to German towns, creating bilingual economic
centers where intermarriage was not uncommon and language choice was largely situational
(Agnew, 2004; Zahra, 2008). By the early 1800s, language in the Czech lands was largely
independent of economic, cultural, or even genetic factors among the masses (King, 2002;
Zahra, 2008).
The origins of a language border
A series of events resulted in increased segregation of German and Czech speaking within
the Czech lands. From the late 1800s, nationalist activists worked to build exclusively
German or Czech societies by establishing linguistically segregated social associations and
lobbying for reforms that limited bilingual education (Tampke, 2003; Judson, 2006; Zahra,
2008). These efforts often took on a geographic dimension. Because later Austrian censuses
required citizens to select a single language of daily use, German nationalists developed a
visual of the borderlands as a distinctly German region and aimed to “Germanize” its mixed
elements. Czech nationalists, in contrast, sought to preserve the historic boundaries of the
Lands of the Bohemian Crown (i.e. the modern day Czech Republic) and built exclusively
Czech-language institutions to combat Germanization (Bryant, 2002; Zahra, 2008). As such,
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Figure 1.1: Germans in the Czech lands, post-1918 (Wiskemann, 1938)
much of activists’ efforts focused on the more mixed areas where the borderlands met the
Czech interior (Cornwall, 1994). And although the masses remained largely indifferent to
national identification, the late 19th century indeed saw greater assimilation along lingual
lines in these places. By the early 1900s, German “language islands” in the interior had
shrunk dramatically and German-speaking populations in urban interior areas were rapidly
declining (Agnew, 2004; Zahra, 2008).
This benefitted both groups, albeit in different ways. The notion of the borderlands as
a formal, German region was further legitimized when, following the collapse of Austria-
Hungary in 1918, it was included in German Imperial Council representatives’ proposal for
a new German-Austrian state – despite the several hundred thousand Czech speakers and
countless nationally ambiguous and indifferent residing there (Agnew, 2004). When the
Allies instead backed Czech efforts to keep historic boundaries intact, the inclusion of the
over 3 million borderland German-speakers as a minority group in the new Czechoslovak state
would serve as an important step toward unifying them around a cohesive “Sudeten” German
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identity, rather than local identities independent of language (Gerlach, 2017). Meanwhile,
Czechoslovak policymakers now had the power and legitimacy of the state to influence the
ethnolinguistic composition of the Czech lands. After 1918, a parent’s nationality as it
appeared on the census determined a child’s language of instruction, with minority-language
schooling and public services being provided only if a minority group exceeded 20% of the
local population (Zahra, 2008; Agnew, 2004). Coinciding with this, census officials could now
choose nationalities for citizens based on “objective” traits, and failure to comply became
a punishable offense. In total, German population counts in mixed areas fell by 420,000
(Zahra, 2008). At least officially, over 90% of German-speakers in the Czech lands lived in
the borderlands in 1930.
Despite this, issues of nationality did not dominate political discourse during the 1920s,
and German and Czech societies functioned in relative political and economy harmony
(Tampke, 2003). After centuries of coexistence and common rule, during which language
differences had mattered little among the masses, such national assignment remained largely
arbitrary in terms of economic and even cultural factors (Zahra, 2008). During the Great
Depression, however, economic anxiety amplified German concerns about the Czechoslovak
state. Export-based industries deep in the borderlands experienced some of the highest un-
employment in Czechoslovakia, and many Germans blamed the Czechoslovak government.
The nationalist Sudeten German Party (SdP) was founded in October of 1933, and before
long demands for autonomy were part of its platform (de Zayas, 1989). Although most
popular German political parties remained anti-separatist and coalesced with leading Czech
parties on common socioeconomic issues during the 1920s, by 1938, 85% of Sudeten Germans
supported the SdP (Glassheim, 2016).
Germany’s proximity to the borderlands made its invasion highly likely. In an attempt
to avoid war, Allied leaders signed the Munich Agreement, formally annexing all majority-
German areas to Nazi Germany (see Figure 1.2; Taylor, 1980; Goldstein, 1999), fully formal-
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Figure 1.2: The occupied Czech lands within Central Europe, 1939
izing the “Sudetenland” as a region.6 Meant to appease Germany, annexation severely weak-
ened Czechoslovakia’s military and industrial capacities (Agnew, 2004; Glassheim, 2016).
Within a few months, Germany had occupied the remainder of the Czech lands, sending its
government into exile.
The expulsion of the Sudeten Germans
The idea of expulsion arose soon after Nazi occupation. During the war, the exiled Czechoslo-
vak government, led by former president Edvard Beneˇs, established the legal basis for the
expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia through several decrees. Thousands of national
committees were to be set up throughout the borderlands to manage the expulsion, includ-
ing the confiscation of German farms, houses, and other property without compensation
and their allocation to incoming settlers. In the end, 3 million Germans would be expelled,
mostly to the Western Zones of occupied Germany, along with almost a million to the East
Zone and 142,000 to Austria (Odsun: Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen, 1995).
6That being said, because the entire region was annexed, some <50% German “islands” were inevitably
included, especially in northern Moravia. Moreover, Zaolzie in Cieszyn Silesia, a largely Polish-speaking
area, was annexed by Poland in 1938. I exclude this latter area from the analysis.
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When the war ended in early 1945, Allied forces moved into the borderlands to liberate
Czechoslovakia from Nazi Germany, resulting in the first expulsions. It was not until June,
however, that the expulsions would gain momentum. By summer’s end, as many as 800,000
Germans had been expelled (Gerlach, 2017).
The 33rd Beneˇs Decree, signed on August 2, 1945, followed the formal Allied approval
of the expulsion at Potsdam and formally stripped all Sudeten Germans of their citizen-
ship. Another 2.2 million Germans were expelled through mid-1947 (Gerlach, 2017). These
transfers were more systematic in comparison to the earlier “wild transfers”. All borderland
residents were suspected of being German. When in doubt, the 1939 German or earlier
Czechoslovak censuses could determine whether one was to be expelled. This meant that
some Germans who had become Czechs by force prior to the war were not expelled, while
some non-Germans who had “switched” to German following the borderlands’ annexation
were (Spurny´, 2013). For others, having an ambiguous or mixed national identity meant
being expelled, regardless of census identification. Once again, “objective” characteristics
were to be used to determine someone’s nationality when necessary (Zahra, 2008). Only a
small number of Germans who were Czech by marriage, could prove their loyalty to the state,
or were deemed economically vital were allowed to stay. By 1950, only 165,000 Germans
remained, of which most would be re-granted citizenship (Cornwall, 1994).
The resettlement of the borderlands
The borderlands’ resettlement was of central importance to the Czechoslovak government,
which sought to maintain the region’s great prewar output (Glassheim, 2016; Gerlach, 2017).
In May 1945, the Czech borderlands contained upwards of 500,000 non-Germans, and the
Czechoslovak government hoped that about 2.5 million more would arrive to resettle the
region. Unlike those of other postwar expulsions, this process was to be voluntary, with
property reallocation being managed by local national committees. The Czechoslovak gov-
ernment saw this as important for ensuring the elimination of perceived differences between
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the interior and borderlands, with the hope that confiscated land and property sold at low
rates would be sufficient to spur a rapid and full resettlement (Gerlach, 2017). Settlers
were to be made up solely of Czechs from nearby “interior” areas. However, as labor short-
ages ensued, policymakers recruited some Slovaks and others from abroad (Gerlach, 2017).
Resettlement began in 1945, concurrently with the expulsion.
Early on, resettlement fed back into expulsion, with Germans being kept around for
their labor until settlers began to arrive (Gerlach, 2017). Farmer-settlers were distributed
9-12 hectare lots at low rates (Korbel, 1959). Others were made property administrators
of confiscated factories and other businesses. As a result, towns with the most appealing
property, particularly those closest to the interior, were emptied and resettled most quickly
(Daneˇk, 1995).
1.3 The data
This section provides an overview of the district- and municipal-level dataset compiled for
this paper. It spans over 90 years and contains newly- and already-digitized data from
historical censuses, statistical journals, and demographic yearbooks.
Treatment variable
The main treatment variable in Section 1.4 (i.e. located in the borderlands, or former “Sude-
tenland”) is coded from two directories. As the primary source, I use Amtliches Deutsches
Ortsbuch fu¨r das Protektorat Bo¨hmen und Ma¨hren, published in 1940, which lists villages
not annexed by Nazi Germany in 1938 (i.e. in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, or
interior) by German and Czech name, regional council district (Oberlandratsbezirk) and sub-
district (Bezirk).7 As a supplementary source, I use Sudetendeutsches ortsnamenverzeichnis:
Amtliches Gemeinde- und Ortsnamenverzeichnis der nach dem Mu¨nchener Abkommen vom
7This list can be accessed at http://www.hartau.de/PBM/Protektorat.html.
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Figure 1.3: Munich Agreement line overlaying 2011 municipalities
29. 9. 1938, published in 1987, which lists villages in the annexed majority-German border-
lands alphabetically by German name, along with their Czech name and government district
(Regierungsbezirk).8 With the aid of GIS maps of the Protectorate by Jel´ınek (2011) and
15,070 modern sub-municipal villages (cˇa´sti obce), provided by the Czech Statistical Office
(CZSO) via its collaboration with the Czech Land Survey Office (ARCDATA PRAHA), I
create a precise “Munich Agreement line” (MAL) to measure the German “language border”
and sort modern villages into treatment or control groups (see Figure 1.3). I then aggre-
gate this assignment for administrative units as necessary, while noting cases in which they
overlap the MAL, and to what extent.
8This list can be accessed at http://www.sudeten-by.de/cms/userfiles/downloads/dokumente nicht-
loeschen/Ortsnamen.pdf.
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Census data
The first Czechoslovak population census was taken in 1921. Decadal censuses have been
held ever since except for during WWII. A smaller population index was also compiled for
the Czech lands in May 1947. The 1930 census contains information for 330 judicial districts
(soudn´ı okresy) and 151 political districts (politicky´ okresy) on ethnic composition, literacy,
and employment by sector. The 1947 index and 1950 census contain data on employment but
not literacy or education, with the number of political districts for the former increasing to
163, and judicial and political districts being consolidated in 1949 into 182 districts (okresy).
The latter also provides post-WWII data on ethnic composition in the Czech lands (see Table
1.1). From 1961 to 1991, censuses contain information on ethnic composition, educational
attainment, and employment by sector for 76 more-aggregated districts. For the 2001 and
2011 censuses, the number of districts increases to 77 and data are also provided for 6258
and 6251 municipalities (obce), respectively.
Most data from the 1930, 2001, and 2011 censuses are digitized or taken directly from
census files provided by the CZSO. All other district-level census data are made available by
the Urban and Regional Laboratory (URRlab) at Charles University in collaboration with the
Czech Ministry of Culture, along with corresponding GIS district shapefiles (2017) for each
census year. Other administrative boundary data are collected from ARCDATA PRAHA
(2017). To construct panels of district-level census data used in supplementary analysis, I
use ArcGIS to interpolate subpopulations for a common set of district boundaries. I use
1991 district boundaries, since districts were arguably at their highest level of aggregation
that year, minimizing error.9
Non-census data
Non-census outcome data come from a variety of sources. I construct 1933 variables using
data from two state statistical publications: Nezameˇstnanost a podp˚urna´ pe´cˇe v Cˇeskoslovensku,
9See Table A.14 in Appendix A for a description of this process.
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a social insurance report published in 1938, and Statistika daneˇ d˚uchodove´ placene´ prˇ´ımo,
daneˇ z vysˇsˇ´ıho sluzˇne´ho, daneˇ rentove´ placene´ prˇ´ımo, vsˇeobecne´ a zvla´sˇtn´ı daneˇ vy´deˇlkove´
podle prˇedpisu za rok 1933, a taxation report published in 1938. The former provides the
number of registered unemployed in each political district as reported by the Minister of
Social Affairs, while the latter lists income and the share of eligible taxpayers by political
district. These data are combined with data on the size of the labor force and population
from the 1930 census to estimate 1933 unemployment and income per capita, respectively.
I digitize non-census data from the post-expulsion period from several statistical reports
published from the mid-1940s. In particular, district-level data for arable land in 1945 and
school enrollment in 1947 are derived from the 1947 and 1948 editions of the state statistical
report, Zpra´vy sta´tn´ıho u´rˇadu statisticke´ho republiky Cˇeskoslovenske´, respectively. District-
level data on migration come from a series of demographic yearbooks, Pohyb obyvatelstva v
republice Cˇeskoslovenske´, made available by the CZSO. Crime data are provided by URRlab.
Data on the number of jobless by municipality in 2011 come from the Czech Ministry of Labor
and Social Affairs.
1.4 The regional economic impact of expulsion
After WWII, around 95% of Germans living in the Czech lands (i.e. the modern day Czech
Republic) were forced to permanently exit the country, leaving their homes and most prop-
erty behind. This section examines how this impacted the relative development of former-
German places over the long-run. Prior to the expulsion, those still identifying as German
within the Czech lands were concentrated in one region, often called the “borderlands” and
formerly the “Sudetenland”. Although German-speaking had for centuries been more promi-
nent in the corners of the Czech lands, historical developments associated with the rise of
nationalism resulted in this region becoming semi-formal by the 1920s, defined by a sharp
spatial discontinuity in German identification – a “language border” – in official statistics
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(see Figure 1.1). This boundary was formalized in 1938, when the Munich Agreement en-
abled the annexation of majority-German areas by Germany. This Munich Agreement line
(MAL) in turn approximates a place’s exposure to the expulsion in 1945 (see Table 1.1).
My identification strategy exploits the discontinuity in exposure to the expulsion at this
boundary in order to identify the local relative effects of the expulsion over the long-run. In
particular, I use a spatial regression discontinuity (RD) design, with the treatment variable
being a discrete function of a place’s location relative to the MAL. This strategy will help
control for potentially confounding factors, such as natural geography and other historical
shocks, to the extent that such factors vary smoothly through the MAL.
To do this, I assign a value of 1 to a municipality or district if it was on the majority-
German side of the MAL and thus annexed by Germany in 1938. A value of 0 is assigned
if it was located in the “interior” where few Germans lived. Consider the municipal-level
specification,
ymdb = α + βInBorderlandsm + f(locationm) + X
′
mΓ + Σb + ∆d + εmdb, (1.1)
where ymbd is the outcome variable for municipality m in district d along segment b of
the MAL; InBorderlandsm is a dummy for if a municipality m lies in the borderlands
where Germans lived;10 Xm is a vector of geographic characteristics, including elevation,
ruggedness, temperature, precipitation, and river density (km per km2); and ∆d captures
district fixed effects. Σb gives the set of border segment fixed effects, denoting to which of the
fifty segments, each roughly 50 km in length, a municipality is nearest. Finally, f(locationm)
is the running variable, capturing all other characteristics that vary smoothly through the
MAL. For the main specifications, I use a municipality’s centroid distance from the MAL,
interacted with the treatment. I explain this choice below. For main 2011 specifications, I
1094 municipalities for which only some parts were annexed are dropped. I define treated as > 95% area
annexed. All specifications and plots exclude those which otherwise overlap the MAL. For 1930-47 analyses,
where units are larger such that more area is dropped, results are robust to including units that overlap the
MAL but were nonetheless homogeneously German (i.e. treated in spite of overlap) or non-German – about
half of units dropped – as shown in Tables A.6 and A.19.
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Table 1.1: Exposure to expulsion
Region (subsample) % German, 1930 % German, 1950
Borderlands (within 25 km of MAL, no overlap) 81.78 4.439
(2.276) (.597)
Interior (within 25 km of MAL, no overlap) 1.601 .495
(.396) (.047)
Borderlands (no bandwidth, no overlap) 86.67 6.821
(1.646) (1.184)
Interior (no bandwidth, no overlap) 1.646 .464
(.418) (.036)
Borderlands (full sample) 80.874 5.36
(1.904) (.808)
Interior (full sample) 3.545 .569
(.544) (.042)
Unit of measure for 1930 is 330 judicial districts. Unit of measure for 1950 is 182 districts. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. A district is considered to be in the borderlands (interior) if 50% or more of its area lies inside (outside) the lands
annexed by Germany in 1938, as determined by the Munich Agreement line (MAL). The full sample includes districts that
overlap the MAL. A district is classified as “no overlap” if >95% of its area lies on one side of the MAL or the other. A district
is classified as “within 25 km” if its centroid lies within 25 km of the MAL. As Prague and Polish Zaolzie are always excluded
from the analysis, I exclude them here as well.
cluster standard errors by the 71 districts in the final sample.
For 20th century outcomes, for which municipal-level data are not available, district fixed
effects are omitted and geographic controls are calculated at the district-level. Depending
on the number and size of districts, border segments are also lengthened and the number of
them decreases. Most pre-1950 data are available for judicial districts. For those regressions,
I control for 24 border segments, each about 100 km in length, and cluster standard errors by
political districts, of which 98 remain in the final sample for main specifications. Some 1933
and 1947 data are available only for the larger political districts.11 For those specifications, I
control for 16 border segments, around 150 km in length, and report robust standard errors.
Balance testing
Historians have noted how, following centuries of admixture and common rule, there were few
occupational or social differences between Germans and Czechs even in the early 1900s, and
the historical developments that gave rise to the MAL and eventual expulsion were ultimately
rooted in national rather than economic considerations (Zahra, 2008). Thus, adopting an
11Due to a higher level of aggregation, the sample underrepresents southern (i.e. non-Eastern Bloc-
bordering) areas. I show in Section 1.5 that long-run effects are independent of this.
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Table 1.2: Pre-expulsion economic differences between regions
%German Literacy
ln Pop.
density
ln Labor
force dens.
Labor
force part.
Unemploy.
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
In borderlands 67.968 -.222 -.318 -.329 -.400 -3.936
(6.042)∗∗∗ (.217) (.208) (.227) (1.196) (2.535)
R2 .933 .533 .475 .482 .623 .69
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 104
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98 –
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 16
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 50 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1933
Incomepc %Taxpayers
Convictspc
1923-27
%Roma
%Jewish
(ethnic)
%Jewish
(faith)
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
In borderlands -1.866 .006 -.454 -.002 -.113 -.086
(1.832) (.604) (.683) (.002) (.140) (.274)
R2 .409 .562 .361 .1 .324 .232
Observations 104 105 164 165 165 165
Clusters – – 98 98 98 98
Border segments 16 16 24 24 24 24
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 50 km 50 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1933 1933 1923-27 1930 1930 1930
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. Standard errors in specifications with political districts are heteroskedasticity-robust. All regressions exclude
Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density
(km per km2), and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the
treatment.
RD approach here should theoretically identify the local relative effects of the expulsion,
absent differences in factors like geography and human capital, which commonly distinguish
different ethnic groups and might therefore drive effects in other settings or under alternative
empirical strategies. Nonetheless, it is important to check that the ethnolinguistic differences
for which the MAL was drawn (and the drawing of the MAL itself) were not associated prior
to 1945 with differences in factors relevant for economic performance.
To test whether ethnic differences were correlated with other distinctions locally, I esti-
mate differences for 24 pre-treatment outcomes. Estimates can be found in Tables 1.2 and
1.3.12 Column (1a) of Table 1.2 confirms that traversing the MAL was associated with an
increase of about 68 percentage points in the German population in 1930. However, this
12See Appendix A for RD plots of all regressions, using a linear polynomial in distance from the Munich
Agreement line and 50 km as the bandwidth, as well as geographic heatmaps for sectors (in addition to
Figure 1.8).
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Table 1.3: Pre-expulsion sectoral differences between regions
Agricultural
sector
Mining and
extraction
Metals Manufacturing Glass Textiles
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
In borderlands 2.915 -1.150 .455 -.421 1.065 -3.311
(3.649) (1.698) (1.458) (.561) (1.681) (2.534)
R2 .526 .376 .313 .298 .338 .634
Other
industry
Con-
struction
Transport
sector
Finance and
insurance
Trade
Other
service
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e) (3f)
In borderlands .102 .500 -.457 -.110 -.534 -.355
(1.429) (.719) (.665) (.094) (.796) (.927)
R2 .315 .332 .318 .258 .377 .209
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98 98
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 24
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness,
precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km2), and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the
Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment.
does not coincide with statistically significant discontinuities in other factors at the MAL.
This is true even for mining, glassworks, and textile manufacturing, for which German labor
was considered to be highly important on the whole. These findings are robust to changes
in RD bandwidth and running polynomial, as shown in Table A.4 in Appendix A. In Fig-
ure 1.4, I show similar patterns for elevation, ruggedness, temperature, and precipitation.13
With the exception of ruggedness, geographic differences appear smooth through the MAL.
To check smoothness for ruggedness, I report sample means at various bandwidths in Table
A.2. Long-run results are also robust to excluding mountainous regions entirely.
The historical literature also downplays local differences in institutions. Even as na-
tional identification became more common and geographically salient after WWI, individual
Czechoslovak citizens retained equal rights in the eyes of the state, including education and
basic healthcare (Bryant, 2002; Tampke, 2003). Minority group rights were weaker, yet still
liberal relative to the country’s peers, with facilities provided for German-language educa-
tional and legal activities in sufficiently German (i.e. > 20%) areas and a role for German
13See Figure A.3 for the same plots for river density and arable land in 1945.
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Figure 1.4: Smoothness of geography around Munich Agreement line
politicians in parliamentary politics (Tampke, 2003; Zahra, 2008). This relative egalitarian-
ism is apparent in the borderlands’ and interior’s similar economic and taxation statuses,
as shown above. Overall, historians recognize the widespread similarities of Germans and
Czechs in the Czech lands after centuries of coexistence – as did the Nazis (Bryant, 2007).
WWII, borderland Czechs, and pre-treatment sorting
The same nationalism that motivated the expulsion of the Germans had also inspired the
annexation of the borderlands and the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany years
prior. Yet one concern is that such events and others associated with them may have
differentially affected borderland areas near the MAL. Indeed, a major limitation to studying
this era is the lack of data from during World War II. I address these concerns here.
Following annexation, the remainder of the Czech lands was quickly occupied by Nazi
Germany until 1945. The Czech government was exiled and preferential treatment of the
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Czech regions by the Nazis during the war would have favored the borderlands, biasing esti-
mates toward zero. That being said, the Czech lands experienced little physical destruction
during the war.14 There were also few acts of resistance by Czechs. The Czech lands held a
large and important industrial workforce, and Nazi officials came to see much of the Czech
masses as “Germanizable” due to a cultural and genetic closeness forged by centuries of
coexistence. Thus, life in the Czech interior continued largely as normal, avoiding much of
the violence experienced by Yugoslavia and Poland (Agnew, 2004; Bryant, 2007; Glassheim,
2016). Economic life in the borderlands also changed little, at the displeasure of some bor-
derland Germans, who had sought greater integration into German economy and society. In
all, “Czechoslovakia emerged from the war with much of its industrial base intact” (Gerlach,
2017, 208). Differences in wartime deaths are more difficult to discern. Historical accounts
suggest the borderlands suffered somewhat more in terms of war casualties than interior
areas, due to conscription of some Sudeten Germans. However, these estimates would have
been driven up by casualty counts from the violent liberation of Czechoslovakia in May of
1945, which also marked the beginning of the expulsions. And although Jews and Roma
were also expelled from and murdered in the Czech lands during this time, these groups
were distributed uniformly through the MAL, as shown in Table 1.2. Thus, pre-expulsion
differences in casualty rates between the regions were likely small on net.15
To further quell concerns that the effects presented below reflect anything other than the
expulsion, I also estimate pre-trends in Table A.5 in Appendix A using data from the 1921
census. With the exception of literacy, which increased slightly in the borderlands relative
to the interior between 1921 and 1930, there are no statistically significant differences in
pre-trends in my data. To the extent that this implies stability in the relative development
trajectories and population patterns of both regions leading up to the war, this also helps
further minimize concerns that they might have diverged significantly during the war.
That being said, one thing that could have disturbed pre-trends involves the presence
14See Figure A.2 for a map of confirmed Allied bombings during WWII.
15See Table A.3 for more details on estimates.
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of Czechs in various parts of the borderlands. Unlike the interior, which by 1930 was strik-
ingly homogeneous (at least officially), some parts of the borderlands were more ethnically
mixed, especially near the MAL. Related to this was pre-treatment sorting among Czechs,
which according to historians occurred following Czechoslovak independence in 1918 – first
by interior Czechs immigrating to some borderland cities; then by 300,000 of the 730,000
borderland Czechs into the interior during the war; and finally by nearly all of those Czechs
back into the borderlands after the war (Cornwall, 1994; Agnew, 2004; Glassheim, 2016).
Even absent pre-treatment sorting concerns, the presence of borderland Czechs renders
the cross-sectional balance tests above potentially problematic, as cross-region differences are
not as such perfectly informative of cross-ethnicity differences. For example, if Czechs near
the MAL were in fact less skilled than Germans, then it could bias balance tests toward zero.
In this case there would be relatively smooth estimates, while in actuality the expulsion of the
borderlands’ Germans would have interacted with crucial, preexisting distinctions between
the regions and their residents. In such a scenario, persistent effects would be less surprising
(Acemoglu et al, 2011).
Since I cannot compare Czechs and Germans directly, I must rely on heterogeneity in the
ethnic composition of the borderlands prior to the expulsion to better compare Czechs and
Germans across regions. In particular, I reexamine the balance tests above using a sample of
“concrete” stretches of the MAL, in which I compare only homogeneous parts of the interior
with nearby, homogeneous parts of the borderlands with few borderland Czechs (as well as
less pre-treatment sorting, in turn). In Table A.9 in Appendix A, I show that while this
increases the size of the ethnic discontinuity to 86 percentage points, estimates regarding
relative literacy, population density, and sector composition change little. Only eligible
taxpayers shows a statistically significant change associated with crossing the MAL, with
an increase of about 1.6 eligible taxpayers per 100 persons from entering the borderlands.16
This exercise helps reaffirm the historical narrative and assumption that spatial variation in
16Relative pre-trends also remain largely unchanged if I examine only the concrete sample, as do long-run
outcomes if I adopt the same concrete stretches. These results are available upon request.
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ethnic composition was not associated with differences in relevant factors in the pre-expulsion
Czech lands, at least near the MAL.17
In contrast, post-treatment sorting is a natural channel of persistence in many spatial
RD settings (Dell, 2010). Indeed, it will be an important channel here, since expulsion in
the borderlands necessitated resettlement from interior areas.
Controlling for smooth differences
Despite the smoothness of relevant variables through the MAL, identification is still threat-
ened if the running variable f(locationm) does not adequately control for these smooth
differences. To deal with this, many spatial RD designs limit the sample to a narrow band-
width around the border of interest. If imposing a narrow bandwidth is feasible given the
sample, then a linear polynomial is likely to be a reasonable control (Gelman and Imbens,
2018). Fortunately, the region of study in this case is quite small, and all samples are easily
limited to within 50 km or less of the MAL. For most specifications I adopt the standard
bandwidth of 25 km.18
A related concern is choice of running variable. A common choice in spatial RD settings
is a two dimensional linear polynomial in longitude and latitude. This would vary smoothly
through the MAL while controlling for local characteristics. However, it would not allow such
differences to vary with treatment status, which could bias estimates. A second common
choice is distance from the border of interest. Here, an interaction term lets smooth differ-
ences vary in slope on either side of the MAL, with the treatment effect being evaluated at
the MAL. Although being x km from the MAL could mean something different in southern
Bohemia versus northern Moravia, border segment dummies and other controls should deal
with any heterogeneity. I thus opt for the latter in all main specifications. In Appendix A,
however, I test alternative specifications, including using local linear polynomials in latitude
17And in addition to the kinds of pre-treatment sorting discussed above, this exercise also reaffirms that
the kind in which Germans “switched” to Czech also would not have mattered.
18Increments of 25 km are standard in the prior literature. Output from optimal bandwidth algorithms
varies with outcome but tends near this for municipal- or judicial district-level specifications.
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Table 1.4: Long-run differences in economic activity, 2011
ln Population
density
ln Labor force
density
Unemployment
(1a) (1b) (1c)
In borderlands -.312 -.317 2.729
(.095)∗∗∗ (.097)∗∗∗ (.546)∗∗∗
R2 .398 .399 .404
Observations 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71
Border segments 50 50 50
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipi-
tation, temperature, and river density (km per km2), and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich
Agreement line interacted with the treatment.
and longitude. These estimates vary somewhat in size but are substantively similar.
1.4.1 Long-run effects
I will now provide evidence that the expulsion of the Germans from the Czech borderlands
(i.e. the former “Sudetenland”) had long-lasting effects on the spatial distribution of eco-
nomic activity within the Czech lands. I will focus on two types of outcomes: (i) the intensity
of economic activity, as measured by population and employment, and (ii) the composition
of economic activity, as measured by variables like education and occupation.
Prior to the expulsion of the Germans, borderland areas were as educated and prosperous
as their adjacent “interior” neighbors. If the determinants of economic activity are invariant
to the expulsion, then we should see interior Czechs spilling over into relatively similar,
nearby borderland areas in smooth ways thereafter. Instead, borderland municipalities today
show discontinuous signs of marked economic decline relative to interior towns just a few
miles away. As of 2011, population and employment were relatively more concentrated in
the interior, as shown in columns (1a) and (1b) of Table 1.4.
Moreover, borderland towns have seen some of the highest unemployment rates since
transition within the Czech Republic, which has relatively low unemployment overall. Col-
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Table 1.5: Long-run differences in sectoral composition, 2011
Agricultural
sector
Industry
Con-
struction
Transport
sector
Finance and
insurance
Hospitality
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
In borderlands -.573 -.621 -.447 -.117 -.369 .365
(.433) (.860) (.267)∗ (.248) (.080)∗∗∗ (.280)
R2 .303 .34 .155 .19 .134 .339
Auto trade
and repair
Public
Commun-
ications
Education Healthcare
Other
service
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
In borderlands -.864 .001 -.297 -.864 -.993 -.219
(.282)∗∗∗ (.274) (.089)∗∗∗ (.176)∗∗∗ (.230)∗∗∗ (.166)
R2 .201 .125 .204 .085 .139 .214
Observations 4049 4049 4049 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71 71
Border segments 50 50 50 50 50 50
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipi-
tation, temperature, and river density (km per km2), and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich
Agreement line interacted with the treatment.
umn (1c) shows that simply traversing the MAL is associated with almost a 3% absolute
increase in the municipal unemployment rate as of 2011. This illustrates the extent to which
production remains less likely to locate in the borderlands, seven decades after the expulsion
and over two decades since transition, with low internal migration helping keep rates high
(Fidrmuc, 2004; Fidrmuc and Huber, 2007).19
Table 1.5 suggests that this is due to an inability of borderland towns to develop skill-
intensive service sectors. The borderlands shows significantly less employment on average
in finance, education, healthcare, communications, and the auto sector relative to nearby
interior areas.
This also suggests a lower concentration of skill in borderland areas in 2011 relative to
neighboring interior towns. If true, one would expect borderland municipalities around the
MAL to have lower levels of educational attainment than those in the nearby interior. The
next set of estimates in this section, in Table 1.6, show this to be the case. The results are
19For more on migration, see Table A.21 in Appendix A.
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Table 1.6: Long-run differences in educational attainment, 2011
% Primary
education or less
% Secondary
education
% Tertiary
education
(1a) (1b) (1c)
In borderlands 4.883 -3.923 -1.936
(.634)∗∗∗ (.516)∗∗∗ (.391)∗∗∗
R2 .297 .199 .271
Observations 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71
Border segments 50 50 50
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipi-
tation, temperature, and river density (km per km2), and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich
Agreement line interacted with the treatment.
striking: even with a sample bandwidth of just 25 kilometers, there is an absolute increase of
over 4.8% of the adult (i.e. age 15 or over) population claiming to have completed no more
than a primary education from an average interior municipality to a borderland one. This
is matched by an absolute decrease of over 3.9% in secondary schooling completion from
crossing the MAL and a 1.9% decrease in tertiary education, such as a college degree.
One concern is that despite the smoothness of geographic characteristics through the
MAL, borderland and interior municipalities in the sample still have too many geographic
differences for which to adequately control, as Figure 1.4 might imply. One solution is to
limit the sample to areas around the MAL that are more geographically homogeneous (i.e.
less mountainous). As it turns out, the results do not change if one excludes the mountainous
sections of the borderlands from the sample, suggesting geography is not driving the results
in the main specification. Results are also robust to numerous changes to bandwidth and
RD polynomial (see Tables A.10-12).
I have used this section to show that the expulsion of the Germans generated a persistent,
discontinuous spatial divergence in local development within the Czech lands. Whereas the
spatial distribution of economic activity was relatively smooth through the Munich Agree-
ment line prior to WWII, productive economic activity is now relatively more concentrated
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Figure 1.5: Economic activity around the Munich Agreement line, 2011
on the interior side. In the next section, I will explore the precise channels through which
the expulsion resulted in this divergence.
1.5 Short-run effects and mechanisms
The previous section documented an unevenness in economic activity present within the
Czech lands, nearly 70 years after the German population was expelled from its borderlands,
i.e. the former “Sudetenland”. This section investigates the origins of these patterns. Since
no such unevenness existed prior to the expulsion, I begin by examining the intensity and
composition of economic activity of those who voluntarily resettled the borderlands from
nearby interior areas immediately following the commencement of the expulsion, relative to
those who did not. Indeed, the expulsion’s impact on the borderlands’ relative development
depended on it being resettled in a quick and convergent manner. Because the expulsion
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was near-absolute (i.e about 95% of Germans), I can use data from after the expulsion and
the borderlands’ initial resettlement had largely concluded in mid-1947 to compare these
populations.20 This will also allow me to examine whether or not key structural changes had
already occurred prior to the communist coup of 1948.
In this section, I show that the expulsion was instead followed by a (i) selective initial re-
settlement, with relatively few workers arriving from sectors like transportation and business
relative to agriculture. This culminated in a relative (ii) de-urbanization of former-German
areas and the emergence of (iii) human capital inequalities between the regions thereafter.
Using a combination of data and historical evidence, I then propose and discuss two mecha-
nisms underlying these short-run effects. First, I argue that large population losses interacted
with agglomeration economies, decreasing the expected relative return to moving to affected
borderland towns for workers in more urban sectors. Second, the expulsion engendered an
extractive institutional environment in the borderlands, which helped crowd out production
there in the short-run. This analysis focuses on the immediate post-expulsion period, during
which the Czechoslovak economy remained generally unplanned, although I also occasionally
discuss patterns of local development during the communist period and following transition
to a market economy in 1989.
1.5.1 Selective resettlement
The economic future of the borderlands depended foremost on the German population being
replaced by settlers of similar count and composition. The stated goal of resettlement was
that it be geographically convergent: since the expulsion “would reduce the Czechoslovakia
population by 25%, the borderlands would only be resettled up to 75% of [its] original
population,” preserving prewar relative densities while creating one homogeneous nation
(Radvanovsky´, 2001, 203). This was to be done quickly and concurrently with the expulsion,
20The historical literature indicates that the 5% or so remaining were disproportionately skilled workers
initially kept out of necessary and later dispersed throughout the country in the 1950s. This may downward
bias 1947 estimates slightly.
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with the goal of maintaining the region’s output (Glassheim, 2016). It was also to be
carried out on a voluntary basis. Policymakers utilized propaganda and incentives, with
local committees transferring confiscated farmland, businesses, and other assets to settlers
at low rates. If settlers selected into more appealing locales first, committees would direct
surplus settlers elsewhere (Radvanovsky´, 2001). Besides these interventions, worker and
firm-level decisions remained unplanned until the communist coup of 1948 (Berna`sˇek, 1970).
Under such circumstances, the theoretical migratory response to the expulsion is am-
biguous, at least in the neighborhood of the MAL, around which differences in fundamentals
and economic activity were smooth ex ante. Indeed, one might expect this to have made the
borderlands an attractive place in which to settle and invest, inducing Czechs from nearby
interior areas to move to the borderlands in a relatively smooth manner. And as it turns out,
the expulsion was indeed met with a large-scale migratory response, beginning in mid-1945
through the first half of 1947, with the vast majority of settlers arriving from nearby interior
areas (Radvanovsky´, 2001; Gerlach, 2017; see Figure 1.6).
However, this initial resettlement was selective in nature. One way to examine this is
to compare population losses endured by the interior (i.e. to the voluntary resettling of
the borderlands) with those of nearby, similar borderland areas (i.e. from the expulsion net
of resettlement) within each sector. Since contiguous borderland and interior districts had
similar densities, compositions, and relevant pre-trends on average prior to WWII, with few
shocks of permanence or scale during the war, the convergent migratory response envisioned
by policymakers would have required that these losses be similar for each sector by the time
expulsion and the borderlands’ initial resettlement had wound down in mid-1947, relative to
pre-expulsion levels. If instead there was differential resettlement across sectors, it could in
turn have generated the emergence of the patterns we see today.
I begin by constructing an outcome variable to measure population losses in each judicial
district d for each sector s between the 1930 census and mid-1947 index:
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Figure 1.6: Sources of immigration to Northern Bohemia, 1945-7 (von Arburg, 2001)
PopLossd,s =
Popd,s,1947 − Popd,s,1930
Popd,s,1930
.
I then examine population dynamics visually by plotting PopLossd,s overall and by sector
(with observations binned for every 6 km) by distance from the MAL. Figure 1.7 shows
that while interior areas did endure significant population losses to nearby borderland areas
during the main period of resettlement (see Figure 1.6), borderland districts near the MAL
on average lost much more than the anticipated 25% of their populations on net, while
interior districts on average lost less. Net population losses in the borderlands continue to
increase as one moves away from the MAL, whereas interior losses decrease.
This lack of short-run convergence has its origins in the sectoral distribution of settlers.
Namely, differences in worker losses around the MAL were relatively small for agriculture and
large for the other, more “urban” sectors.21 This is consistent with the historical narrative
21Although it is worth noting that the secondary sector includes the relatively small construction sector,
which was more prevalent in less populated, developing areas in 1930, as discussed below.
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Figure 1.7: Sectoral change around the Munich Agreement line, 1930-47
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that settlers were disproportionately unskilled farmers, with settlement initiatives struggling
to attract skilled workers while interior areas suffered shortages in agricultural labor (Rad-
vanovsky´, 2001; Gerlach, 2017). Nevertheless, there tends to be fewer differences in net
losses between regions (i.e. greater convergence) as one approaches the MAL, around which
most migration from the interior to the borderlands had occurred as of mid-1947.22 Overall,
this exercise provides insight into the origins of the divergence found above.23 I will now
show how these migratory patterns altered the sectoral structure of the borderlands as early
as May 1947, culminating in the de-urbanization of the region we still see today.
1.5.2 De-urbanization
To see how selection in the borderlands’ initial resettlement altered its relative urban devel-
opment in the post-expulsion period, I apply the RD approach above to examining differences
between outcomes in 1930, prior to the expulsion, and outcomes in mid-1947, after the near-
total expulsion and the borderlands’ initial resettlement had wound down. In particular, I
adopt a “local” difference-in-differences (DD) model,
ydbt = α + βInBorderlandsd ×Y1947 + f(locationdt) + X′dΓt +Yt + Σbt + ∆d + εdbt,
which is equivalent to differencing (1.1) across years t, indicated by the dummy Yt, using
time-invariant district fixed effects ∆d while allowing the effects of the running variable
f(locationdt), border segments Σbt, and natural geography Xd to vary over time. This
estimates the effect of being just in the borderlands in mid-1947 relative to the same effect
in 1930. As before, I adopt a linear interacted polynomial in distance from the MAL and
a default bandwidth of 25 km, with robustness for all short-run outcomes in Table A.18 in
Appendix A.
22While it is possible that more settlers coming from abroad or Slovakia were of those sectors, these made
up only a very small fraction of settlers and would only have made the borderlands’ relative declines appear
smaller.
23For the RD estimates, see Table A.13 in Appendix A.
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The first estimate of interest can be found in column (1) of Table 1.7 and shows that
whereas differences in population density between the regions were statistically smooth and
stable over time prior to the expulsion, population density became relatively lower in the
borderlands after the expulsion and remained as such following the large-scale resettlement
discussed above – even in the most easily accessible areas near the MAL. This is consistent
with the historical literature, in which only 1.3 million settlers had arrived and remained by
mid-1947, largely from nearby interior areas (Daneˇk, 1995; Gerlach, 2017). In combination
with Czechs living in the borderlands pre-1938, its population was still below two thirds of
its prior size. A more “global” DD analysis covering the entire period from 1921 to 2011
shows that such differences persisted on the whole throughout the communist period (see
Table A.14). Moreover, they have actually grown since liberalization in 1989, suggesting that
state investments under central planning may have cushioned the borderlands somewhat.
This suggests that the expulsion of the Germans triggered a de-urbanization of the bor-
derlands. To explore this further, I consider a second important dimension of urban de-
velopment: sectoral structure. Columns (2a-d) in Table 1.7 show a structural shift toward
agriculture occurring alongside declines in density by the time expulsion and resettlement
had concluded in mid-1947, in spite of a previous lack of differences and parallel pre-trends.
And though all major sectors shrunk, the sector which bears the largest and only statis-
tically significant relative loss is the business sector – i.e. finance, insurance, trade, and
other commerce – which was highly important in northern Bohemia in 1930, including in
the borderlands (see Figure 1.8).
Once again, the same patterns can also be seen “globally” in a panel covering 1921 to
2011 (see Table A.15). This shows an immediate and persistent shift toward agriculture
relative to 1930 differences, with differences growing alongside a continued relative loss of
industrial workers after 1950. This reflects how, after resettlement wound down in the late
1940s, migration out of the borderlands occurred by many skilled workers as “administrative
conflicts, a lack of suitable settlers, labor shortages, and property squabbles” beset them
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Table 1.7: De-urbanization around the Munich Agreement line, 1930-47
ln Population
density
Agricultural
sector
Secondary
sector
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(1) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
∆‘47−‘30In borderlands -.190 4.046 -.311 -.221 -1.306
(.048)∗∗∗ (1.868)∗∗ (1.810) (.400) (.515)∗∗
R2 .919 .59 .76 .673 .635
Observations 330 330 330 330 330
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98
Border segments×1947 24 24 24 24 24
Geographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1930-47 1930-47 1930-47 1930-47 1930-47
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness,
precipitation, temperature, and river density (km per km2) interacted with year, and utilize a local linear running variable of
distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment and year.
(Gerlach, 2017, 14).24 Meanwhile, service sector differences have widened even more since
transition to a market economy, when state investments in steel, coal, heavy weapons, and
other industries were reduced and their labor forces transitioned into sectors like banking
and the auto industry (Illner and Andrle, 1994). This mirrors the findings in Table 1.5,
in which borderland municipalities in 2011 had lower employment shares in skill-intensive
service-based sectors.25 Hence, the data show that the expulsion of the Germans generated
an immediate urban divergence within in the Czech lands, at the expense of the former
Sudetenland, which persists long after the conclusion of intervening shocks.
1.5.3 Regional human capital inequalities
Recall that there was little difference on average in literacy between districts around the
MAL prior to the expulsion of the Germans. However, compositional changes associated
with weak and selective migration into the post-expulsion borderlands as well as its subse-
quent de-urbanization may have generated differences in human capital between the regions,
24See Figure A.6 for a heatmap of out-migration by 1950 districts.
25In contrast, agriculture has tended to remain dispersed smoothly through the MAL over time, despite
still being relatively more prominent in the borderlands “globally” as shown in Table A.15.
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Table 1.8: Short-run educational effects, mid-1947
Primary & lower secondary Upper secondary Tertiary
Enrollment,
general5-14
Enrollment,
civic10-14
Enrollment,
agricultural15-19
Enrollment,
vocational15-19
Enrollment,
college15-24
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3)
In borderlands 5.651 -8.204 7.174 -12.980 -2.926
(.967)∗∗∗ (2.661)∗∗∗ (1.817)∗∗∗ (5.15)∗∗ (.449)∗∗∗
R2 .867 .589 .485 .241 .734
Observations 115 115 115 115 115
Border segs. 16 16 16 16 16
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km
Year 1947 1947 1947 1947 1947
Robust standard errors reported in brackets, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation,
temperature, and river density (km per km2), and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement
line interacted with the treatment.
making it relatively more concentrated in the interior. This in turn could have fed back into
de-urbanization (Moretti, 2004), generating further structural change as well as persistent
human capital inequalities between the regions. Such a pattern would be consistent with the
historical narrative that settlers were relatively unskilled (Radvanovsky´, 2001; Glassheim,
2016), as well as the finding that the borderlands is a less educated region today.
While no data exist on educational attainment for the Czech lands between 1930 and
1961, some evidence that the borderlands had lower human capital post-resettlement can be
found by examining regional school enrollment patterns in mid-1947, after the main waves of
expulsion and resettlement had wound down. Until the communist coup in 1948, Czechoslo-
vakia had 8 years of compulsory education. For primary education, children attended a
general school (obecna´ sˇkola) for 5 years. Following this, one could either complete his or her
education with 3 more years at a general school or pursue a more advanced lower secondary
education. Commonly, this entailed attending a civic school (meˇsˇt’anska´ sˇkola) for 3 years.
Civic schooling in turn was a prerequisite for subsequent upper secondary (e.g. vocational)
education.26
Upon examining differences in school enrollment in mid-1947 between the post-expulsion,
post-resettlement borderlands and nearby interior areas, I find that rates of enrollment in
26For more, see Greger et al (2012) and https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/download/120238971.
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general schools among the relevant age group were significantly higher in the former relative
to the latter. Given that all primary school-age children were enrolled in general schools
regardless of region, this had to have been driven by differences at the lower secondary level
– namely, a greater share of 10-14 year olds in the borderlands forgoing civic schooling in favor
of the terminal general school track. Consistent with this, I find that civil school enrollment
rates among 10-14 year olds were significantly lower in the borderlands in mid-1947 relative
to those of nearby interior areas. These RD results can be found in Table 1.8.
This also means that there would have been relatively fewer students in the borderlands
going on to pursue upper secondary and tertiary education. Indeed, column (3) confirms
lower rates of college enrollment in the borderlands relative to the interior in mid-1947.
Yet there may also have been differences in the types of schooling being pursued among
those who did. To test this, I examine data from mid-1947 on enrollment for two common
types of upper secondary schools: basic vocational schools (za´kladn´ı odborna´ sˇkola) and
agricultural folk schools (lidova´ sˇkola zemeˇdeˇlska´). The former provided education specific
to a variety of trades, while the latter were meant specifically for those going into agriculture
and horticulture.
In examining these, I observe another striking trend, which mirrors the structural changes
observed above. Namely, while basic vocational schooling was significantly less popular
among those living in the borderlands in mid-1947 relative to those in nearby interior areas,
enrollment in agricultural folk schools was actually somewhat higher. This suggests that
even among those in the borderlands who did go on to pursue advanced education, there
was a tendency to invest in agricultural skills over other, more technical skills.
Overall, these findings are consistent with a demand-side explanation, in which those
who selected into the borderlands after the expulsion of 3 million Germans had less demand
for advanced and technical education, relative to those who stayed in nearby interior areas.
Further evidence for this can be found in Appendix A. Table A.16 shows that, contrary to a
supply-side argument, lower rates of civic and basic vocational schooling in the borderlands
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did not correspond to relative shortages in the number of schools or teachers per pupil. On
the contrary, there appears to be a greater teacher-pupil ratio in the borderlands for basic
vocational schools.
Hence, despite Germans and Czechs previously having similar levels of education, the
expulsion of the Germans generated a loss of human capital in former-German areas begin-
ning with compositional changes they endured during their resettlement. That being said,
the exact source of this decline in demand is harder to discern. In particular, it is difficult
to differentiate between this being driven by (i) a lack of skilled workers selecting into the
borderlands and (ii) relatively fewer incentives to become skilled in the post-expulsion bor-
derlands due to the relative lack of skill-intensive sectors there. More than likely there is a
circular feedback between the two, with de-urbanization feeding into both and vice versa.27
1.5.4 Discussion of mechanisms
This section has established that the long-run differences observed around the Munich Agree-
ment line (MAL) today can be traced back to the initial migratory responses to the expulsion,
which culminated in the de-urbanization and subsequent human capital decline of the former
“Sudetenland”. But why did the expulsion produce this response rather than the convergent
one anticipated by policymakers? The setting here rules out some of the typical explana-
tions, such as that Germans were too difficult to replace from a labor or skill standpoint; that
they lived in geographically distinct places; that there was excessive destruction of physical
capital; or that there was selection as to the types of Germans being expelled.
Indeed, the answer to this is not obvious in theory, at least in the neighborhood of
the MAL around which differences in fundamentals and economic activity were historically
smooth. For instance, one might expect the cheap land and capital made available by the
expulsion to have made the borderlands an attractive place in which to settle and invest,
inducing Czechs from nearby interior areas to spill over into borderland areas in relatively
27Long-run trends show that these enrollment differences indeed correspond to a structural change which
persists to today. See Table A.17.
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Figure 1.8: Population density, agriculture, business, industry heatmaps (clockwise), 1930
smooth ways. Instead, fewer settlers arrived to resettle the borderlands than remained in
unaffected interior areas. Some settlers even returned to the interior, having not found the
economic opportunity they sought. And those who did stick around were seemingly less
skilled than those who did not.
I now discuss two possible forces through which the expulsion resulted in differences in
economic activity around the MAL, rather than the spatial convergence initially envisioned
by policymakers: (i) agglomeration economies and (ii) extractive institutions. These forces
may or may not be complementary, and there may also be others, although I will argue that
they are sufficient.28
First, the expulsion of the Germans served as a very large, negative shock to the bor-
derlands’ population, relative to nearby interior areas in which few Germans lived. In the
28See Testa (2019) for theory and discussion of these forces and their interactions.
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presence of agglomeration economies, this would have generated a massive spatial coordina-
tion problem among the remaining population, potentially decreasing the expected relative
return to moving to affected borderland towns for workers in urban sectors in the short-
run (Bosker et al, 2007; Murard and Sakalli, 2018). This would in turn have inhibited the
convergent resettlement envisioned by policymakers, helping lock in the de-urbanization of
borderland areas over the longer-run (Krugman, 1991; Schumann, 2014).
Indeed, data from the 1930s suggest the presence of strong agglomeration economies
throughout the Czech lands prior to the expulsion. Table A.20 in Appendix A shows that
population density was strongly and positively correlated with income as well as employment
in overall industry, transport, and business, and negatively with employment in agriculture
and construction, with magnitudes independent of region. Figure 1.8 also shows a signifi-
cant degree of localization along sector lines in 1930, with industry featuring prominently
in Northern Moravia and business in Northern Bohemia, which would have been severely
disrupted by the expulsion.29
As it turns out, the sectors most associated with density were the ones most negatively
selected against during the borderlands’ initial resettlement, as shown above. Importantly,
these patterns first emerged prior to the communist coup of 1948. And while it is difficult
to know how they might have evolved over the subsequent four decades in the absence of
central planning, there exists evidence that agglomeration economies continue to matter in
the post-transition period. Since 1991, net-migration into the borderlands on the whole
has declined, causing overall differences in population density between the borderlands and
interior to increase (see Table A.14 and A.21). And around the MAL, differences in relevant
variables remain remarkably stable since transition, as discussed later.
That being said, the political economy of forced migration cannot be ignored. Indeed,
the expulsion also had important implications for the institutional environment within the
borderlands: when the Czechoslovak government formally sanctioned the expulsions, it ex-
29See Figure A.8 for more heatmaps and discussion.
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propriated nearly all of Germans’ property. While confiscated property was intended to be
sold and transferred to incoming settlers, in the interim this vacuum of property rights was
often exploited by local authorities, as well as appropriative Czechs called “gold-diggers”
(zlatokopove´), who saw the borderlands not as a place in which to settle but as a free lunch.
Historians have written extensively on how this helped crowd out the reemergence of pro-
duction in the borderlands and left it with a “Wild West”-like character. As a result, the
borderlands often failed to attract or retain productive workers, which in turn fed into the
concentration of economic activity in interior areas (Radvanovsky´, 2001; Glassheim, 2016;
Gerlach, 2017). Hence, the extractive institutions that enabled the expulsion also aﬄicted
the borderlands thereafter. That historically extractive institutions can impact future local
development mirrors patterns observed in countless other settings (Nunn, 2007; Becker et
al, 2014; Acemoglu et al, 2019).
It did not end here. The expulsion also enabled state officials to expand their political
and economic powers. Prior to the 1948 coup, communists oversaw the structure of the
property allocation process, which lent them popularity among some settlers. The party
won a plurality of seats for the first time in the 1946 elections, due to its new base of
support in the borderlands, where it won three fourths of the vote (Radvanovsky´, 2001).
Hence, the expulsion served as a source of patronage and legitimacy for the communists. In
fact, historians consider the expulsion to have been key, if not necessary, for the communist
takeover (Glassheim, 2001; Tampke, 2003). From there, historians have documented how
the communist regime extracted from the borderlands. The liquidation and relocation of
mills, machinery, and other physical capital from under-settled borderland areas to other
parts of the country aided in the decline of thousands of towns, in spite of local resistance by
borderland workers (Radvanovsky´, 2001; Gerlach, 2017). Others were destroyed or uprooted
to extract raw materials beneath them (Glassheim, 2016). Before long, “empty factory
buildings [dotted] the borderlands like gravestones” (Gerlach, 2017, 258).30
30In Figure A.7, I use data from Zanikle´ obce a objekty (zanikleobce.cz), an ongoing open-source project
to document abandoned and destroyed sites in the Czech lands predominantly from the postwar period, to
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Hence, the expulsion shocked the borderlands’ formerly productive equilibrium in two key
ways: by removing the bulk of its workforce in the presence of (i) agglomeration economies,
and by engendering an (ii) extractive institutional environment there. And although gold-
diggers disappeared and the Czech lands have since liberalized throughout, these two forces
together can explain how the borderlands ended up on a lower development path as early as
1947, on which it still remains today.
1.5.5 Alternative channels
This paper shows a persistent spatial divergence in local development within the Czech
lands following the 1945 expulsion of 3 million Germans from its borderlands. It has also
discussed the origins of these patterns, which emerged immediately following the expulsion
and persist decades after. That being said, there may be other forces which contributed to
the persistence of or variation in such differences. In this section, I consider three additional
channels.
Natural geography
The analysis thus far controls for locational fundamentals, with physical geography being
smooth through the MAL. Yet some questions remain. First, some stretches of the MAL
lie close to edges of the Sudete, Sumava, and Ore mountain ranges. If natural geography is
too different in the borderlands relative to the interior, a spatial RD approach may poorly
approximate them. As a robustness check, I consider only stretches of the MAL that do
not border mountain ranges. Tables A.11 and A.12 in Appendix A show geographic bal-
ance tests and 2011 outcomes that exclude these mountainous stretches. Even when only
geographically similar borderland and interior areas are compared, long-run effects remain
practically unchanged.
However, locational fundamentals may nonetheless have helped mitigate the long-run
illustrate this phenomenon relative to the MAL.
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effects of the expulsion within the borderlands. Since access to water is considered an im-
portant determinant of economic geography (Rappaport and Sachs, 2003), I expand the
analysis by interacting the treatment variable with a mean-normalized river density control,
which indicates kilometers (km) of waterways per square km in each municipality. Although
the long-run effects on unemployment, population density, and educational attainment re-
main strong and significant, I find evidence that sufficiently high local river density can
attenuate them. This can be found in Table A.22. However, note that this does not elimi-
nate the treatment effect, as 95% of municipalities in the main specification have fewer than
0.9 km per square km of river greater over the mean. I find no such effect for ruggedness.
Central planning
The expulsion and the borderlands’ resettlement occurred prior to the communist coup of
1948, when Czechoslovakia’s labor economy still operated to a large extent via the market
mechanism (Berna`sˇek, 1970). However, it is important to consider to what extent central-
planning institutions were responsible for preserving this divergence post-1947. If signs of
convergence are observed as having occurred around the MAL since transition, then it might
mean that this persistence had more to do with active central-planning decisions, whereas
e.g. losses in density in the borderlands may not have persisted to the same extent locally
in a market economy.
To test this, I consider in Table A.23 trends in relevant outcomes between 2001 and 2011,
after the end of communism and the restructuring of the 1990s. Differences in density and
unemployment remain remarkably stable near the MAL. I find similar stability for sector
shares, with the exception of the construction sector, which declined somewhat more as a
share of the labor force in the borderlands relative to the interior during the period.
Thus, despite large-scale structural change since transition, the overall magnitude of the
spatial divergence remains remarkably stable. This downplays the importance of central-
planning institutions. That being said, the institutional environment is an important part
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of expulsion and plays a key role here, as discussed above.
Geopolitics
Economic geography may interact with political geography. After WWII, the Czechoslovak
government intentionally kept parts of the borderlands near the West German border emptied
for use as a military buffer zone (Illner and Andrle, 1994). Although these areas were closer
to international borders than to the MAL, it is possible that once it was clear the borderlands
would be under-settled, geopolitical concerns would have influenced other central-planning
decisions, harmed trade networks, or altered foreign investment in former-German areas
more broadly. It is therefore of interest to consider how stretches of the borderlands near the
MAL that were closer the Eastern Bloc fared relative to stretches near West Germany and
Austria. Table A.24 shows several of the baseline long-run regressions with an interaction
term for if a municipality was closer to the Eastern Bloc prior to 1989. Interestingly, the
interaction generates no significant effect.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper considers the long-run implications of Czechoslovakia’s postwar German expul-
sions for the relative development of former-German areas. Using a spatial regression dis-
continuity design on the border of the “Sudetenland” region where Germans lived – today
known as the Czech borderlands – I show that the expulsion had immediate and long-lasting
consequences for these areas relative to nearby places in the Czech interior. I then show that
these patterns first emerged from a selective resettlement following the expulsion, which cul-
minated in the region’s de-urbanization and relative human capital decline. Using data and
historical evidence, I propose agglomeration economies and extractive institutions as two
compelling forces through which the expulsion generated this outcome.
Much of this analysis has focused on how effects emerged out of the borderlands’ resettle-
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ment after the expulsion. In contrast, more work is needing to connect the short- and long-run
outcomes documented in the paper and address the numerous questions that remain. For
example, what role did communism play in driving persistence relative to what would have
persisted regardless? On one hand, the relative stability of trends around the former German
“language border” today suggests that central planning was unnecessary ex post for persis-
tence. On the other hand, historians have documented how the communists extracted capital
and raw materials from the borderlands following its initial de-urbanization, as discussed in
Section 1.5. As such, it is unclear how effects might have differed had Czechoslovakia been
more like Austria or Finland during the Cold War. Future work should examine how the
communists influenced the first- and second-nature geography of the borderlands and on
what margins this mattered for long-run persistence (i.e. post-transition). This would tell
us more about both the channels of persistence in this particular setting, as well as the
extent to which policy can influence long-run development more generally. Future research
should also examine and compare the long-run effects of forced migration in a variety of
institutional settings, including forced migration as a result of non-political factors such as
climate change. Finally, household-level data collection and analysis is needed. A next step
should entail examining narrow areas around the former language border, as in Karaja and
Rubin (2017), to better understand the choice to resettle the borderlands as well as vertical
and horizontal transmission mechanisms at play at a more micro level.
This paper provides several important lessons for understanding forced migration, at a
time when the number of forcibly displaced worldwide is approaching 70 million. First, it
illustrates how such events may affect not only targeted groups but also have long-term im-
plications for development and regional inequality within the origin economy. Moreover, it
shows that forced migration can have strong and persistent effects even when displaced popu-
lations are compositionally similar to those remaining. Other factors, such as agglomeration
and institutional forces, may be important for explaining why affected areas do not recover
their former relative statuses. This suggests that expelling even relatively disadvantaged
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minorities may have negative effects. This is no small finding. While previous research has
focused on expulsions involving high-skilled minorities, forced migration has plagued groups
from many backgrounds throughout history. This should give both dictators and legislators
pause when considering the exclusion of even relatively low-skilled minorities, as doing so
may leave a lasting mark on the places left behind.
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Chapter 2
Shocks and the Spatial Distribution of
Economic Activity: The Role of
Institutions
2.1 Introduction
What factors determine the distribution of economic activity across space? And why do some
shocks to local development permanently alter this distribution, while others do not? These
questions are of central importance in urban and development economics for understanding
differences in economic performance within countries, as well as the potential role of policy.
Despite this, their answers remain subject to active debate.
One theory is that there exists the potential for multiple equilibria in spatial development
but conditions set by both nature and history select among them. In this view, the location
of economic activity is driven in part by incentives for humans to locate near each other, such
as in production (i.e. agglomeration spillovers). Such increasing returns can generate path
dependence, while also implying a potential for policy to induce or transplant economic ac-
tivity in self-reinforcing ways (Kline and Moretti, 2014; Jedwab and Moradi, 2016). However,
some empirical research has cast doubt upon the empirical relevance of multiple equilibria.
Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2008) and Miguel and Roland (2011), among others, have shown
how even massive shocks may only temporarily redistribute economic activity across space.
This literature supports a more deterministic view, in which individuals co-gravitate toward
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strong fundamentals over the long-run, while returns to scale matter more for determining
spatial dispersion (e.g. of cities). Efforts to reconcile these findings have varied considerably,
with selection in shock exposure, focal points, and heterogeneity in physical geography all
being proposed as potential sources of differential effects (Redding, 2010; Acemoglu et al,
2011; Bleakley and Lin, 2012; Nunn, 2009, 2014; Jedwab et al, 2019).
This paper provides an alternative approach to understanding this empirical puzzle, by
considering the interaction of increasing returns with another important force for long-run
development: formal institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Dell, 2010; Acemoglu and Dell,
2010). Using a two-region model with migration between regions, I explore the role of
institutions in explaining the differential impact of temporary shocks on the long-run spatial
distribution of economic activity. In the model, more extractive institutions decrease the
return on production relative to “unproductive” activities that do not contribute to the
productive process, thus utilizing resources at the expense of it (Nunn, 2007). In the presence
of increasing returns to productive activity within regions, a large negative shock to a region’s
population can temporarily reduce productive spillovers. When institutions are sufficiently
extractive, this can induce substitution among workers from productive into unproductive
activities. Now absent productive spillovers, relatively fewer workers will prefer to live in
the affected region, while those who do migrate there will also prefer to engage in relatively
unproductive activities, locking in asymmetries in both population and production between
regions.
Hence, the model exhibits multiple equilibria: one with two similarly productive and
populated regions, and one with a single highly populated, productive region neighboring a
less populated and relatively unproductive region. Moreover, these asymmetries can arise
even when there are no differences in natural advantages, local institutions, or endowments
ex ante between regions. Then, as institutions become stronger and less extractive, spatial
equilibria become more robust to large shocks. This illustrates how relatively low levels of
economic activity may persist in a region following a negative population shock, causing
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population and productive inputs such as human capital to become concentrated in select
regions over the long-run – even if formal institutions eventually improve.
The notion that historical institutions can have long-lasting effects is not new. A large
theoretical and empirical literature exists documenting numerous cases throughout history
in which extraction negatively impacted long-run economic development. Human capital
(Acemoglu et al, 2014), culture (Tabellini, 2010), and public goods provision (Dell, 2010)
have all been cited as important channels through which historical institutions continue to
matter. Most similar to this paper is Nunn (2007), which assumes a similar tradeoff between
productive and unproductive activities in explaining the importance of historical extraction.
This paper goes a step further, exploring how national institutions influence the persistence
of shocks, and therefore the distribution of economic activity, within countries. In particular,
it argues that in places that feature less economic activity, extractive institutions promote
comparative advantages in unproductive activities that, as such, do not attract productive
workers. In the context of a large shock, such as a natural disaster, this means that activities
such as corruption and property theft made more attractive by weak institutions are present
to reinforce the effects of the initial shock. It also means that, by weakening incentives
underlying urban recovery in the short-run, weak central institutions may produce greater
variation in development within countries.
Nevertheless, a link between the institutional environment experienced by a country or
region and the persistence of population shocks therein has often been alluded to in existing
empirical research on war, expulsion, and natural disaster. Mirroring Davis and Weinstein’s
(2002, 2008) finding that Japanese city size and composition were robust to the bombings
of WWII, returning to their prewar distributions within decades, Miguel and Roland (2011)
observe similar convergence in Vietnam. At the same time, they argue that differential
convergence would be unsurprising in a larger sample of studies. In particular, the authors
note that while postwar Japan was a market democracy and Vietnam a socialist regime,
both had relatively strong political institutions, which would have aided in catch-up in both
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places. Similar points about the importance of preexisting institutions are made by Brakman
et al (2004), who find swift convergence after WWII in West but not East Germany, as well
as in surveys of the empirical literature by Redding (2010) and Nunn (2014).
Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that much of the work on forced migration has
shown, in contrast, strong persistence in the origin economy. For instance, Chaney and
Hornbeck (2016) find delayed convergence following the expulsion of Moriscos from Spain in
1609, citing preexisting extractive institutions in Morisco areas as a potential source. Testa
(2019) similarly finds Czech municipalities affected by expulsions of Germans after WWII to
be worse off today relative to unaffected areas nearby, attributing these differences in part to
the widespread property exploitation that took place of affected areas by settlers and local
officials. Meanwhile, Nunn (2008) finds a negative relationship between exports of slaves
and future economic performance in African countries, characterizing the slave trade as an
extractive regime that gave rise to raiding and internal warfare in origin economies.
Such can also be found in the relatively smaller literature on non-political population
shocks, such as natural disaster. In the case of earthquakes, Barone and Mocetti (2014) cite
preexisting institutions as a source of differential effects, with corruption and declining social
capital impeding recovery in poorly institutionalized places, while Anbarci et al (2005) sim-
ilarly show poor collective action to exacerbate earthquake fatalities in places with greater
inequality, and Belloc et al (2016) observe local institutional stagnation following earth-
quakes in medieval Italy in places where separation of relevant powers had previously been
weak. Meanwhile, Acemoglu et al (2019) find that severe droughts paved the way for the
Sicilian Mafia where institutions were weak, at the expense of subsequent local economic
development.1 That being said, this is but a subset of papers in a very large literature,
and many other factors may explain differential persistence, such as selection in the initial
shock (Acemoglu et al, 2011) as well as various focal points in nature and history aiding in
1Also see Maloney and Caicedo (2015) and Jedwab et al (2016) for examples of institutions as a source
of heterogeneous effects in the persistence of pre-colonial American agglomerations and the Black Death,
respectively, as well as Dell and Olken (2019) for evidence that within the extractive colonial Dutch regime
in Java, agglomeration economies from sugar factories gave rise to countervailing long-run effects locally.
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post-shock recovery (Jedwab et al, 2019). I therefore go now to the model, before concluding
in Section 2.3.
2.2 The model
The economy in the model is composed of a share of non-atomic workersMr in each region r ∈
{1, 2}. Workers are long-lived but myopic. I therefore focus for now on a single time period.
Each worker begins a period with some endowment, which she may choose to transform into
a labor input, h (e.g. human capital). If she does, then her labor input is combined with a
firm’s resources to produce goods, and she is compensated at the regional market wage rate
wr. In this scenario, she is said to be engaged in production. At any given time, the share of
all workers living in region r and engaged in production is mr ≤Mr.2 Each region also has a
fixed stock of resources, K, which are divided amongst a mass λ∗mr of identically-producing
firms, indexed by ω.3 In a given period, each region r firm has some amount kr ≤ K/λmr
of resources for use in production, to be defined shortly.
However, a worker may also choose to forgo engagement in production. In this scenario,
she simply consumes resources directly – resources which might otherwise be used by firms
as inputs in production. I refer to such behavior as unproductive, to the extent that it does
not contribute to the local production process and as such comes at its expense. The relative
payoffs from unproductive activities as compared to productive ones crucially depends on
the formal institutional environment. The assumption that extractive or weak institutions
decrease the relative payoffs from productive activities and give rise to unproductive behavior
is long-standing in the political economy literature (Skaperdas, 1992; Nunn, 2007). In this
model, the quality of institutions is exogenous to local economic activity and represented
simply by the parameter β.
2Thus the share of the world’s workforce that is engaged in production is mr +m−r ≤ 1.
3For simplicity, K is immobile and regenerates each period.
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The productive environment
Production is subject to constant returns to scale within firms in resources and labor inputs.
However, the model allows for external increasing returns (i.e. within regions) in regional
labor inputs Hr ≡ mrh. In this case, as the relative amount of productive workers in
region r increases, its firms can produce relatively more given the same labor inputs. This
agglomeration spillover is represented by Hγr , where γ ≥ 0 gives its magnitude.4
Besides agglomeration, heterogeneity across regions in firm-level productivity can also be
attributed to differences in natural advantages. These locational benefits are given by the
parameter ar. Thus the overall productivity level for region r is given by:
Ar = arH
γ
r .
Altogether, this yields a firm-level CRS production function of:
fr(ω) = Arkrhr(ω),
where hr(ω) gives a region r firm’s demand for labor inputs. Hence, a firm’s profit maxi-
mization problem can be given by:
max
hr(ω)
parH
γ
r krhr(ω)− wrhr(ω), (2.1)
where prices p are set collectively by all regions with workers engaged in production.5 As-
suming zero profit, this implies a real income and thus consumption payoffs for productive
4This term is common in the economic geography literature (Allen and Donaldson, 2018). For micro-
foundations, see Marshall (1920) and Duranton and Puga (2004). For empirical estimation, see Rosenthal
and Strange (2004), Moretti (2004), Greenstone et al (2010), and Ellison et al (2010).
5Since regions are in close proximity, I assume no trade costs or differences in market access.
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workers in region r of:
Vr(h) = arH
γ
r kr ∗ h
= arkrh
1+γmγr .
(2.2)
How does the institutional environment matter?
Unlike typical two-region models of economic geography, this framework incorporates a
strategic component in which workers may prefer to engage in unproductive activities. In
contrast with production, which involves combining worker endowments with resources to
create value for consumers, unproductive activities involve acquiring and consuming re-
sources directly (i.e. every man for himself), which does not entail external economies of
scale, while coming at the expense of the local productive sector, which does. This distinction
between productive and unproductive activities is common in the literature on institutions
and conflict (Acemoglu, 1995; Nunn, 2007). Real world examples might include corruption
and rent-seeking, looting and property crime, and free-riding on public goods.
I model the acquisition of resources using a variant of the contest success function (Skaper-
das, 1996). Unproductive workers consume resources that would otherwise be used in pro-
duction, where the total amount of resources acquired by unproductive workers in region r
is proportional to the relative prevalence of unproductive behavior in the regional economy:
Mr −mr
Mr
K,
where Mr−mr equals the share of all workers living in region r and engaged in unproductive
activities. This leaves each region r firm with a final resource endowment of:
k∗r =
(
1− Mr −mr
Mr
)
K
λmr
=
K
λMr
.
(2.3)
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Unproductive payoffs follow from this. Adopting the assumption that relative value from
unproductive activities is derived inversely from the quality of institutions, consider the
following payoffs from engaging in unproductive activities in region r:
Vr(u) =
1
β
1
Mr −mr
(
Mr −mr
Mr
)
K
=
K
βMr
.
(2.4)
Recall that β describes the quality of institutions, which I consider to be a deep parameter
that is the same in both regions. In spite of this, unproductive behaviors may become
widespread in one region and not the other, as one will see shortly. At the same time,
because resources are fixed in each region and of use in both production and unproductive
activities, they will serve as a relative congestion force in each region that prevents “black
hole” equilibria, in which all workers locate in one region, from arising in the long-run.
2.2.1 Short-run equilibria
I assume that in the short-run, workers cannot move between regions but can move between
productive and unproductive activities. For analytical simplicity, this choice is modeled
as a simple binary decision. That is, an agent prefers to transform her endowment into a
productive labor input if and only if
ar
K
λMr
h1+γmγr ≥
K
βMr
. (2.5)
For now, let γ > 0. Since agents are non-atomic, each takes mr as given when deciding
whether to deviate. Hence, worker behavior exhibits strategic complementaries around some
critical threshold, m̂r, above which the optimal m
∗
r = Mr. To describe this outcome, I define
the following:
Definition 2.2.1. A high production short-run equilibrium [HPSE] consists of all workers
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in a region r specializing in production (m∗r = Mr).
Definition 2.2.2. A low production short-run equilibrium [LPSE] consists of all workers in
a region r specializing in unproductive activities (m∗r = 0).
Now consider the first result:6
Proposition 1. There exists a high production short-run equilibrium [HPSE] for each region
r. In every HPSE:
(i) There is a threshold relative amount of productive workers m̂r when γ > 0, above which
all workers in region r, Mr, prefer to specialize in production, m
∗
r = Mr.
(ii) The share of all workers located in r must be sufficiently large, Mr ≥ m̂r, where this
equilibrium is locally stable in Mr whenever this inequality is strict.
(iii) m̂r is decreasing in ar, h, and β and increasing in λ.
The remaining space below m̂r is characterized by a LPSE, in which all agents in region
r forgo production and instead simply acquire and consume local resources (i.e. m∗r = 0).
Importantly, since the productive population of a region is constrained by the size of its total
worker population, a temporary decrease (i.e. shock) in the share of the population in r has
the potential to permanently shift a region from a HPSE to a LPSE (i.e. Mr < m̂r implies
mr < m̂r). However, this depends on the quality of formal institutions. When the quality of
institutions β is sufficiently high, even large shocks will not generate incentives for workers
to substitute toward unproductive activities in the affected region. This is important, as
a population shock which cannot induce a shift from one short-run equilibrium to another
within a region will also have no effect on the long-run equilibrium population distribution
across regions, as we will see shortly.
Now let γ = 0, such that there are no agglomeration spillovers. This is relevant for
understanding how sectors such as agriculture respond to population shocks in the short-
6All proofs are in Appendix B.
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run. As it turns out, population shocks cannot shift a region from one short-run equilibrium
to another in the absence of agglomeration spillovers:
Remark 1. In the absence of agglomeration spillovers, γ = 0, if a HPSE exists in region r
for some Mr, then it exists for all M
′
r.
Hence, the propensity for a population shock to shift a regional economy from a HPSE to
a LPSE depends not only on the quality of formal institutions but also on the presence
of external increasing returns (i.e. γ > 0), which generate strategic complementarities in
production choices within regions. In fact, absent agglomeration spillovers, economic activity
will always tend toward its initial distribution as determined by fundamentals regardless of
institutions. To show this, however, I must first introduce population dynamics, in the form
of migration between regions over time.
2.2.2 Long-run equilibria
In the long-run, agents can move between productive and unproductive activities within
regions as well as migrate between regions. Population dynamics are modeled as in the
economic geography literature,7 using a standard replicator dynamic:
M˙r = Mr(Vr − V ), (2.6)
where M˙r gives the change over time in the share of the population in region r, which depends
on the relative size of the short-run payoffs in region r, and where V ≡ M1V1 + M2V2 gives
the national average payoffs. There is no cost to migration. However, since agents are non-
atomic, short- and long-run incentives can interact to generate coordination problems which
in turn constrain migration.
7In this tradition, population dynamics are often framed in relative terms (i.e. regional shares), such that
the size of the total population does not matter for the long-run analysis. For instance, see Krugman (1991),
Davis and Weinstein (2008), and Allen and Donaldson (2018).
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Suppose, for instance, that mr ≥ m̂r initially in each region r, such that both regions
specialize in production (i.e. m∗r = Mr for all r). Then there exists some steady state
Mr ≡ M∗r at which M˙r = 0 as long as M∗r ≥ m̂r for each region r. That is, when enough
agents are coordinating on productive behavior in each region, mr ≥ m̂r, there is some
population distribution Mr at which both regions have high levels of production and no
worker prefers to deviate from one region to other. From (2.2) and (2.6), this is the solution
to:
a1Kh
1+γ
λ
Mγ−11 =
a2Kh
1+γ
λ
Mγ−12 , (2.7)
which implies for each region r:
M∗r =
a
1
1−γ
r
a
1
1−γ
r + a
1
1−γ
−r
.
However, the local stability of this as a long-run equilibrium depends on γ.
Assume for now that γ ∈ (0, 1). When γ ∈ (0, 1), the lefthand side of (2.7) is strictly
decreasing in Mr while the righthand side is strictly increasing. Then small changes in Mr
will have only temporary effects, holding short-run equilibria fixed. However, by Proposition
1.2, the stability of this state also depends on the size of Mr relative to the threshold m̂r for
each region, i.e. local stability in the short-run. I thus define the following:
Definition 2.2.3. A symmetric high production long-run equilibrium [HPLE] consists of (i)
each region being in a HPSE (m∗r = Mr for all r), with (ii) a steady state share of workers
located in each region, M∗r , which is locally stable in Mr in both the short- and long-run.
8
Now suppose that Mr and m̂r are sufficiently close. Then a large, negative shock to Mr in
the short-run (e.g. from death or displacement) may result in a shift to a LPSE in region r,
such that the steady state population distribution is no longer determined by (2.7).
This brings me to a second case, in which a large, negative shock to e.g. M2 occurs,
8Formally, local stability requires that small population shocks around M∗r are temporary (
∂M˙r
∂Mr
|Mr=M∗r <
0), as well as that short-run equilibria be locally stable in Mr for all r (M
∗
r > m̂r).
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shifting region 2 from a HPSE to a LPSE. In other words, in depleting region 2 of its
productive workforce relative to region 1, a large negative population shock reduces its
productive spillovers, thus making it relatively more appealing for those living in region
2 to engage in unproductive behavior, so long as institutions are sufficiently extractive.
Furthermore, conditional upon engaging in unproductive activities, it also increases the
consumable amount of resources per capita in region 2. In the long-run, this will trigger
migration into region 2 by those who see opportunity in unproductive activities, but not
productive ones. Assuming that such a shock did not also occur in region 1, the new steady
states Mr will be the solution to:
a1Kh
1+γ
λ
Mγ−11 =
K
βM2
. (2.8)
It can be shown that such a shock should leave region 2 at a permanently lower relative
population level when γ ∈ (0, 1), as in Figure 2.1. To do this, I first define the following:
Definition 2.2.4. An asymmetric long-run equilibrium [ALE] consists of (i) one region r
being in a HPSE (m∗r = Mr) and (ii) the other region −r being in a LPSE (m∗−r = 0), with
(iii) a steady state share of workers located in each region, M∗∗r , which is locally stable in
Mr in both the short- and long-run.
Altogether, these results can now be summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 2. (i) There exists a locally stable symmetric high production long-run equi-
librium [HPLE], with a unique interior steady state population M∗r ∈ (0, 1) when ag-
glomeration spillovers are moderately strong, specifically γ ∈ (0, 1), where M∗r = 12 if
and only if a2 = a1, and where M
∗
r increasing in ar and decreasing in a−r.
(ii) There also exists a locally stable asymmetric long-run equilibrium [ALE], with a steady
state population share in the productive (unproductive) region of M∗∗r > M
∗
r (M
∗∗
−r <
M∗−r), with M
∗∗
r increasing in ar, h, and β and decreasing in λ.
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∗∗
2m̂2 1− m̂1
M2
M˙2
Figure 2.1: Symmetric high production versus asymmetric long-run equilibria
Thus, a sufficiently large, negative population shock in one region (i.e. such that Mr < m̂r)
can permanently (i) shift its local economy from production to unproductive activity, (ii)
lowering its relative population due to now relatively larger productive spillovers in the other
region, (iii) leaving a population that is nonetheless positive to the extent that its resources
may still be utilized in relatively unproductive ways, with such payoffs being determined by
the quality of institutions (i.e. ∂m̂r
∂β
< 0).9
In other words, given more extractive institutions, large-scale population loss tends to
induce a shift toward unproductive activities in the affected region by those remaining as well
as incoming migrants (e.g. property exploitation, corruption), rendering it less productive
and populated over the long-run. Stronger institutions, meanwhile, limit the extent to which
being production becomes relatively unappealing following large shocks, such that agents are
more likely to coordinate back to pre-shock patterns.10
Finally, let γ /∈ (0, 1). We know that when γ = 0, short-run shocks of any size should have
9Hence, if a shock also negatively affects K over the long-run in that region, even fewer would reside
there.
10As a corollary to Propositions 1 and 2, note that if institutions become too extractive, then unproductive
activities will become too appealing relative to productive ones, such that no HPLE or ALE can survive and
both regions will be in LPSE as part of a globally stable symmetric low production long-run equilibrium
[LPLE]. To see this, note that the derivative on m̂r and those on both steady states M
∗
r and M
∗∗
r are
opposing in β. For sufficiently low β, Mr ≥ m̂r can never occur, regardless of shocks.
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Figure 2.2: Asymmetric long-run equilibria with strong agglomeration spillovers
no bearing on short-run equilibria. Hence, sectors lacking agglomeration spillovers should see
their workers return to their pre-shock distribution, as determined by either (2.7) or (2.8).
Remark 2. In the absence of agglomeration spillovers, γ = 0, population shocks have no
long-run effect on the spatial distribution of productive activity.
In other words, in sectors like agriculture which lack external economies of scale, shocks
have no permanent effects, regardless of institutions. Rather, the distribution of productive
activity is determined solely by the fundamentals. If fundamentals are sufficiently pro-
production, then activity will tend to locate more where they are stronger. If they are
symmetric across regions (i.e. a2 = a1), then so will be the distribution of e.g. farmers, both
before and after population shocks, assuming a HPLE to begin with.
What about when agglomeration spillovers are very strong, i.e. γ > 1? As it turns out,
when productive spillovers are sufficiently great, all HPLE become unstable. This means
all of the productive population will be located in one region or another. Whichever region
has its worker population drained by such forces will eventually specialize in unproductive
activities. This generates a single locally stable long-run equilibrium with one productive
region and one unproductive region, as before:
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Proposition 3. When agglomeration spillovers are sufficiently strong, specifically γ > 1,
then:
(i) There are no locally stable HPLE.
(ii) There are at most two interior ALE, with steady state populations in the productive
region r of Mr
∗ ∈ (0, γ−1
γ
) and Mr
∗ ∈ (γ−1
γ
, 1).
(iii) Only the second, more populated steady state Mr
∗
can be locally stable.
Hence, the existence of a locally stable HPLE is sufficient but not necessary for uneven
spatial patterns of development to arise. When agglomeration spillovers are sufficiently
strong, unevenness will always arise from initial conditions (or historical conditions from
prior to the emergence of spillovers) and remain as such forever.
The role of local development policy
Finally, note that in contrast with negative shocks, the model implies that the effects of
temporary local development policies and positive population shocks associated with them
(assuming an unproductive equilibrium to begin with) may actually be more likely to persist
in the long-run in places with strong institutions. This is because while it takes a negative
shock to mr larger than Mr − m̂r to move a region from a productive equilibrium to an
unproductive one, it takes a positive policy shock larger than m̂r to do the opposite. Hence,
when β is large, only a small-scale coordinated effort (e.g. by some “city corporation”) is
needed to move a region from an unproductive equilibrium to a productive one: an investment
need only attract a few to the region simultaneously before complementarities take over.
2.3 Conclusion
Why do some shocks to local development permanently impact the spatial distribution of
economic activity, while others do not? This paper considers the role of formal institutions in
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explaining these differential effects. In the model, extractive institutions decrease the return
on productive relative to unproductive activities. In the presence of increasing returns to
productive activity within regions, a sufficiently large, negative shock to one region’s labor
force can serve as a tipping point, inducing its workers to substitute into unproductive
activities. Thereafter, new migrants will also prefer to engage in unproductive activities,
resulting in regional asymmetries in population and production levels over the long-run. This
suggests that extractive institutions may magnify the importance of increasing returns for
long-run local development, while long-run equilibria may be more robust to large negative
shocks where there are strong institutions to help coordinate the reemergence of production.
I end with a few remarks. First, it is important to note that the choice between pro-
ductive and unproductive activity is, in reality, not binary. Rather, the prevalence of the
latter will depend on its relative return as determined by the institutional environment (i.e.
β). As institutions improve, it is likely that even unproductive regions would become more
developed. Nor is this stylized model sufficient to explain all differences in development
observed within countries. A richer model is needed to capture the nuanced interactions
between institutions, agglomeration spillovers, natural geography, infrastructure, etc. That
being said, this model illustrates in simple terms how formal institutions can influence the
importance of increasing returns in the face of large, negative population shocks. In partic-
ular, it suggests that spatial equilibria may be more subject to influence by negative shocks
in places and times in which institutions are weak, becoming more robust as they improve.
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Chapter 3
Education and Propaganda: Tradeoffs
to Public Education Provision in
Nondemocracies
3.1 Introduction
Why do nondemocracies invest in public education? Doing so promotes human capital ac-
quisition and social cohesion, favoring economic development and expanding the tax base.1
Yet the same forces may also promote political development, enhancing political sophistica-
tion and participation.2 Indeed, education has historically been restricted to certain groups
in expectation of this. Many U.S. states banned the education of slaves prior to the Civil
War, while Colonial powers in Africa and East Asia often adopted similar measures against
indigenous peoples, even though the resulting productivity gains would have benefitted eco-
nomic elites in both cases (Woodson, 1915; Bjork, 2005). Given this, the extent to which
many modern nondemocracies invest in education is puzzling.3
Nevertheless, another view holds that nondemocratic regimes use public education to
1See Gradstein and Justman (2000, 2002), Glaeser et al (2004), and Galor and Moav (2006).
2See Lipset (1959), Dee (2004), Milligan et al (2004), Yanagizawa-Drott (2014), Chong and Gradstein
(2015), and Friedman et al (2016). Some argue that education leads to democracy. For this debate, see
Acemoglu et al (2005) and Castello´-Climent (2008).
3Lott (1999) and Bursztyn (2016) note positive associations between nondemocracy and various measures
of public education provision among lower income countries. Aghion et al (2019) find this trend more
generally, although Acemoglu et al (2015) suggest a reversal at the secondary level. De la Croix and Doepke
(2009) do not observe this trend, but find variance in education spending to be increasing in non-freedom,
with non-free countries dominating the right tail.
61
shape public opinion and control civil society. Early compulsory education systems in Europe
and North America were designed principally to unify historically disparate groups around
new national identities in the process of nation-building (Alesina et al, 2019; Bandiera et
al, 2017). Likewise, 20th century authoritarian states often used public schools to promote
compliance with autocratic power structures and state-sanctioned ideologies.4
This paper brings these two views together, treating them as separate dimensions of
public education that interact in important ways. In doing so, it generates new insight
into why many nondemocracies choose to invest in public education when doing so can
promote political development. In particular, this paper explores how a ruler can alter the
incentives underlying public education provision by manipulating the content of education.
To do this, I draw from a vast literature from across the social sciences, which conceives
of political engagement as something learned and habituated early in life.5 In this view,
public education promotes political participation to the extent that it tends to facilitate
involvement in political and other social activities. However, this effect varies with the style
and content of education.
With that in mind, I develop a model examining a ruler’s decision to invest in public
education. With some probability the ruler has predatory objectives, seeking only to max-
imize his own rents. Indeed, providing education may increase his taxation revenues. Yet
education also enables citizens to become active in political “clubs.” In the model, this
promotes acquisition of inputs needed for citizens to credibly oppose high taxes in the future
(i.e. political participation).
A ruler is not naive to this: if he invests in education, then he decides whether to adopt
a curriculum embedded with propaganda. In the model, the content of education provides
a signal of the political environment,6 influencing citizens’ beliefs about the importance of
4See Cantoni et al (2017), Alesina and Fuchs-Schundeln (2007) and Voigtlander and Voth (2015).
5See Nie et al (1996), Nie and Hillygus (2001), Plutzer (2002), McFarland and Thomas (2006), Campbell
(2008), Quintelier (2008), Gardner et al (2008), and Kahne et al (2013).
6Bowles and Gintis (1976) argue that public schooling is informative of political and economic institutions
not only in terms of its content but also in its organizational structures.
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developing inputs useful for political participation relative to labor. By distorting this signal,
propaganda can decrease a citizen’s expected payoffs from political uses of human capital
relative to productive ones, making joining a political club seem more costly. As a result,
it can induce suboptimal levels of political participation and higher taxes in an equilibrium
with public education, making its provision more appealing to a predatory ruler.
However, citizens are also not naive to a ruler’s incentives to disseminate propaganda.
Although propaganda increases the likelihood that a citizen is exposed to a “ruler-favorable”
curriculum, it also decreases the value of public schooling for learning about the political
environment. Too much propaganda can generate excessive uncertainty, such that joining a
political club becomes social insurance against future expropriation. In this case, propaganda
encourages political participation and in turn lower taxes whenever a predatory ruler invests
in public education.7 Moreover, as society becomes more productive, the potential costs of
not becoming politically active increase, such that this outcome is more likely to occur.
Propaganda can therefore make investments in education more appealing to a preda-
tory ruler when initial productivity growth from education is relatively modest, letting him
promote economic development while extracting greater rents. Nevertheless, by making
education provision desirable, propaganda can actually make citizens better off. Further
development will then correspond to a shift away from propaganda to more neutral educa-
tional content, and in sufficiently high productivity settings, educational content will forgo
propaganda entirely. In this latter scenario, a predatory ruler always benefits from investing
in public education, inducing optimal political participation levels and low taxes. I provide
evidence consistent with these predictions in Section 3.3.
As previously noted, much of the existing literature treats public education provision as
either a means for a ruler to increase his rents, often at the risk of uprising or democratiza-
tion, or a means of indoctrinating citizens in order to reduce the risk of insurrection. This
paper adds to this discussion by considering an interaction of these two views. On one hand,
7For discussions of “backlash” and other disutilities from the character of public schooling, see Fouka
(2019), Carvalho and Koyama (2016), Gradstein and Justman (2005), and Swee (2015).
63
it follows Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), in which education promotes economic growth
but is also politically costly, as in this paper. Both models generate equilibria in which
sufficient income growth from education induces investment, even if political development
cannot be constrained. In their setup, however, education serves as a de facto franchise ex-
tension, generating intermediate equilibria in which elites retain political power by providing
education only to some. This paper considers an alternative mechanism by which political
externalities of public education can be reduced without varying its provision. Namely, it
considers how changes within the education system, particularly with regard to its content,
can relax political barriers to public education provision. Also related is Glaeser et al (2007),
who discuss a model of political transition in which human capital benefits more democratic
regimes, and Campante and Chor (2012), who examine empirically the conditions under
which education promotes political participation.
This article is also related to Alesina et al (2019). They model public education as
useful for its homogenizing effect, bringing citizens’ preferences closer to elites’. In contrast,
this paper considers the incentives to invest in public education when the homogenizing
nature of education may actually be costly to a ruler, by facilitating political participation.
This is consistent with empirical evidence that education favors political development. As
in Alesina et al, however, public education may also serve as a political instrument. By
using propaganda, a ruler can provide schooling while simultaneously minimizing the risk of
uprising. A connected literature explores how the ideological content of education influences
educational outcomes (Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013; Meyersson, 2014; Carvalho et al,
2017). Also related is Fuchs-Schundeln and Masella (2016), who show that propaganda-based
education in East Germany negatively impacted outcomes after reunification.
This paper relates in a more general way to the literature on nondemocratic institutions.
Like many in that tradition, this paper concerns the expansion of public goods in settings
with self-interested elites (Myerson, 2008; Gehlbach et al, 2016). Finally, the model itself is
inspired by other models of strategic information transmission (Crawford and Sobel, 1982;
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Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011, Edmond, 2013).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model and
extensions. Section 3.3 presents the empirical evidence. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 The model
The model has two players: a ruler and a citizen. The ruler’s type is θ ∈ {0, 1}, where θ = 1
denotes a “benevolent” ruler who will choose policies that maximize social welfare, while
θ = 0 denotes a “predatory” ruler who will maximize his own rents. A ruler’s type is private
knowledge. The citizen’s prior belief, Pr(θ = 1) = pi ∈ (0, 1), indicates the extent to which
she has been socialized prior to attending school to trust the ruler.
After learning his type, a ruler first decides whether to invest in public education, gθ ∈
{0, 1}. If he invests, the citizen then decides whether or not to enroll in a public school,
e ∈ {0, 1}. Let y(e) be her education-contingent labor income. If she enrolls, she acquires
human capital and her labor income becomes y(1) = w+αh, where h > 1 is the productivity
effect of education, and α > 0.8 Otherwise, she earns y(0) = w ≥ 0. Human capital may
also benefit the ruler down the line: once income is accrued, he imposes upon the citizen a
lump sum tax, τθ ≥ 0.
Public education provision also has political consequences. For instance, public schooling
may expose the citizen to a larger peer network, enhancing her political efficacy via new
social capital.9 In the model, the citizen can become active in a political club while enrolled
in school, a choice represented by c ∈ {0, 1}. If she does, then she acquires the capacity to
challenge a predatory ruler’s choice of τ0 after entering the labor force. However, joining a
political club comes at the cost of time and effort that might otherwise have gone toward
developing more productive inputs: if c = 1, then one unit of productivity is allocated toward
political participation once she enters the labor force, inducing a proportionate decrease of
8For algebraic simplicity, I treat αh as absorbing any direct private costs of attending school.
9See Gradstein and Justman (2000, 2002) and Helliwell and Putnam (2007). Also see Appendix C for a
discussion of a two-citizen set up.
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α in labor income. Thus, the citizen’s payoff function is
U = y(e)− αc− τθ.
Here, political participation means having the capacity to challenge τ0. Let r ∈ {0, 1} denote
a politically active citizen’s decision to mount a political challenge against a predatory ruler.10
A challenge might arise nonviolently as a campaign or violently as a revolt. If the citizen
mounts a challenge, with probability q ∈ (0, 1) she succeeds in recovering τ0, but a fraction
1− σ ∈ (0, 1) of income is destroyed.
Although nondemocracies often display kleptocratic qualities (i.e. θ = 0), they vary with
respect to the means and ease with which a citizen can participate in the political process
and thus constrain those tendencies. q and σ characterize the institutional environment
underlying political participation. I interpret q as reflecting the citizen’s political power
relative to the ruler. For example, q may reflect the prevalence of explicit repression (e.g.
banning of parties and ideologies). σ gives the extent to which challenges are resolved
nonviolently (e.g. via trials or elections), independent of who is favored to win a challenge. I
interpret this as a measure of rule of law, or the availability of formal institutions for conflict
resolution. Altogether, I take higher q and σ to imply the prevalence of more inclusive
political institutions (i.e. greater initial political development).
Given these institutions and the possible outcomes following public education provision,
a predatory ruler may or may not want to restrict public education. Depending on θ, a ruler
prefers to invest in public education if and only if his payoff,
V (θ) = θU + (1− θ)Rθ,
is greater with public education provision than in its absence. Here, Rθ ≥ 0 denotes the
10Since a benevolent ruler only sets a tax to balance his budget constraint (i.e. pay off debts from education
provision), I do not discuss the possibility that the citizen challenges a benevolent ruler.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of actions and events
ruler’s rents at the end of the game. Investment in public education also entails a cost,
normalized to 1 if the citizen enrolls in public school, and is feasible only when the ruler’s
expected tax revenues are sufficiently large, i.e. satisfy the budget constraint
Rθ + egθ ≤ RI +E(τθ|θ), (3.1)
where RI denotes his initial rents. For analytical simplicity, I restrict RI ≥ max{1 −
(1− q)σ(w + αh− α), 0} so that any equilibrium in which education provision is incentive-
compatible satisfies (3.1). Finally, taxes are bounded by the feasibility constraint τθ ≤ y−αc,
with no other limits on fiscal capacity.
If a ruler does invest in public schooling, he can influence the content of education. In the
model, the curriculum is informative of the political environment, i.e. provides a signal of
the ruler’s type, θˆ ∈ {0, 1}. If the citizen enrolls in public school, she observes θˆ and updates
her beliefs about the ruler’s type, before deciding whether to join a political club. As such, a
ruler may want to manipulate the curriculum to disseminate propaganda, a choice given by
mθ. I refer to this as his education policy, where mθ = 1 indicates a biased education policy
with propaganda, while mθ = 0 indicates a neutral education policy without. Critically, the
citizen does not observe mθ; she can only infer it given her information about the ruler’s
type, which itself is endogenous to mθ. Without loss of generality, I limit m1 = 0 to focus
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on the importance of propaganda for public education provision by a predatory ruler.11
By default, education policy is neutral. I assume that it remains neutral if a ruler is
indifferent between policies. Under a neutral education policy, the curriculum provides a
precise signal of the ruler’s type (i.e. Pr(θˆ = 0|θ = 0,m0 = 0) = 1). If a predatory ruler sets
a biased education policy, with probability γ ∈ (0, 1] propaganda is successfully transmitted
to the citizen, who then observes a ruler-favorable curriculum θˆ = 1.12 Hence, θˆ = 1 may
originate with a benevolent ruler, or a predatory ruler who has successfully shaped the
education system through propaganda. In this scenario, the citizen’s posterior belief is
pˆi(θ = 1|θˆ = 1,m0 = 1) = pi
pi + γ(1− pi) ∈ [pi, 1).
In other words, since education policy is privately chosen, the citizen cannot tell apart
a dishonest predatory ruler from a truly benevolent one whenever both would transmit
θˆ = 1. In turn, her process of evaluating the ruler’s preferences will be distorted, skewing
her expectations about what τθ will be once income is accrued.
Although propaganda often appeals outwardly to a ruler’s benevolence, the actual channel
through which it influences a citizen’s behavior can vary. One potential channel is optimism,
wherein propaganda convinces the citizen that a predatory ruler is truly benevolent and that
she has less to lose in trusting him. Another is fear, wherein propaganda makes her believe
that she has more to lose in not trusting him, i.e. by becoming politically active. The better
interpretation will depend on the ruler. Some dictators, like Suharto or Muammar Gaddafi,
have gained real popularity through development initiatives while simultaneously enriching
themselves.13 Others, like Ferdinand Marcos, have relied largely on intimidation. The inter-
pretation adopted will not matter, however, so long as propaganda affect the citizen’s belief
about the opportunity cost of joining a political club.
11See the proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix C.
12I refer to all curricula θˆ = 1 as ruler-favorable, regardless of θ, as it induces a higher payoff.
13Winters (2011) notes how the perception of Suharto’s Indonesia as a genuinely modernizing state, as
opposed to an extractive oligarchy, was shared even by many prominent Western scholars.
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Finally, there is one caveat to using propaganda. Though education policy is privately
chosen, γ gives the exogenous and commonly-known probability that the citizen will nonethe-
less correctly infer a predatory ruler’s type when he sets a biased education policy. I conceive
of γ as the state of the ruler’s propaganda technology. For example, a strong propaganda
technology (γ → 1) might reflect a highly centralized education system, while a weak tech-
nology (γ → 0) might imply a greater prevalence of substitutes for information transmission
among teachers and students.
3.2.1 Public education without propaganda
The purpose of this section is to establish the basic incentives that underlie public education
provision, particularly by a predatory ruler. To begin, I define:
Definition 3.2.1. A schooling equilibrium [SE] consists of (i) public education provision
by both types of ruler (g∗0 = g
∗
1 = 1); (ii) a predatory ruler’s education policy choice m
∗
0;
(iii) enrollment in public schooling by the citizen (e∗ = 1); (iv) the citizen’s political club
choice c∗; (v) a pair of tax choices (τ ∗0 , τ
∗
1 ); and (vi) the citizen’s political challenge choice r
∗
whenever c∗ = 1.
Since I am interested mainly in the strategic behavior of a predatory ruler, I will refer to all
other equilibria, in which a predatory ruler refrains from providing schooling (g∗0 = 0), as
non-schooling equilibria [NE]. In and of itself, a NE is rather uninteresting. In the absence of
education, a predatory ruler just expropriates all income w from the citizen. If a benevolent
ruler also refrains from providing schooling, he sets a social welfare maximizing tax of 0. If
the citizen observes public education provision, however, there are three possible taxes τ ∗θ
that she may face, conditional upon the ruler’s type θ and whether she joins a political club
while in school:
1. Benevolent taxation given education provision (BE): any surplus rents R1 would come
at the expense of the citizen, such that τ ∗1 = max{1 − RI , 0} ≡ τBE1 and R∗1 = RI +
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τBE1 − 1 ≡ RBE1 under a benevolent ruler when g1 = 1.
2. Predatory taxation given education provision and a politically inactive citizen (PI): a
predatory ruler risks nothing by expropriating everything, such that τ ∗0 = w+αh ≡ τPI0
and R∗0 = R
I + τPI0 − 1 ≡ RPI0 .
3. Predatory taxation given education provision and a politically active citizen (PA): a
tax τ0 exists that is neither high enough to induce a political challenge, nor too low
that he would rather risk a challenge than just commit to the tax, such that τ ∗0 =
(1− qσ)(w + αh− α) ≡ τPA0 and R∗0 = RI + τPA0 − 1 ≡ RPA0 .14
Altogether, these imply:
Lemma 1. τPA0 < τ
PI
0 , where:
(i) For any pair of political power levels (q, q′) such that q′ > q, τPA0 (q
′) < τPA0 (q).
(ii) For any pair of rule of law levels (σ, σ′) such that σ′ > σ, τPA0 (σ
′) < τPA0 (σ).
Thus, insofar as it socializes the citizen to be politically active, participation in a political
club while in school induces greater accountability later on under a predatory ruler in the
form of strictly lower taxes. Furthermore, the magnitude of this decrease in taxes is larger
when initial political institutions are more inclusive.
Given these potential taxes, I start by solving a version of the model in which education
policy is fixed at its default neutral state (i.e. is always mθ = 0). As such, the political
knowledge generated by the curriculum will be accurate with regard to the ruler’s type (i.e.
Pr(θˆ = 0|θ = 0) = 1). Consider the following equilibrium:
Definition 3.2.2. A developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE] is a SE wherein (i) education
policy remains neutral under a predatory ruler (m∗0 = 0), such that ruler types separate over
θˆ; hence (ii) the citizen joins a political club (c∗ = 1) if and only if the ruler is predatory
(θ = 0), and (iii) a predatory ruler always sets τ ∗0 = τ
PA
0 .
14See the proof of Lemma 1. All proofs can be found in Appendix C.
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It is not difficult to imagine conditions under which a DSE arises. Whereas a benevolent ruler
only invests in schooling if the citizen will benefit from it, subject to the budget constraint (1),
a predatory ruler has other concerns – namely, whether promoting a more educated society
will yield him sufficient rents. Moreover, when education policy is neutral, the citizen can
perfectly infer the threat of future expropriation and hence always joins a political club
when the ruler is predatory. Thus, stronger economic incentives (i.e. higher h) are needed
to induce education provision by a predatory ruler relative to a benevolent one. Formally,
Proposition 4. There exists a developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE] when m0 = 0. In
every DSE:
(i) h is the minimum h such that a predatory ruler invests in public education, while h
is the minimum h such that a benevolent ruler would invest in public education. In a
DSE, h ≥ h > h.
(ii) h is increasing in q, σ, and w and decreasing in α, and h is weakly decreasing in α
and RI .
By definition, this outcome always constitutes a socially efficient arrangement ex post. Thus,
DSE are characterized by optimal political participation, where the citizen becomes politically
active if and only if the threat of high taxes (i.e. τ0 = τ
PI
0 ) is credible. Absent sufficient
economic incentives for a predatory ruler, however:
Definition 3.2.3. A repressive non-schooling equilibrium [RNE] is a NE in which (i) a
predatory ruler cannot suppress political club participation (c∗ = 1), such that (ii) he does
not invest in public education (g∗0 = 0) and (iii) expropriates τ
∗
0 = w, even though (iv) the
citizen prefers to enroll in public school (e∗ = 1); meanwhile (v) a benevolent ruler invests
in public education (g∗1 = 1) and (vi) sets τ
∗
1 = τ
BE
1 .
From Proposition 1 can be inferred conditions under which a predatory ruler will not invest
in schooling when m0 = 0, whereas a benevolent ruler will (i.e. h ∈ [h, h)), inducing a RNE
in which education provision alone accurately signals ruler type.
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Hence, the interval [h, h) characterizes the space in which a citizen can always expect to
be made better off by education (e∗ = 1) but a predatory ruler does not provide it (g∗0 = 0).
15
In turn, when a predatory ruler does in invest in education, the citizen will always enroll.16
When this happens, however, the citizen will initially face uncertainty about the ruler’s true
objective in providing education. It is this initial uncertainty which a predatory ruler aims
to exploit with propaganda. To see how this works, I will now solve the full model, in which
setting a biased education policy is a feasible option for a predatory ruler.
3.2.2 Public education, propaganda, and productivity
In the baseline model just discussed, any uncertainty that arose when conditions for education
provision by both types were satisfied disappeared as the citizen became educated, inducing
optimal political participation. In this section, I explore how a predatory ruler can exploit
this uncertainty via education policy (i.e. when m0 ∈ {0, 1}) to influence the citizen’s
political socialization, in turn altering his incentives to invest in public education. I begin
with the case in which the citizen sometimes does not join a political club when the ruler is
a predatory type.
Suboptimal political participation
In the model, public education is necessary but not sufficient for the citizen to become
politically active. Rather, it is the content of education that drives political socialization.
Lemma 1 illustrates how a predatory ruler benefits from a less politically active citizenry. I
now explore the conditions under which a predatory ruler will provide public education but
embed the curriculum with propaganda.
Solving the model yields conditions under which a biased education policy (m∗0 = 1)
generates a ruler-favorable curriculum (θˆ = 1) under a predatory ruler (θ = 0), yet where
15When h < h, there arises a NE in which neither ruler type provides education. For the sake of space, I
will henceforth discuss only equilibria in which at least one type invests.
16To see why this always holds, see the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in Appendix C.
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the citizen nonetheless behaves as in a developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE] with
optimal political participation (i.e. c∗ = 1 only if θˆ = 0). As such, she sometimes does not
join a political club when the ruler is predatory. In such cases, all human capital is allocated
toward labor, rendering political challenges infeasible. In turn, political participation levels
will be weakly suboptimal for her ex post, and a predatory ruler can expect his rents to be
greater than in a DSE, ceteris paribus.
Definition 3.2.4. A biased schooling equilibrium [BSE] is a SE in which (i) a predatory ruler
chooses a biased education policy (m∗0 = 1); (ii) the citizen joins a political club (c
∗ = 1) if
and only if the curriculum is not ruler-favorable (θˆ = 0); and (iii) a predatory ruler chooses
τ ∗0 = τ
PA
0 if and only if c
∗ = 1.
Proposition 5. There exists a biased schooling equilibrium [BSE]. In every BSE:
(i) There exists a threshold level of propaganda γ > 0 below which the citizen joins a
political club if and only if the curriculum is not ruler-favorable (θˆ = 0).
(ii) There exists a threshold γ above which a predatory ruler invests in public education
and sets a biased education policy if γ < γ, where h ≥ h if γ ≥ γ.
(iii) When γ > γ and γ ∈ [γ, γ),17 with probability (1−pi)γ the citizen does not join a polit-
ical club even though the ruler is predatory, inducing suboptimal political participation,
and he sets the maximal tax τ ∗0 = τ
PI
0 .
(iv) γ is decreasing in q, σ, h, and w and increasing in α and pi, while γ is decreasing in
h and α and increasing in q, σ, and w when h > α−1.
The intuition behind this equilibrium is simple. A populace of politically engaged citizens is
needed to prevent expropriation, and citizens that undergo less political socialization while
in school make less politically sophisticated and engaged adults. In the model, the citizen’s
exposure to some propaganda prompts her to forgo political club participation. Hence,
17Note that h ≥ h is sufficient but not necessary for γ > γ.
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a moderately strong propaganda technology can induce a more apolitical citizenry. Since
this helps to reinforce a balance of power otherwise reduced by schooling, public education
provision becomes more desirable to a predatory ruler.
This outcome is more common (↑ γ − γ) when the citizen is more trusting in the ruler
prior to schooling (↑ pi), when political institutions are less inclusive (↓ q, σ), and when
human capital is relatively more valuable (↑ α, ↓ w). Of these comparative statics, the first
suggests a complementary role for other types of propaganda outside of the education system,
while the other two complement the existing literature. For example, Campante and Chor
(2012) provide evidence in support of a model in which the relationship between education
and political participation is weaker when relative payoffs from productive activities are
greater. In the present model, less inclusive institutions and relatively more productive
human capital both increase the opportunity cost of engaging in political activities. Since
propaganda works by increasing that perceived opportunity cost, weaker institutions and
more productive human capital increase the marginal effectiveness of propaganda, making
BSE more common.
Finally, the relationship between a BSE and productivity levels h is more ambiguous, and
I will revisit it shortly. First, however, consider the case in which a biased education policy
induces suboptimal political participation, but insufficiently so. That is, the propaganda
technology is too weak (i.e. when γ ≤ γ). Formally,
Definition 3.2.5. A weak non-schooling equilibrium [WNE] is a non-schooling equilibrium
[NE] in which (i) a biased education policy (m∗0 = 1) induces political club participation
(c∗ = 1) if and only if the curriculum is not ruler-favorable (θˆ = 0), but (ii) a predatory ruler
forgoes education provision (g∗0 = 0) and (iii) expropriates τ
∗
0 = w; (iv) a benevolent ruler
invests in schooling (g∗1 = 1) and (v) sets τ
∗
1 = τ
BE
1 .
Remark 3. There exists a weak non-schooling equilibrium [WNE]. In every WNE, (i) h ≥ h
and γ < γ but γ < γ, such that the propaganda technology is too weak to sufficiently suppress
political participation, where (ii) γ ≮ γ for all h ≥ h.
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Hence, a WNE arises when the propaganda technology cannot adequately suppress political
development associated with schooling and the economic gains from education are insuffi-
ciently great to induce education provision under a predatory ruler without propaganda (i.e.
h ∈ [h, h)). This mirrors the last subsection, wherein a predatory ruler’s education policy
choice set was limited to m0 = 0. However, now:
Remark 4. When m0 ∈ {0, 1} and h ∈ [h, h): if γ < γ < γ, then there exists a stronger
propaganda technology γˆ ∈ [γ, γ), which would strictly improve the citizen’s expected payoffs
by inducing public education provision under a predatory ruler.
In other words, when setting a biased education policy is feasible and the propaganda tech-
nology is sufficiently strong, public education provision becomes attractive to predatory
rulers in lower productivity settings (i.e. h ∈ [h, h)). Since the citizen prefers to become
educated (e∗ = 1) when h ≥ h, propaganda can make her better off by making education
provision possible. But can propaganda be too strong?
Overparticipation
The citizen knows Pr(θˆ = 1|θ = 0,m0 = 1) = γ, such that her decision to join a political club
after observing θˆ = 1 depends on the state of the propaganda technology. However, Propo-
sition 2 alludes to an interesting caveat: the relationship between the level of propaganda
and the incentive to become politically active is non-monotonic.
On one hand, if the citizen knows that a predatory ruler prefers a biased education
policy (m∗0 = 1) but propaganda is sufficiently moderated, then apathy in the face of θˆ = 1
is rational. However, as the propaganda technology strengthens, the probability that she is
wrongly exposed to a ruler-favorable curriculum (θˆ = 1) increases. By generating excessive
uncertainty about the ruler’s type, too much propaganda (γ ≥ γ) lowers the value of political
knowledge generated by the curriculum. When this happens, propaganda actually heightens
political engagement, inducing the citizen to join a political club under all curricula as social
insurance against future expropriation, and producing an activistic citizenry that can always
75
E(c(mθ|θˆ))
1
1− pi
γγ
E(c(m0 = 0,m1 = 0|θˆ))
E(c(m0 = 1,m1 = 0|θˆ))
Figure 3.2: Average political participation of the educated, with and without propaganda
demand greater accountability over taxes. As before, this “overparticipation” outcome is
suboptimal for the citizen, insofar as it involves her joining a political club even when it will
induce an unnecessary loss (i.e. c∗ = 1 when θ = 1).
However, even more interesting are the welfare implications for a predatory ruler. In
this event, he will either choose to invest in schooling but maintain a neutral education
policy, inducing a developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE], or forgo education altogether,
inducing a repressive schooling equilibrium [RNE]. Formally,
Proposition 6. If setting a biased education policy is feasible for a predatory ruler, m0 ∈
{0, 1}, but the propaganda technology is sufficiently strong, γ ≥ γ:
(i) There exists a developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE], with optimal political par-
ticipation and less-than-feasible taxes, when h ≥ h.
(ii) There exists a repressive non-schooling equilibrium [RNE], with no public education
and no political participation, when h ∈ [h, h).
(iii) Propaganda disappears with productivity growth: γ|h=h > 0, but limh→∞ γ = 0.
As it turns out, a predatory ruler could have done better in both cases had he been able to
set a lower value of γ ex ante, inducing a biased schooling equilibrium [BSE]:
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Figure 3.3: A predatory ruler’s expected rents, with and without education provision, h < h
Remark 5. When m0 ∈ {0, 1} but γ ≥ γ: if γ > γ, there exists a weaker propaganda
technology γ˜ ∈ (max{γ, 0}, γ), which would:
(i) Strictly improve a predatory ruler’s expected payoffs, with a payoff-maximizing γ˜ ≡
γ˜∗ = limε→0 γ − ε.
(ii) Strictly improve the citizen’s expected payoffs when h ∈ [h, h), by inducing public edu-
cation provision by a predatory ruler.
Hence, a predatory ruler can sometimes improve his payoffs by weakening propaganda. In
lower productivity settings (h ∈ [h, h)), for instance, a somewhat weak propaganda technol-
ogy can help him avoid overparticipation and induce him to invest in public education.
This result also has dynamic implications. Any subsequent rise in productivity (↑ h)
that might occur with development would lower the citizen’s opportunity cost of becoming
politically active. Insofar as this would make her more sensitive to propaganda (↓ γ), rising
productivity should further weaken a predatory ruler’s incentives to use propaganda. More-
over, this effect would be amplified if political institutions were to also evolve to become
more inclusive (↑ q, σ). Eventually, γ → 0 or h ≥ h, such that propaganda would cease to
be useful, while productivity levels would be sufficiently high to sustain education provision
without propaganda.
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium space over productivity (h) and propaganda technology (γ)
3.2.3 Overview of main findings
The model produces three main insights. First, an increase in the productivity effect of
education from low to mid-h may be sufficient to induce investments in public education by
a predatory ruler. However, this is made possible only by the feasibility of biased education
policies, by which public education provision occurs as part of a biased schooling equilibrium
[BSE] with propaganda. Nevertheless, by making investments in education appealing to
predatory rulers, propaganda can make citizens better off. This outcome is more likely when
political institutions are initially less inclusive (i.e. low q, σ), the ruler maintains high levels
of trust (i.e. high pi), and human capital is relatively valuable (i.e. high α, low w).
Then, as citizens become more productive (↑ h), an increasingly weaker propaganda tech-
nology is needed to sustain public education provision. In turn, one should see a shift away
from biased to more neutral educational content among countries with public education.
This effect is compounded as political institutions become more inclusive. However, invest-
ments in public education would nonetheless continue to improve a predatory ruler’s expected
payoffs, even as the frequency of political development driven by education increases.
Finally, in sufficiently high productivity settings (h ≥ h), public education provision is
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always incentive-compatible, even as the optimal propaganda technology ex ante approaches
a perfectly weak technology (i.e. γ → 0). In this developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE],
education policy is always characterized by neutral educational content, regardless of initial
political institutions. Moreover, in the absence of propaganda, education always favors
political development, inducing optimal political participation and in turn lower taxes.
3.2.4 Extension: A dynamic model of unproductive education
The findings of the previous section imply that a rise in the human capital from public
education can decrease a predatory ruler’s payoffs from providing it, by promoting transition
from a biased schooling equilibrium [BSE] with propaganda to a developmental schooling
equilibrium [DSE] with optimal political participation. Indeed, a predatory ruler may wish to
prevent this. A temporary solution, of course, would be for him to simply use less propaganda
for each subsequent cohort of citizens, as implied by Remark 3. However, a second approach
would be for him to actually impede productivity growth. Take the following example:
Example 1. Fix the ruler’s propaganda technology at γ = γh=h. By Proposition 3, when
h = h, there is a DSE, while a lower h ∈ [h, h), conditional upon γ ≥ γ, induces a BSE.
Then there exists some η = ηˆ > 0, such that a predatory ruler’s payoffs from a BSE with
a productivity effect of education, h = h − η, exceed his payoffs from a DSE with a greater
productivity effect, h = h, for any value of η ∈ (0, ηˆ).
Hence, under certain conditions, a predatory ruler will prefer propaganda over productivity.
This points to an interesting dynamic problem, in which a predatory ruler has an incentive
to sabotage increases in human capital. That is, he may want to choose an education
policy that not only manipulates citizens’ beliefs about the political environment, but also
negatively impacts the productivity of education, so to sustain a BSE in the long-term. As
counterintuitive as that may seem, the notion that propaganda-based education may also
lower the return on education has received empirical support (Fuchs-Schundeln and Masella,
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2016). In this section, I explore a dynamic extension of the model in which this arrangement
is sometimes preferable from the standpoint of a predatory ruler. Furthermore, I will show
that this enriches the equilibrium structure described in the proceeding sections.
There are now two time periods t ∈ {1, 2}, and human capital acquired in the first
period increases the productivity of education in the second. A ruler with type θ ∈ {0, 1}
rules over both periods. At the end of the first period, a citizen with a prior belief, pi1 ∈ (0, 1),
reproduces. Before dying, she transmits some information about the political environment to
her offspring. To reflect this, if the ruler is a predatory type, then the second period citizen
inherits a more informative prior, pi2 < pi1. Otherwise, pi2 > pi1. However, each citizen is
myopic and makes decisions only with regard for her own payoffs.
If the ruler invests in education, gθt ∈ {0, 1}, in any period, then an education system
always exists thereafter, and he incurs a cost of 1 each remaining period. At the end of each
period, he must balance the budget constraint, Rθt + etgθt ≤ RIθt +E(τθt|θ). He is endowed
with new rents RI at the beginning of each period, such that RIθ1 = R
I and RIθ2 = Rθ1 +R
I ,
with RIθt restricted as before.
If he invests in education in the first period, then human capital acquisition promotes
increased productivity in the second:
h2 = h+ (1− δ)h1 > h1,
where δ ∈ (0, 1). The ruler decides whether to invest in education in the first period given
a lifetime payoff function,
V (θ) = θU1 + (1− θ)Rθ1 + β[θ(t− 1)U2 + (1− θ)(Rθ2 −Rθ1)],
where β ∈ (0, 1] is the time discount factor. This functional form assumes that a benevolent
ruler internalizes citizens’ myopia, while a predatory ruler does not double count the rents
he acquired in the first period.
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As before, if a citizen enrolls in a public school, et ∈ {0, 1}, then she has the choice to
join a political club, ct ∈ {0, 1}, and dedicate some of her time to developing politics-specific
human capital. If ct = 1, then she can later mount a political challenge against a predatory
ruler, rt ∈ {0, 1}. If the citizen challenges a predatory ruler in period 1 and wins, then the
ruler is replaced in period 2 by a new ruler who, with probability 1− pi1, is also predatory.
However, a predatory ruler can try to influence this political club decision via education
policy.
With the addition of dynamic human capital accumulation, I now allow education policy
to vary over two dimensions. The curriculum continues to provide a signal of the ruler’s
type, θˆt ∈ {0, 1}, so a predatory ruler may want to manipulate the curriculum to dissemi-
nate propaganda that targets the citizen’s beliefs in period t, a choice given by mAθt ∈ {0, 1}.
However, if he opts to use propaganda, he may want to structure education such that pro-
paganda also affects the return on education, suppressing human capital accumulation from
period 1 to 2. I model this as a one-time choice, mBθ ∈ {0, 1}. This effect might be direct
if the content of propaganda entails transmission of less productive values, or it might work
through complementary teaching styles and reward structures that inhibit critical thinking
or promote rent-seeking (Algan et al, 2013; Fuchs-Schundeln and Masella, 2016).
With probability γ = Pr(θˆ = 1|θ = 0,mA0t = 1) ∈ (0, 1], propaganda affects the citizen’s
beliefs about a predatory ruler in period t. If in addition mB0 = 1, then a portion ρ ∈ (0, 1) of
education in period 1 is unproductive (i.e. h1 = (1−ρ)h). Less human capital being acquired
in period 1 results in a decreased productivity effect of education in period 2, relative to if
mB0 = 0. I assume these two effects of propaganda to be orthogonal ex ante. However, they
will nonetheless be highly interdependent in equilibria with propaganda, as will soon become
clear.
The general structure of the game within each period remains unchanged. In turn, the
results from the basic model regarding optimal taxes and rents for any schooling equilibrium
[SE] will continue to hold for all t. I can now define the following:
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Definition 3.2.6. An unproductive biased schooling equilibrium [UBSE] is a two period BSE
in which (i) a predatory ruler chooses a biased education policy in both periods (mA∗0t = 1 for
all t); (ii) propaganda suppresses human capital accumulation from period 1 to 2, decreasing
the return on education (mB∗0 = 1); (iii) a citizen joins a political club (c
∗
t = 1) if and only
if the curriculum is not ruler-favorable (θˆt = 0) for all t; and (iii) a predatory ruler chooses
τ ∗0t = τ
PA
0t if and only if c
∗
t = 1 for all t.
Proposition 7. When the propaganda technology is sufficiently strong such that γ < γ(h1|mB0 =
0) in period 1 but γ ≥ γ(h2|mB0 = 0) in period 2, there exists an unproductive biased schooling
equilibrium [UBSE]. In every UBSE:
(i) There exists a positive level of unproductive education ρ > ρ ≥ 0 for which neither
generation of citizen becomes politically active if exposed to a ruler-favorable curriculum
(θˆt = 0).
(ii) If ρ > ρ, then there exists an upper level of unproductive education ρ = ρ > 0 below
which a predatory ruler sets a biased education policy with unproductive education if he
invests in education in period 1.
(iii) ρ is increasing in γ and h, while ρ is increasing in γ and decreasing in h.
The intuition behind this equilibrium is simple. Human capital accumulation (i.e. h2 > h1)
decreases the effectiveness of propaganda in period 2 (i.e. γ(h2) < γ(h1)), making it more
likely that education induces a DSE with optimal political participation and lower taxes. By
letting propaganda not only impact beliefs but also lower the productivity of education in
a small but non-zero way, this can be avoided. Although human capital still feeds into the
productivity of education over time, it does not induce a transition from a BSE in period 1
to a DSE in period 2.
Nevertheless, the comparative statics generated by this exercise suggest that use of strat-
egy will be short-lived. First, note that the two effects of propaganda – on beliefs and on
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the productivity of education – are complementary. A strong effect of propaganda on beliefs
(↑ γ) enhances both the importance of and the incentives to use unproductive education
(↑ ρ, ρ) for preventing transition to a DSE in period 2. Likewise, if propaganda cannot suffi-
ciently lower the productivity of education (i.e. if ρ  ρ), then a predatory ruler will prefer
a weaker beliefs effect (↓ γ) in order to retain a BSE. Since this is more likely to occur if
human capital continues to accumulate even a little (i.e. ↑ ρ and ↓ ρ if ↑ h), a predatory
ruler will eventually prefer little or no propaganda, as in the basic model.
Despite the simple environment assumed in this extension, it yields several interesting
results that strengthen and expand the implications of the basic model. Moreover, it points
to avenues for future theoretical work in which these assumptions are relaxed. For instance,
it would be interesting to explore how propaganda’s ability to impact citizens’ beliefs may
change over time, as well as how a predatory ruler might alter the propaganda technology
to promote persistence in beliefs. I leave these as possibilities for future research.
3.3 Empirical evidence
Numerous studies have documented a robust relationship between education and democracy
(Barro, 1999; Bobba and Coviello, 2007). Many others have helped illustrate, at least in
part, a complex interplay between human or social capital and political development.18 This
section highlights some additional evidence relevant to this discussion, by testing two of the
model’s main relationships. One is a predatory ruler’s incentives to use propaganda following
investments in public education. Another is a citizen’s tendency to be politically active after
receiving an education, given her exposure to propaganda. Modeling each empirically, I
establish strong and robust correlations that support the model’s main predictions.
18See Gradstein and Justman (2000), Tabellini (2010), Algan et al (2013), Nannicini et al (2013).
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3.3.1 Education provision and propaganda
To study the connection between public education and propaganda, I use data from the World
Bank’s (WB) World Development Indicators (WDI) index, spanning across 136 countries
from 1997 to 2014. Since countries that use less propaganda exhibit political development in
the model, I do not limit the sample to nondemocracies. In order to gauge a government’s
relative demand for public education, I use education expenditures as a percentage of total
government expenditures as the explanatory variable. The response variable should thus
indicate its investment in propaganda.
Unfortunately, there is no measure of propaganda within education systems across coun-
tries or over time. I therefore adopt a more general measure of propaganda – Freedom
House’s (FH) Freedom of the Press index, rescaled to be out of 10, with a larger value
indicating more constraints on the press – as a proxy, implicitly assuming that press in-
dependence is perfectly correlated with academic independence. Nevertheless, to address
concerns that this variable is too removed from the use of propaganda in schools, or similar
only insofar as both are likely to be correlated with certain institutional qualities, I construct
a cross-country “academic constraints” variable. This indicator takes a value of 1 only if a
country appears in the Scholars at Risk (SAR) Incident Index as having punished scholars
with imprisonment, prosecution, or travel restrictions.19 In a cross section of countries, a
10% increase in a country’s FH score corresponds to around a 7.5% increase in the probabil-
ity that a country is assigned a 1 for academic constraints, even after controlling for general
institutional qualities. Those estimates are available in Appendix C.
Additional cross-country variables are also derived from the WDI. To proxy for a country’s
productivity, I use GDP per capita (in USD 2010). To control for other potential sources of
variation driving choices of press constraints, I include as covariates military expenditures
as a percentage of GDP and government expenditures as a percentage of GDP.20 To gauge
19I exclude incidents involving violence or loss of position, since the former usually follow general protests
unrelated to academic content, while the latter typically reflect non-state retaliation.
20Cross-country observations are transformed logarithmically for greater normality. As a result, zero or
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Table 3.1: Public education provision and media and press constraints
Proxy for propaganda: press constraints and media censorship
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2) (3)
lnEducation
1.850∗∗
(0.731)
1.850∗∗
(0.717)
1.958∗∗
(0.762)
1.822∗∗
(0.782)
2.011∗∗
(0.817)
2.517∗∗∗
(0.921)
lnEdu× lnGDPpc −0.241
∗∗∗
(0.092)
−0.243∗∗∗
(0.091)
−0.259∗∗∗
(0.096)
−0.240∗∗
(0.098)
−0.262∗∗
(0.102)
−0.309∗∗∗
(0.116)
lnGDPpc
0.272
(0.333)
0.253
(0.332)
0.289
(0.333)
0.243
(0.339)
0.359
(0.299)
0.408
(0.397)
Polity
−0.108∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.105∗∗∗
(0.020)
−0.107∗∗∗
(0.022)
−0.104∗∗∗
(0.023)
−0.125∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.098∗∗∗
(0.026)
Crisis –
0.176∗
(0.100)
0.189∗
(0.106)
0.194∗
(0.108)
0.140
(0.150)
0.169
(0.122)
lnMilitary – –
−0.025
(0.102)
0.008
(0.118)
0.029
(0.096)
0.040
(0.134)
lnGovExpend – – –
−0.045
(0.215)
−0.196
(0.175)
−0.183
(0.237)
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDPmin 0.588
∗∗
(0.271)
0.578∗∗
(0.264)
0.605∗∗
(0.280)
0.565∗
(0.292)
0.641∗∗
(0.305)
0.872∗∗∗
(0.330)
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDP10% 0.363
∗
(0.199)
0.352∗
(0.194)
0.365∗
(0.206)
0.341
(0.215)
0.397∗
(0.225)
0.586∗∗
(0.243)
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDP90% −0.714
∗∗
(0.285)
−0.734∗∗
(0.287)
−0.790∗∗
(0.303)
−0.732∗∗
(0.304)
−0.773∗∗
(0.308)
−0.790∗
(0.374)
Adj. R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.21
Observations 1452 1452 1366 1343 2134 1092
Countries 136 136 132 131 132 85
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balanced panel? No No No No No Yes
Mean imputation? No No No No Yes No
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Column 2 applies a country mean imputation procedure to the education expenditure data and controls for a dummy,
which takes a value of 1 when a value is missing. Rows labeled lnEdu + lnEdu × lnGDP report the combined effect (and
standard errors) of lnEducation and lnEdu× lnGDPpc at different levels (sample minimum, 10% and 90%) within the sample
distribution of lnGDPpc.
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a country’s political institutions, I include Polity IV’s POLITY2 index, which ranges from
−10 to 10 with 10 being most democratic. I also use POLITY2 to derive a “crisis” dummy,
since propaganda may be more prevalent in more volatile times. This variable takes a value
of one for any year Polity IV denotes a country as being in interregnum or transition – plus
the years before and after an interregnum, transition, or foreign interruption – as well as a
value of one for any year immediately preceding or following a change in POLITY2 score
larger than 5.21 Finally, I include country and year fixed effects and cluster standard errors
by country.
With these data, I analyze two predictions regarding investment in propaganda: that (i)
public education spending should be positively correlated with propaganda in less productive
settings, and that (ii) this positive correlation should disappear with rises in productivity.
Given these predictions, I include in each regression a term interacting education expendi-
tures with real GDP per capita.
The estimates, as shown in Table 3.1, match these predictions. There is a positive
and significant relationship between a government’s education expenditures and its press
constraints among observations in the bottom third of the distribution of real GDP per
capita. This positive correlation disappears with productivity: the coefficient on the term
interacting education expenditures and GDP per capita is negative and significant. This can
also be seen by looking at the combined effect of education expenditures and its interaction
with real GDP per capita. This is reported in Table 3.1 at different levels (sample minimum,
10%, and 90%) within the sample distribution of logged real GDP per capita. Finally, these
results are also presented using standardized beta coefficients in Table C.6.
Since collecting and reporting on macroeconomic data is likely to be correlated with a
country’s institutions, I deal with concerns regarding missing education expenditures ob-
servations in columns (2) and (3). First, following Glaeser et al (2007), I impute missing
near-zero military expenditure values become outliers. In Table C.3, I repeat the main regressions with an
alternative military expenditures variable correcting for this.
21Summary statistics can be found in Tables C.1 in Appendix C.
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education expenditure values using country means, controlling for a dummy indicating when
a value is missing. The estimates change little.22 A second approach simply drops underre-
porting countries from the sample. These estimates in (3) remain substantively similar as
well. Altogether, this exercise provides strong evidence in support of the model.
3.3.2 Education, propaganda, and political participation
To study how political participation levels following education vary with exposure to propa-
ganda, I use individual-level data from the World Values Survey (WVS), spanning across 70
countries from 1994 to 2014, in addition to FH’s press freedom and Polity IV’s POLITY2
indexes. As before, I do not limit the sample based on polity.23 Because the theory con-
cerns the effects of propaganda observed while in school on political engagement thereafter,
I match survey respondents with a FH score corresponding to the year of some base age (e.g.
18 years old), to proxy for exposure to propaganda during later adolescence. Since FH began
publishing numeric scores in 1993, individuals in the sample range from 18 to 43 years of
age.
To gauge adult political engagement, I use four WVS variables to create two composite
response variables.24 The first measures passive political participation and takes into account
survey respondents’ (i) interest in politics and (ii) beliefs about its importance. The most
passively engaged respondents received a score of 6; the least, a score of 0. The second
measures active participation and considers survey respondents’ participation in (i) lawful
demonstrations and (ii) petition signings. The most actively engaged respondents received
a score of 4; the least, a score of 0.
Besides press constraints, the main explanatory variable is educational attainment, with
responses ranging from 0 (incomplete primary) to 7 (university). In each specification with
22See Table C.4 for more on these relationships.
23I do however follow Glaeser et al (2007) in excluding countries with Polity IV autocracy scores that
average > 4 over the period, since those may be more likely to mandate political participation.
24See Appendix C for explicit details about how variables were derived from WVS variables. See Table
C.7 for some specifications run using each of the four original variables.
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Table 3.2: Press constraints at age 18, education, and passive participation
Measure of passive political participation
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (3c)
EducationAttainment
0.088∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.141∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.097∗∗
(0.044)
0.183∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.172∗∗∗
(0.040)
0.167∗∗∗
(0.040)
EA× PressConstraintsb – −0.012
∗∗
(0.005)
−0.008
(0.006)
−0.057∗∗∗
(0.017)
−0.053∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.052∗∗∗
(0.012)
EA× PressConstraints2b – – –
0.005∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.005∗∗∗
(0.001)
EA×Polityt – – 0.004(0.003)
0.004
(0.003)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
0.005∗∗
(0.002)
PressConstraintsb –
0.022
(0.025)
0.007
(0.028)
0.255∗∗∗
(0.097)
0.251∗∗∗
(0.071)
0.258∗∗∗
(0.064)
PressConstraints2b – – –
−0.027∗∗
(0.011)
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.024∗∗∗
(0.006)
Polityt
−0.003
(0.018)
0.011
(0.028)
−0.004
(0.033)
−0.003
(0.034)
0.025
(0.024)
0.019
(0.023)
Aget
0.054∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.056∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.057∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.053∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.055∗∗∗
(0.018)
Aget
2 −0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
−0.001∗
(0.0003)
−0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
−0.001∗
(0.0003)
−0.001∗
(0.0003)
−0.001∗∗
(0.0003)
IncomeLevelt
0.033∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.031∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.032∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.025∗∗∗
(0.006)
Studentt – – – –
0.158∗∗∗
(0.030)
0.156∗∗∗
(0.033)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11
Observations 43714 32432 32432 32432 49552 56129
Countries 65 65 65 65 70 70
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-students only? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Mean imputation? No No No No No Yes
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Base year (b) is derived from the survey year (t), minus the respondent’s age (Aget), plus 18. All regressions control for
sex, relationship status, number of children, and employment status. Columns (2c) and (2d) also apply a mean imputation
procedure to educational attainment, income level, sex, relationship status, number of children, employment, and student
status and control for dummies, which equal 1 when an observation is missing.
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press constraints, I include a term interacting an individual’s educational attainment with
press constraints at her base age. Then, prompted by the model’s prediction that the effects
of propaganda will be non-monotonic, I allow press constraints to affect the correlation
between education and political participation quadratically in columns (3a-3c). Finally, I
include as controls a host of individual characteristics, as well as country and year fixed
effects, and cluster standard errors by country.
Given this, I want to test three of the model’s claims regarding the effects of propaganda:
(i) the effect of educational attainment on political participation will be positive; (ii) exposure
to more propaganda will decrease the effects of education on political participation; and (iii)
the effect of propaganda on the relationship between education and political participation
will decrease with the level of propaganda.
Using age 18 as the base age,25 the estimates in specifications with passive political
participation are consistent with those predictions. Although the overall effect of having
press constraints on the correlation between education and political participation is at most
slightly negative, quadratic specifications indicate a strong and significant effect when press
constraints are relatively weak. As a level of constraints rises, this effect diminishes. If press
constraints is a good proxy for propaganda, then this is reassuring evidence in favor of the
model’s predictions. When the response variable instead describes active participation as
in Table 3.3, the results are similar, albeit at slightly lower levels of statistical significance.
Results using standardized beta coefficients are presented in Table C.10.
Though the main specifications limit to sample to those who have completed schooling,
the results should also hold for those still in school, for whom propaganda induces a greater
allocation of time toward substitute activities. These estimates can be found in columns
(3b) of Tables 3.2 and 3.3. They remain generally the same, with the correlation between
being a student and being politically active being strong.
As before, many respondents correspond to missing observations. Luckily, there is more
25Is 18 the best base age if political socialization is still ongoing during college years? See Table C.8 for a
version with 22 as the base age. The estimates are similar.
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Table 3.3: Press constraints at age 18, education, and active participation
Measure of active political participation
(1) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (3c)
EducationAttainment
0.111∗∗∗
(0.006)
0.147∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.115∗∗∗
(0.039)
0.138∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.129∗∗∗
(0.037)
0.136∗∗∗
(0.033)
EA× PressConstraintsb – −0.008
∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.019∗
(0.011)
−0.019∗
(0.010)
−0.022∗∗
(0.009)
EA× PressConstraints2b – – –
0.001
(0.001)
0.002∗
(0.001)
0.002∗∗
(0.001)
EA×Polityt – – 0.003(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.003
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
PressConstraintsb –
0.033∗∗
(0.015)
0.023
(0.019)
0.058
(0.052)
0.070
(0.048)
0.076
(0.046)
PressConstraints2b – – –
−0.004
(0.005)
−0.005
(0.005)
−0.005
(0.004)
Polityt
0.026
(0.020)
0.036
(0.027)
0.025
(0.027)
0.026
(0.027)
0.040∗∗
(0.020)
0.043∗∗
(0.018)
Aget
0.018
(0.012)
0.008
(0.016)
0.009
(0.016)
0.008
(0.016)
0.006
(0.015)
0.014
(0.014)
Aget
2 −0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0001
(0.0003)
−0.00004
(0.0003)
IncomeLevelt
0.002
(0.006)
0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.002
(0.007)
0.003
(0.005)
0.004
(0.005)
Studentt – – – –
0.193∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.208∗∗∗
(0.040)
Adj. R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22
Observations 41221 30546 30546 30546 46492 52399
Countries 65 65 65 65 70 70
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-students only? Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Mean imputation? No No No No No Yes
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Base year (b) is derived from the survey year (t), minus the respondent’s age (Aget), plus 18. All regressions control for
sex, relationship status, number of children, and employment status. Columns (2c) and (2d) also apply a mean imputation
procedure to educational attainment, income level, sex, relationship status, number of children, employment, and student
status and control for dummies, which equal 1 when an observation is missing.
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flexibility in this setting, as countries have multiple observations per year. In turn, I am able
to perform a country-year mean imputation procedure, generating greater variation among
imputed values. There are no major differences between models with or without imputation.
Columns (3c) summarize these results.
Another issue is that it is impossible to know whether a respondent was educated (and
thus exposed to propaganda) in her country of current residence. Fortunately, WVS does
ask some respondents about their immigration and citizenship statuses. I exclude from the
analysis respondents identifying as immigrants or non-citizens, since those individuals are
more likely to have characteristics that would bias the estimates, distracting from the mech-
anism of interest. This exclusion produces only trivial changes to the estimates. However,
this is possibly due to the fact that the number of reported immigrants and non-citizens in
the sample is relatively small.
Indeed, it is likely that other respondents are also immigrants. Moreover, it is also pos-
sible that some individuals might have been in the sample had they not migrated prior to
the survey. Could the decision to migrate be correlated with education or press constraints?
Fortunately, the existence of some respondents who were asked about immigration and citi-
zenship allows me to make some rough inferences about the types of individuals who might
have migrated. Being an immigrant or non-citizen, or both (i.e. “international”),26 seems to
be somewhat negatively correlated with educational attainment. However, each is similarly
negatively correlated with political participation and does not appear to alter the relation-
ship between education and political participation. As such, there is probably little reason
for concern over unobservable inclusion or exclusion of migrants in the sample.
Lastly, it is worth noting that having greater press constraints at age 18 is positively
correlated with passive (but not active) participation among individuals with less education
(i.e. less then secondary). Whether this speaks to press censorship having a lesser effect
on the uneducated or more government-favorable forms of political engagement among the
26See Tables C.9 in Appendix C.
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uneducated deserves further study. A first step for future research into the connections
between propaganda, education, and political participation would be the creation of a cross-
country index of educational content. The current article cites a cross-sectional index of
academic constraints as support for its use of press and media constraints to proxy for
propaganda in educational settings. However, to my knowledge no systematic effort has
been made to date to measure the relative prevalence of political propaganda or censorship in
public schools across countries. Detailed analysis of state-sponsored curricula and teaching
practices, including textual analysis of textbooks and education laws, is needed to better
understand the importance of educational content for economic and political development.
Finally, future research should also exploit educational reforms and regional variation in
education policy in order to document causal effects of educational content on economic and
political outcomes in specific settings.
3.4 Conclusion
Nondemocratic regimes face a tradeoff when investing in public education. On one hand,
education promotes economic development. On the other hand, it may also facilitate po-
litical engagement and new social ties among citizens, elevating future political opposition
movements. As a result, the economic incentives underlying public education provision may
be insufficient to induce investment therein.
I present a model in which a ruler can relax this tradeoff by disseminating propaganda
through the education system. I show that educational content will tend to be embedded
with propaganda in less developed countries with public education. By making investments
in education more appealing to a nondemocratic regime, however, propaganda can also make
citizens better off. Further development should then coincide with decreases in propaganda.
Perhaps the most important takeaway from this is that it may ultimately be a bad idea to pro-
mote “Western” (e.g. secular) education standards in illiberal countries. If successful, those
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efforts could drive down levels of investment in education, slowing development. Rather, if
education does promote development, this transformation should eventually happen on its
own.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
Table A.1: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Pre-war data (1923-33)
% German 325 35.666 41.132 .024 98.845
% Roma 325 .002 .012 0 .129
% Jewish (ethnic group) 325 .145 .316 0 2.825
% Jewish (religion) 325 .522 .645 0 6.981
% Literate 325 98.516 .709 94.94 99.65
Convictions per capita 318 7.274 2.057 2.484 16.318
% Taxpayers 147 5.698 1.786 2.33 11.65
Income per capita (100 Kcˇs) 145 9.469 4.105 3.669 30.775
ln Population density 325 4.724 .623 3.336 9.002
ln Labor force density 325 3.951 .698 2.413 8.476
Labor force participation 325 46.468 5.318 33.339 61.908
Unemployment 146 13.125 10.186 1.417 58.796
% Agricultural sector 325 28.077 13.991 .769 60.529
% Secondary sector 325 40.602 13.672 16.967 76.309
% Industry 325 33.557 14.183 10.753 72.145
% Mining and other extraction 325 3.59 5.199 .26 36.218
% Metallurgy and metalwork 325 4.411 3.499 1.429 24.611
% Manufacturing 325 2.283 2.21 .311 16.322
% Glasswork 325 1.133 3.687 0 33.643
% Textiles 325 7.13 10.822 .029 54.741
% Other industry 325 15.01 6.149 6.809 62.857
% Construction 325 7.045 2.364 2.806 17.536
% Transport sector 325 3.473 2.012 1.131 13.615
% Business sector 325 5.999 2.497 2.592 20.841
% Finance and insurance 325 .401 .279 0 3.084
% Trade 325 5.597 2.301 2.512 19.469
% Other service 325 6.694 3.779 3.071 29.368
Geographic data
Elevation (m) 6206 410.505 144.345 121.833 1144.601
Ruggedness (◦) 6206 6.422 3.001 1.053 20.725
Precipitation (mm) 6206 53.047 6.98 40.494 100.068
Temperature (◦C) 6206 7.581 .82 3.262 9.534
Rivers/km2 (km) 6206 1.183 .52 0 5.1
% Arable land, 1945 159 45.39 14.569 7.938 77.664
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Table A.1: Summary statistics (II)
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Post-expulsion/resettlement data (mid-1947)
ln Population density 325 4.396 .742 2.1 8.913
% Agricultural sector 325 29.417 15.433 1.096 68.175
% Secondary sector 325 47.046 14.501 14.138 81.535
% Transport sector 325 5.136 2.776 1.373 17.252
% Business sector 325 6.372 1.877 2.262 15.599
General enrollment per 100, 5-14 160 56.201 5.287 47.15 73.243
Civic enrollment per 100, 10-14 160 52.363 8.596 27.805 75.51
Agricultural enroll. per 100, 15-19 160 6.528 4.976 0 22.097
Vocational enroll. per 100, 15-19 160 15.212 10.74 0 57.857
College enrollment per 100, 15-24 160 2.14 1.506 .093 10.552
Contemporary data (2011)
Unemployment 6206 11.511 5.686 0 52.222
ln Population density 6206 3.987 .946 -3.965 7.894
ln Labor force density 6206 3.251 .967 -5.064 7.214
% Agricultural sector 6206 7.111 6.195 0 100
% Industry 6206 25.769 8.119 0 58.974
% Construction 6206 7.135 3.148 0 30.769
% Transport sector 6206 5.301 2.75 0 27.273
% Finance and insurance 6206 1.381 1.262 0 10
% Hospitality 6206 2.435 2.341 0 41.213
% Auto trade and repair 6206 7.861 3.322 0 29.167
% Public 6206 4.54 2.664 0 64.029
% Communications 6206 1.33 1.399 0 14.085
% Education 6206 4.012 2.199 0 22.222
% Healthcare 6206 4.525 2.864 0 54.412
% Other service 6206 4.599 2.806 0 33.333
% Primary education or less 6206 21.797 5.698 0 68.908
% Secondary education 6206 65.919 5.317 25.21 86.111
% Tertiary education 6206 8.364 4.214 0 33.741
Panel data (1921-2011)
% Agricultural sector 657 18.399 13.032 .426 56.506
% Industry 657 36.892 10.585 11.95 70.679
% Service sector 657 28.909 11.846 7.479 63.622
ln Population density 730 4.727 .647 3.4 7.431
ln Labor force density 657 3.979 .684 2.347 6.786
Education index 584 -.024 .929 -4.183 3.882
% Secondary education 438 46.962 18.93 6.498 66.538
% Tertiary education 438 7.079 4.441 1.407 28.584
Net migrants per capita 511 -.032 .537 -2.383 2.634
In migrants per capita 511 1.945 1.326 .568 9.378
Out migrants per capita 511 1.977 1.301 .682 10.16
For variable descriptions, see the end of these supplementary materials. This table omits Prague and Polish Zaolzie since they
are excluded from all analyses. Sample is otherwise not limited, including by bandwidth or by the extent of overlap with the
Munich Agreement line, except: 1933 income per capita data are missing for a handful of political districts in the Prague area
(Praha-venkov, Ricany, and Jilove). Unemployment data for 1933 political districts are missing for Praha-venkov, while labor
force data are combined for Olomouc and Olomouc-venkov. 1923-7 convictions data merge several districts into larger criminal
jurisdictions in the Brno, Zlin, and Prague urban areas. In 1945, political districts Lanskroun and Usti nad Orlici were merged,
so I manually merge them for the 1945 arable land variable.
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Table A.2: Geographic balance tests
Borderlands Interior Difference S.E. Borderlands Interior Difference S.E.
Elevation 407.243 401.409 (12.065) 434.071 398.881 (5.147)∗∗∗
Ruggedness 6.554 6.455 (.253) 7.373 6.093 (.106)∗∗∗
Precipitation 53.471 53.920 (.612) 54.610 53.104 (.259)∗∗∗
Temperature 7.517 7.590 (.076) 7.244 7.650 (.028)∗∗∗
Rivers/km2 1.045 1.115 (.0 46) 1.163 1.141 (.019)
Observations 224 322 546 1102 2947 4049
Bandwidth 2 km 2 km 2 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Arable land 46.974 50.279 (6.374) 39.600 50.547 (3.462)∗∗∗
Observations 11 14 25 30 38 68
Bandwidth 10 km 10 km 10 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945
Mean difference standard errors reported in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All t-tests exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie.
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Table A.3: WWII deaths by group
Group
Cause of
wartime death
Casualties Source Notes
Sudeten
Germans
Military deaths
∼180,000;
<206,000
Die Deutschen
Vertreibungsverluste:
Bevo¨lkerungsbilanzen
fu¨r die Deutschen
Vertreibungsgebiete,
1939-50 (1958);
Overmans (2004)
Includes Sudeten German servicemen
who died during the liberation of
Czechoslovakia in May of 1945, which
also marked the start of the
expulsions. Though impossible to
know theexact number killed during
the liberation, it was a violent event
that left hundreds of thousands dead.
Overmans estimates 206,000
Germans dead from all territories
annexed by Germany in WWII.
Civilian casualties ?
Uncertain how many Sudeten
Germans died in the bombings that
hit Czechoslovakia during the war.
However, few bombs struck the coun-
try, and most were in the interior
(see Figure A.2). About 30,000
Sudeten German civilian deaths,
including about 7000 murders at
Czech hands, occurred during the
expulsion itself (Gerlach, 2017).
Jews
Executed by
Nazis or died
from forced labor
270,000 Erlikhman (2004) Previously smooth through MAL.
Roma
Executed by
Nazis or died
from forced labor
8000 Erlikhman (2004) Previously smooth through MAL.
Other
Czechs
Military deaths 35,000 Erlikhman (2004)
Civilian casualities 10,000 Erlikhman (2004)
Executed by
Nazis or died
from forced labor
32,000 Erlikhman (2004)
Overmans (2004) refers to Deutsche Milita¨rische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Munich: Oldenbourg. Erlikhman (2004) refers
to Poteri Narodonaseleniia v XX Veke: Spravochnik, Moscow: Russkaia Panorama.
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Table A.4: RD robustness, balance tests
% German Literacy
ln Pop.
density
Unemploy. Incomepc % Taxpayer
Agri.
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (1g)
Local conditional mean comparison, 10km bandwidth
In borderlands 74.186 .084 -.162 .676 -1.249 .422 -1.149
(5.605)∗∗∗ (.173) (.153) (2.148) (2.630) (.832) (2.731)
R2 .924 .288 .355 .769 .361 .513 .404
Observations 70 70 70 20 21 21 70
Clusters 53 53 53 – – – 53
Border segments 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Local linear in longitude and latitude
In borderlands 73.575 .264 -.108 1.781 -.392 .391 -1.264
(3.853)∗∗∗ (.152)∗ (.116) (2.449) (1.490) (.484) (2.577)
R2 .933 .515 .482 .645 .387 .541 .535
Observations 165 165 165 104 104 105 165
Clusters 98 98 98 – – – 98
Border segments 24 24 24 16 16 16 16
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 25 km
Cubic in distance from Munich Agreement line, no bandwidth
In borderlands 68.325 -.309 -.433 -3.091 -6.904 -1.109 .266
(7.478)∗∗∗ (.269) (.330) (6.404) (4.694) (1.508) (6.385)
R2 .951 .495 .389 .692 .447 .591 .485
Observations 272 272 272 110 109 111 272
Clusters 138 138 138 – – – 138
Border segments 24 24 24 16 16 16 24
Mining and
extraction
Metals
Manu-
facturing
Glass Textiles
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f) (2g)
Local conditional mean comparison, 10km bandwidth
In borderlands -.789 .920 -.438 1.248 -1.591 -.046 .360
(1.181) (1.355) (.309) (1.333) (2.581) (.496) (.571)
R2 .224 .32 .329 .284 .464 .287 .189
Observations 70 70 70 70 70 70 70
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Border segments 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Local linear in longitude and latitude, 25km bandwidth
In borderlands -.982 -.414 -.697 .230 .758 -.114 .483
(.970) (.911) (.324)∗∗ (.479) (1.552) (.420) (.464)
R2 .395 .339 .311 .467 .64 .321 .341
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165 165
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Cubic in distance from Munich Agreement line, no bandwidth
In borderlands -1.751 2.432 .801 .898 -6.562 .040 -1.262
(2.505) (2.450) (.999) (2.365) (4.682) (.891) (1.225)
R2 .251 .251 .263 .287 .554 .289 .339
Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272
Clusters 138 138 138 138 138 138 138
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Robust standard errors clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and control for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature,
and river density.
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Table A.5: Pre-expulsion RD pre-trends, 1921-30
Literacy
ln Population
density
ln Labor force
density
Agricultural
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
∆‘30−‘21In borderlands .576 .019 .00005 -1.640
(.163)∗∗∗ (.021) (.037) (1.591)
R2 .95 .519 .495 .895
Industry Construction
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
∆‘30−‘21In borderlands .597 -.049 -.226 -.283
(1.418) (.307) (.215) (.257)
R2 .435 .876 .683 .862
Observations 330 330 330 330
Clusters 98 98 98 98
Border segments×1930 24 24 24 24
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1921-30 1921-30 1921-30 1921-30
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness,
precipitation, temperature, and river density interacted with year, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the
Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment and year. Since there were some splits and mergers of judicial districts
between 1921 and 1930, I perform areal interpolation in ArcGIS to reshape a few 1921 districts into 1930 ones (see Table A.14
for details on procedure).
109
Table A.6: Balance tests (extended sample)
% German Literacy
ln Pop.
density
Unemploy. Incomepc % Taxpayer
Agri.
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (1g)
In borderlands 66.681 -.097 -.301 -2.048 -.053 .612 4.666
(5.102)∗∗∗ (.186) (.189) (2.377) (1.477) (.532) (3.390)
R2 .934 .541 .456 .68 .343 .507 .495
Observations 191 191 191 119 120 121 191
Clusters 104 104 104 – – – 104
Border segments 24 24 24 16 16 16 24
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 1933 1930
Mining and
extraction
Metals
Manu-
facturing
Glass Textiles
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f) (2g)
In borderlands -.927 .679 -.414 .922 -4.471 -.775 -.512
(1.180) (1.233) (.583) (1.692) (2.355)∗ (.615) (.808)
R2 .377 .319 .291 .35 .636 .294 .332
Observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Clusters 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by political district, with *** and * denoting significance at the 1% and 10% levels, respec-
tively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature,
and river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line (MAL) interacted with
the treatment. Relative to the main sample, this also includes districts lying mostly but not entirely in the borderlands that
nonetheless had >80% Germans in 1930 (i.e. treated in spite of overlap) as well as those lying mostly but not entirely in the
interior that nonetheless had <20% Germans.
Table A.7: Extent of ethnic diversity by region, 1930
Ethnic fractionalization
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
In borderlands .240 .265 .199 .204
(.023)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.031)∗∗∗
R2 .605 .629 .403 .564
Observations 70 165 123 218
Clusters 53 98 68 107
Border segments 4 24 4 24
Include overlapping districts? No No Yes Yes
Including distance polynomial? No Yes No Yes
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 10 km 25 km 10 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness,
precipitation, temperature, and river density. (1b) and (1d) utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich
Agreement line interacted with the treatment. (1c) and (1d) include districts that overlap the Munich Agreement line, on the
basis that they are relevant as they are likely to be ethnically mixed. The ethnic fractionalization measure used here only takes
into account the share of the population that was German (g) or Czechoslovak (c) on the 1930 census. Other ethnic groups in
the Czech lands were of trivial size. Hence, this measure is given by 1− g2 − c2.
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Table A.8: What kinds of places tended to be mixed?
Literacy ln Pop. density Unemployment Incomepc
Agri.
sector
Mining and
extraction
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
Ethnic frac. -.175 .739 1.491 6.415 -15.918 1.099
(.299) (.324)∗∗ (4.174) (2.779)∗∗ (4.976)∗∗∗ (2.456)
R2 .462 .464 .596 .368 .481 .326
Observations 218 218 97 98 218 218
Clusters 107 107 – – 107 107
Border segments 24 24 16 16 24 24
Year 1930 1930 1933 1933 1930 1930
Metals
Manu-
facturing
Glass Textiles
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
Ethnic frac. -.421 -.313 2.252 .452 .519 3.055
(1.272) (.617) (1.886) (2.971) (.726) (1.107)∗∗∗
R2 .302 .252 .354 .611 .295 .312
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218
Clusters 107 107 107 107 107 107
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 24
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and control for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation,
temperature, and river density. Regressions include all districts with centroids within 25 km of the Munich Agreement line, on
the basis that those are the places most likely to be mixed in the Czech lands. The ethnic fractionalization measure used here
only takes into account the share of the population that was German (g) or Czechoslovak (c) on the 1930 census. Other ethnic
groups in the Czech lands were of trivial size. Hence, this measure is given by 1− g2 − c2.
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Table A.9: Balance tests (concrete sample)
% German Literacy
ln Pop.
density
Unemploy. Incomepc % Taxpayer
Agri.
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (1g)
In borderlands 86.052 -.253 -.179 -5.253 2.778 1.624 2.939
(1.398)∗∗∗ (.314) (.183) (5.421) (1.846) (.762)∗∗ (3.359)
R2 .996 .376 .474 .683 .557 .648 .498
Observations 105 105 105 60 60 60 105
Clusters 65 65 65 – – – 65
Border segments 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 1933 1930
Mining and
extraction
Metals
Manu-
facturing
Glass Textiles
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f) (2g)
In borderlands -1.278 .026 -.270 .472 -6.266 -.461 -.079
(.778) (1.326) (.515) (1.785) (4.077) (.588) (1.178)
R2 .071 .173 .142 .188 .477 .173 .323
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Clusters 65 65 65 65 65 65 65
Border segments 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness,
precipitation, temperature, and river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement
line (MAL) interacted with the treatment. Due to the loss of various stretches of the MAL, I aggregate border segments into
four, associated with North and South Bohemia and Moravia. The concrete sample was generated as follows:
1. First, I drop from the sample all districts that lie entirely in the borderlands or the interior which are not “homogeneous.”
I call these “mixed” districts. For the borderlands, I define “homogeneous” as being >80% German; for the interior,
<20% German (or >80% Czechoslovak). However, stopping here would be problematic. Recall that the goal of this
exercise is to check that places with many Germans (i.e. exposed to expulsion) and places with few were indeed
otherwise ex ante similar around the MAL, while at the same time minimizing the likelihood that borderland Czechs
and pre-treatment sorting around the MAL may have been biasing local district-level differences toward zero. Yet
given what we know from history and Tables A.7-8 – that the borderlands was more mixed than the interior, and that
borderland Czechs selected into urban areas – dropping only these mixed districts will bias the remaining borderlands
sample toward being poorer and more rural on average relative to that of the interior.
2. Hence, we must also drop the other areas around the MAL in the neighborhood of these mixed districts – namely,
the interior districts which correspond to them on the other side of the MAL that are not mixed yet are likely to be
fundamentally similar, given the estimates in Tables 1.2 and 1.3. To do this, I first discretize the MAL in ArcGIS into
just over 100,000 unique points.
3. I then perform a proximity analysis, wherein if a point on the MAL is nearer to the centroid of a homogeneous judicial
district in the borderlands than that of a mixed district, I consider it to be part of a “concrete stretch” of the MAL
(note: since judicial districts are less likely to be mixed in the interior and those which were “language islands” were
not close to the MAL, I need not perform this for both regions). I then generate two files: one of concrete stretches of
points and another of non-concrete.
4. But being on a concrete stretch need not mean the district which is closest will necessarily be concrete, even if that
district is homogeneous; the district which is closest to that point may itself be closer to a different point. To determine
whether a given district is concrete or not, I perform another proximity analysis among districts (note: for political
districts, I use the same set of concrete and non-concrete points as generated by the less aggregated judicial district
data). If a district is closer to a concrete point of the MAL, then I say that that district lies on a concrete stretch.
5. Finally, I drop all remaining districts that do not lie on a concrete stretch of the MAL. See Figures A.10-11 for the final
concrete sample alongside a map showing the spatial distribution of Germans at the village level in the Czech lands prior
to 1938. We are now comparing only homogeneous parts of the borderlands with nearby homogeneous
parts of the interior.
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Table A.10: RD robustness, long-run effects
Unemployment
ln Population
density
Agricultural
sector
Finance and
insurance
Auto repair
and trade
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e)
Local conditional mean comparison, 5km bandwidth
In borderlands 3.042 -.224 -.565 -.271 -.649
(.462)∗∗∗ (.086)∗∗∗ (.364) (.082)∗∗∗ (.270)∗∗
R2 .481 .457 .385 .174 .22
Observations 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201
Clusters 46 46 46 46 46
Local linear in longitude and latitude, 25km bandwidth
In borderlands 3.623 -.251 -.752 -.386 -.933
(.520)∗∗∗ (.084)∗∗∗ (.457) (.073)∗∗∗ (.252)∗∗∗
R2 .398 .4 .304 .134 .201
Observations 4049 4049 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71
Cubic in distance from Munich Agreement line, no bandwidth
In borderlands 1.827 -.264 -.788 -.250 -.320
(.589)∗∗∗ (.110)∗∗ (.432)∗ (.097)∗∗ (.296)
R2 .41 .378 .312 .205 .225
Observations 6112 6112 6112 6112 6112
Clusters 76 76 76 76 76
Communications Education Healthcare
% Primary
education or less
% Tertiary
education
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e)
Local conditional mean comparison, 5km bandwidth
In borderlands -.272 -.648 -.685 4.403 -1.743
(.078)∗∗∗ (.197)∗∗∗ (.258)∗∗ (.572)∗∗∗ (.343)∗∗∗
R2 .201 .156 .236 .387 .281
Observations 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201
Clusters 46 46 46 46 46
Local linear in longitude and latitude, 25km bandwidth
In borderlands -.381 -.791 -.780 4.965 -2.270
(.082)∗∗∗ (.145)∗∗∗ (.233)∗∗∗ (.543)∗∗∗ (.375)∗∗∗
R2 .202 .085 .139 .298 .269
Observations 4049 4049 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71
Cubic in distance from Munich Agreement line, no bandwidth
In borderlands -.217 -.735 -.655 3.836 -1.334
(.101)∗∗ (.209)∗∗∗ (.237)∗∗∗ (.657)∗∗∗ (.412)∗∗∗
R2 .337 .07 .095 .276 .326
Observations 6112 6112 6112 6112 6112
Clusters 76 76 76 76 76
Border segments 50 50 50 50 50
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respec-
tively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation,
temperature, and river density.
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Table A.11: Geographic balance tests (no mountainous stretches)
Borderlands Interior Difference S.E. Borderlands Interior Difference S.E.
Elevation 347.153 355.892 (9.160) 353.893 384.911 (5.772)∗∗∗
Ruggedness 5.905 6.012 (.209) 6.541 6.211 (.132)∗∗
Precipitation 50.654 50.598 (.385) 51.006 51.150 (.257)
Temperature 7.865 7.849 (.058) 7.673 7.727 (.034)
Rivers/km2 .927 .977 (.039) 1.042 1.056 (.024)
Observations 284 424 708 728 1778 2506
Bandwidth 5 km 5 km 5 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Arable land 55.782 51.672 (7.843) 42.572 49.172 (4.948)
Observations 8 7 15 19 22 41
Bandwidth 10 km 10 km 10 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945
Mean difference standard errors reported in parentheses, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All t-tests exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie. Mountainous areas excluded include stretches of the Munich
Agreement line that visibly closely follow the Sudete and Sumava ranges, as well as low-lying parts of the Ore range (see Figure
A.9).
Table A.12: Long-run effects (no mountainous stretches)
Unemploy.
ln Pop.
density
ln Labor force
density
% Primary
edu. or less
% Second.
education
% Tert.
education
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
In borderlands 2.973 -.338 -.352 4.608 -3.632 -1.772
(.732)∗∗∗ (.127)∗∗∗ (.129)∗∗∗ (.890)∗∗∗ (.694)∗∗∗ (.526)∗∗∗
R2 .446 .396 .4 .353 .223 .331
Agri.
sector
Auto repair
and trade
Communi-
cations
Finance and
insurance
Education Healthcare
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
In borderlands -.921 -.589 -.312 -.441 -.782 -1.017
(.585) (.349)∗ (.104)∗∗∗ (.099)∗∗∗ (.210)∗∗∗ (.319)∗∗∗
R2 .308 .217 .271 .144 .1 .145
Observations 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506 2506
Clusters 57 57 57 57 57 57
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Border fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipi-
tation, temperature, and river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line
interacted with the treatment. A municipality is omitted if it lies closer to one of the mountainous stretches highlighted in
Figure A.9 than to any other part of the Munich Agreement line. 50 border segment dummies are included, though 19 are
dropped by removing mountainous stretches.
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Table A.13: Relative net population decline, 1930 to mid-1947
Labor force
% change
Agricultural
% change
Secondary sector
% change
Transport sector
% change
Business sector
% change
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e)
In borderlands -12.408 -9.290 -13.220 -27.023 -32.913
(3.175)∗∗∗ (3.313)∗∗∗ (5.314)∗∗ (7.180)∗∗∗ (4.455)∗∗∗
R2 .732 .549 .727 .572 .844
Observations 165 165 165 165 165
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1930-47 1930-47 1930-47 1930-47 1930-47
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness,
precipitation, temperature, and river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement
line interacted with the treatment.
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Table A.14: Relative density change, 1921-2011
ln Population density ln Labor force density ln Pop. density ln L.F. density
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
Assignment by no overlap MAL, 50km Assignment by majority overlap
In borderlands×1921 -.004 -.030 -.011 -.014
(.034) (.045) (.015) (.020)
In borderlands×1930 0 0 0 0
In borderlands×1947 -.443 -.367 -.310 -.281
(.054)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1950 -.415 -.388 -.298 -.301
(.060)∗∗∗ (.074)∗∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1961 -.391 – -.299 –
(.076)∗∗∗ (.054)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1970 -.312 -.299 -.272 -.260
(.070)∗∗∗ (.069)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1980 -.252 -.262 -.238 -.243
(.070)∗∗∗ (.073)∗∗∗ (.058)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1991 -.214 -.222 -.214 -.216
(.075)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗∗
In borderlands×2001 -.214 -.231 -.203 -.208
(.073)∗∗∗ (.076)∗∗∗ (.059)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗∗
In borderlands×2011 -.315 -.353 -.245 -.267
(.084)∗∗∗ (.094)∗∗∗ (.056)∗∗∗ (.062)∗∗∗
R2 .607 .809 .423 .701
Observations 410 369 730 657
Clusters 41 41 73 73
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and include controls for longitude, latitude, and each interacted
with census. To construct common district boundaries used for this panel analysis and others, I use the “intercept” tool in
ArcGIS software to interpolate population and subpopulations. I use 1991 boundaries as the standard, since districts were
arguably at their highest level of aggregation that year, minimizing error. The “intercept” tool creates subsets of districts based
on where a given census year’s district boundaries overlapped with those from 1991. For example, if a 1921 judicial district lied
completely within a 1991 district, that judicial district would only have one subset: itself. If it straddled the line of two 1991
districts, it would have two subsets. Adopting the assumption that a given census’ district’s subpopulations were uniformly
distributed within its boundaries, I estimate the number of individuals in various subpopulations (e.g. number of farmers)
within each district subset. I then add up these estimates within the boundaries of each 1991 district.
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Table A.15: Relative sectoral change, 1921-2011
Agricultural
sector
Industry
Service
sector
Agricultural
sector
Industry
Service
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Assignment by no overlap MAL, 50km Assignment by majority overlap
In borderlands×‘21 -2.550 .374 1.709 -.954 .115 .835
(1.607) (1.386) (.572)∗∗∗ (.739) (.691) (.323)∗∗
In borderlands×‘47 4.521 – -2.933 3.277 – -1.466
(2.038)∗∗ (1.227)∗∗ (.847)∗∗∗ (.662)∗∗
In borderlands×‘50 5.916 -3.518 -2.831 3.725 -2.676 -1.272
(1.914)∗∗∗ (2.047)∗ (1.667)∗ (.889)∗∗∗ (1.026)∗∗ (.844)
In borderlands×‘61 – -7.883 – – -4.639 –
(2.437)∗∗∗ (1.238)∗∗∗
In borderlands×‘70 5.141 -7.347 -1.566 3.025 -4.297 -.284
(1.355)∗∗∗ (2.068)∗∗∗ (1.295) (.982)∗∗∗ (1.201)∗∗∗ (.904)
In borderlands×‘80 6.341 -6.849 -1.831 3.186 -3.539 -.862
(1.258)∗∗∗ (2.422)∗∗∗ (1.415) (1.125)∗∗∗ (1.339)∗∗∗ (.862)
In borderlands×‘91 6.470 -7.484 -1.556 3.148 -3.975 -.523
(1.407)∗∗∗ (2.617)∗∗∗ (1.485) (1.200)∗∗ (1.450)∗∗∗ (.842)
In borderlands×‘01 7.429 -4.862 -5.100 2.839 -1.840 -2.282
(2.202)∗∗∗ (4.644) (1.857)∗∗∗ (1.600)∗ (1.998) (.952)∗∗
In borderlands×‘11 7.750 -6.292 -8.830 2.845 -2.621 -5.050
(2.495)∗∗∗ (4.657) (2.080)∗∗∗ (1.748) (2.057) (1.070)∗∗∗
Constant 36.156 32.361 14.310 35.754 32.413 14.686
(.998)∗∗∗ (.903)∗∗∗ (.486)∗∗∗ (.829)∗∗∗ (.715)∗∗∗ (.340)∗∗∗
1930 -12.308 2.593 4.329 -11.329 2.160 4.155
(.779)∗∗∗ (.721)∗∗∗ (.277)∗∗∗ (.589)∗∗∗ (.559)∗∗∗ (.202)∗∗∗
1947 -14.627 – 12.003 -12.899 – 11.478
(1.118)∗∗∗ (.521)∗∗∗ (.820)∗∗∗ (.355)∗∗∗
1950 -16.406 13.175 14.054 -14.429 11.878 13.563
(1.131)∗∗∗ (.923)∗∗∗ (.759)∗∗∗ (.894)∗∗∗ (.692)∗∗∗ (.479)∗∗∗
1961 – 13.317 – – 11.080 –
(1.064)∗∗∗ (.819)∗∗∗
1970 -20.384 13.535 .756 -17.627 11.450 .281
(1.303)∗∗∗ (1.022)∗∗∗ (.761) (1.125)∗∗∗ (.950)∗∗∗ (.627)
1980 -24.049 13.259 19.767 -21.167 11.111 18.937
(1.326)∗∗∗ (1.247)∗∗∗ (.739)∗∗∗ (1.233)∗∗∗ (1.092)∗∗∗ (.555)∗∗∗
1991 -24.829 9.773 23.021 -21.920 7.650 22.021
(1.398)∗∗∗ (1.355)∗∗∗ (.840)∗∗∗ (1.278)∗∗∗ (1.176)∗∗∗ (.606)∗∗∗
2001 -33.732 1.616 33.655 -31.000 .108 32.314
(1.721)∗∗∗ (2.315) (1.101)∗∗∗ (1.572)∗∗∗ (1.593) (.716)∗∗∗
2011 -36.176 -4.684 30.026 -33.580 -6.402 28.674
(1.813)∗∗∗ (2.262)∗∗ (1.287)∗∗∗ (1.653)∗∗∗ (1.549)∗∗∗ (.806)∗∗∗
R2 .891 .738 .957 .872 .719 .958
Observations 369 369 369 657 657 657
Clusters 41 41 41 73 73 73
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and include controls for longitude, latitude, and each interacted
with census. To construct common district boundaries used for this panel analysis and others, I perform areal interpolation as
described in Table A.14.
117
Table A.16: Short-run supply of education, mid-1947
General schools
per 100 pupils
General teachers
per 100 pupils
Civic schools
per 100 pupils
Civic teachers
per 100 pupils
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b)
In borderlands .056 -.162 .069 -.234
(.221) (.147) (.062) (.235)
R2 .46 .529 .296 .243
Observations 115 115 115 115
Agricultural schools
per 100 pupils
Agricultural teachers
per 100 pupils
Vocational schools
per 100 pupils
Vocational teachers
per 100 pupils
(3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
In borderlands -1.228 -1.933 .257 2.537
(.359)∗∗∗ (1.854) (.173) (1.343)∗
R2 .397 .287 .195 .241
Observations 104 99 97 97
Border segments 16 16 16 16
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km
Year 1947 1947 1947 1947
Robust standard errors reported in brackets, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and
river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the
treatment. Note that some districts have no vocational or agricultural schools. Also note that some agricultural teacher data
is missing for a few larger cities with few (e.g. 1) agricultural folk schools. If I assign a value of 1 for teachers in these cities,
the coefficient remains negative and insignificant.
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Table A.17: Regional differences in education, 1921-2011
Education
index
% Second.
education
% Tert.
education
Edu.
index
% Second.
education
% Tert.
education
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Assignment by no overlap MAL, 50km Assignment by majority overlap
In borderlands×‘21 -1.090 – – -.755 – –
(.104)∗∗∗ (.103)∗∗∗
In borderlands×‘30 0 – – 0 – –
In borderlands×‘61 -1.759 -2.087 -1.312 -1.204 -1.611 -1.180
(.255)∗∗∗ (.486)∗∗∗ (.508)∗∗ (.228)∗∗∗ (.294)∗∗∗ (.314)∗∗∗
In borderlands×‘70 -1.562 -2.735 -.272 -1.156 -2.618 -.374
(.314)∗∗∗ (1.118)∗∗ (.258) (.257)∗∗∗ (.676)∗∗∗ (.176)∗∗
In borderlands×‘80 -1.968 -3.930 -.487 -1.324 -2.884 -.529
(.280)∗∗∗ (.871)∗∗∗ (.355) (.272)∗∗∗ (.611)∗∗∗ (.231)∗∗
In borderlands×‘91 -2.527 -4.745 -.968 -1.686 -3.242 -.926
(.253)∗∗∗ (.497)∗∗∗ (.495)∗ (.277)∗∗∗ (.438)∗∗∗ (.301)∗∗∗
In borderlands×‘01 -3.002 -3.859 -2.603 -1.891 -2.403 -1.876
(.266)∗∗∗ (.522)∗∗∗ (.736)∗∗∗ (.283)∗∗∗ (.362)∗∗∗ (.415)∗∗∗
In borderlands×‘11 -3.093 -2.233 -4.603 -1.926 -1.318 -3.131
(.286)∗∗∗ (.8205)∗∗ (1.263)∗∗∗ (.271)∗∗∗ (.461)∗∗∗ (.587)∗∗∗
R2 .627 .989 .802 .433 .988 .826
Observations 328 246 246 584 438 438
Clusters 41 41 41 73 73 73
District fixed effects Yes No No Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and include controls for longitude, latitude, and each interacted
with census. The education index uses prewar literacy and postwar post-primary education data transformed into standard
deviations from census year district means. To construct common district boundaries used for this panel analysis and others, I
perform areal interpolation as described in Table A.14.
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Table A.18: RD robustness, short-run effects
ln Population
density
Agricultural
sector
Secondary
sector
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e)
Local conditional mean comparison, 10km bandwidth
∆‘47−‘30In borderlands -.270 5.088 -2.308 -.276 -1.889
(.033)∗∗∗ (1.222)∗∗∗ (1.366)∗ (.306) (.340)∗∗∗
R2 .898 .421 .612 .58 .497
Observations 140 140 140 140 140
Clusters 53 53 53 53 53
Border segments×1947 4 4 4 4 4
Local linear in longitude and latitude, 25km bandwidth
∆‘47−‘30In borderlands -.296 6.390 -3.389 -.003 -1.959
(.028)∗∗∗ (1.129)∗∗∗ (1.064)∗∗∗ (.294) (.244)∗∗∗
R2 .914 .584 .748 .685 .625
Observations 330 330 330 330 330
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98
Border segments×1947 24 24 24 24 24
Cubic in distance from Munich Agreement line, no bandwidth
∆‘47−‘30In borderlands -.188 2.407 2.707 -.145 -1.214
(.078)∗∗ (2.648) (2.559) (.573) (.768)
R2 .908 .518 .721 .651 .651
Observations 544 544 544 544 544
Clusters 138 138 138 138 138
Border segments×1947 24 24 24 24 24
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enrollment,
general5-14
Enrollment,
civic10-14
Enrollment,
agricultural15-19
Enrollment,
vocational15-19
Enrollment,
college15-24
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e)
Local conditional mean comparison, 10km bandwidth
In borderlands 7.805 -11.840 4.386 -11.910 -2.540
(1.236)∗∗∗ (3.239)∗∗∗ (1.672)∗∗ (5.706)∗ (.349)∗∗∗
R2 .779 .611 .63 .33 .746
Observations 25 25 25 25 25
Border segments 4 4 4 4 4
Local linear in longitude and latitude, 50km bandwidth
In borderlands 6.959 -7.669 5.562 -6.293 -2.574
(.728)∗∗∗ (2.395)∗∗∗ (1.374)∗∗∗ (4.398) (.374)∗∗∗
R2 .86 .591 .517 .214 .724
Observations 115 115 115 115 115
Border segments 16 16 16 16 16
Cubic in distance from Munich Agreement line, no bandwidth
In borderlands 4.899 -7.067 7.725 -26.282 -3.405
(2.180)∗∗ (5.545) (4.009)∗ (12.246)∗∗ (.901)∗∗∗
R2 .87 .597 .5 .28 .73
Observations 122 122 122 122 122
Border segments 16 16 16 16 16
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year 1947 1947 1947 1947 1947
Robust standard errors clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and control for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature,
and river density.
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Table A.19: Short-run effects (extended sample)
ln Population
density
Agricultural
sector
Secondary
sector
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e)
∆‘47−‘30In borderlands -.192 3.689 -.650 -.382 -1.138
(.045)∗∗∗ (1.816)∗∗ (1.801) (.345) (.440)∗∗
R2 .914 .563 .745 .697 .644
Observations 382 382 382 382 382
Clusters 104 104 104 104 104
Border segments×1947 24 24 24 24 24
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Enrollment,
general5-14
Enrollment,
civic10-14
Enrollment,
agricultural15-19
Enrollment,
vocational15-19
Enrollment,
college15-24
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e)
In borderlands 5.492 -8.011 5.372 -10.818 -2.558
(.874)∗∗∗ (2.422)∗∗∗ (1.726)∗∗∗ (4.366)∗∗ (.366)∗∗∗
R2 .868 .562 .496 .214 .661
Observations 131 131 131 131 131
Border segments 16 16 16 16 16
Bandwidth 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km 50 km
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year 1947 1947 1947 1947 1947
Robust standard errors clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% lev-
els, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation,
temperature, and river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line (MAL)
interacted with the treatment. Relative to the main sample, this also includes districts lying mostly but not entirely in the
borderlands that nonetheless had >80% Germans in 1930 (i.e. treated in spite of overlap) as well as those lying mostly but not
entirely in the interior that nonetheless had <20% Germans.
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Table A.20: Pre-expulsion agglomeration economies
Incomepc
Agricultural
sector
Industry
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b)
ln Pop density 5.036 5.247 -13.729 -13.607 8.004 7.905
(.586)∗∗∗ (.630)∗∗∗ (2.311)∗∗∗ (2.293)∗∗∗ (2.947)∗∗∗ (3.004)∗∗∗
In borderlands – 1.973 – -1.417 – -.745
(1.335) (2.368) (3.022)
R2 .757 .767 .767 .781 .65 .653
Observations 104 104 165 165 165 165
Clusters – – 98 98 98 98
Border segments 16 16 24 24 24 24
Bandwidth 50 km 50 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1933 1933 1930 1930 1930 1930
Construction
Transport
sector
Business
sector
(4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b)
ln Pop density -.987 -.996 1.135 1.125 3.034 3.018
(.279)∗∗∗ (.276)∗∗∗ (.374)∗∗∗ (.375)∗∗∗ (.316)∗∗∗ (.302)∗∗∗
In borderlands – -.183 – -.099 – .317
(.709) (.629) (.564)
R2 .378 .383 .403 .404 .669 .692
Observations 165 165 165 165 165 165
Clusters 98 98 98 98 98 98
Border segments 24 24 24 24 24 24
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930 1930
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors are clustered by political district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and control for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation,
temperature, and river density. Regressions (b) utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement
line interacted with the treatment.
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Table A.21: Net migration
Net migrat. In migrat. Outmigrat. Net mig. In mig. Outmig.
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
Assignment by no overlap, 50km Assignment by majority overlap
In borderlands×1950 -.434 3.067 3.501 -.470 1.760 2.230
(.349) (.471)∗∗∗ (.512)∗∗∗ (.221)∗∗ (.348)∗∗∗ (.312)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1961 -.507 .928 1.435 -.492 .477 .969
(.284)∗ (.288)∗∗∗ (.226)∗∗∗ (.161)∗∗∗ (.180)∗∗∗ (.138)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1970 -.488 .667 1.155 -.329 .385 .713
(.145)∗∗∗ (.305)∗∗ (.264)∗∗∗ (.097)∗∗∗ (.156)∗∗ (.137)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1980 -.616 -.142 .475 -.316 -.056 .260
(.121)∗∗∗ (.146) (.149)∗∗∗ (.090)∗∗∗ (.100) (.087)∗∗∗
In borderlands×1991 .006 .005 -.001 .023 .003 -.019
(.067) (.141) (.131) (.041) (.072) (.060)
In borderlands×2001 -.549 -.604 -.055 -.269 -.280 -.011
(.232)∗∗ (.289)∗∗ (.111) (.096)∗∗∗ (.122)∗∗ (.062)
In borderlands×2011 -.907 -.958 -.051 -.417 -.485 -.068
(.263)∗∗∗ (.336)∗∗∗ (.109) (.124)∗∗∗ (.149)∗∗∗ (.071)
R2 .232 .846 .904 .182 .781 .859
Observations 287 287 287 511 511 511
Clusters 41 41 41 73 73 73
District fixed effects No No No No No No
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie and include controls for longitude, latitude, and each interacted
with census. To construct common district boundaries used for this panel analysis and others, I perform areal interpolation as
described in Table A.14.
Table A.22: Heterogeneous effects, natural geography
Unemployment
ln Population
density
% Primary
education or less
(1a) (1b) (1c)
In borderlands×River density -.956 .230 -1.474
(.630) (.077)∗∗∗ (.415)∗∗∗
R2 .405 .401 .3
(2a) (2b) (2c)
In borderlands×Ruggedness .004 .034 -.129
(.081) (.019)∗ (.100)
R2 .404 .4 .298
Observations 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71
Border segments 50 50 50
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, tem-
perature, and river density, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted
with the treatment. For these regressions, river density and ruggedness are mean-normalized.
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Table A.23: Post-transition trends, 2001-11
Unemployment
ln Pop.
density
Agricultural
sector
Industry Construction
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e)
∆‘11−‘01In borderlands -.205 .005 -.307 -.501 -.904
(.368) (.012) (.665) (.602) (.276)∗∗∗
R2 .392 .318 .632 .522 .369
Auto repair
and trade
Transport+
comm.
Public
Education+
healthcare
% Primary
edu. or less
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e)
∆‘11−‘01In borderlands -.021 .147 -.125 -.266 -.483
(.242) (.292) (.190) (.219) (.321)
R2 .094 .133 .076 .162 .757
Observations 8088 8088 8088 8088 8088
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71
Border segments×2011 50 50 50 50 50
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects×2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Robust standard errors are clustered by district, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level. All regressions exclude Prague
and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation, ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density interacted
with year, and utilize a local linear running variable of distance from the Munich Agreement line interacted with the treatment
and year. Since a few municipalities split or merged between 2001 and 2011, I manually aggregate these and their data.
Table A.24: Heterogeneous effects, Eastern Bloc
Unemploy.
ln Pop.
density
ln L.F.
density
% Primary
edu. or less
% Second.
education
% Tertiary
education
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f)
In borderlands
×Eastern Bloc .780 .009 -.013 1.669 -.959 -.669
(.983) (.165) (.168) (1.234) (.983) (.740)
R2 .406 .402 .403 .301 .201 .272
Agricultural
sector
Auto repair
and trade
Commun-
ications
Finance and
insurance
Education Healthcare
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f)
In borderlands
×Eastern Bloc .123 .429 -.007 .047 .221 .539
(.824) (.521) (.169) (.164) (.332) (.379)
R2 .305 .204 .206 .137 .086 .143
Observations 4049 4049 4049 4049 4049 4049
Clusters 71 71 71 71 71 71
Border segments 50 50 50 50 50 50
Geo. controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bandwidth 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km 25 km
Year 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011
Robust standard errors clustered by district. A municipality is dummied 1 if it lied closer to East Germany/Poland pre-1989
than West Germany/Austria. All regressions exclude Prague and Polish Zaolzie, include exogenous controls for elevation,
ruggedness, precipitation, temperature, and river density, and use a linear running variable of distance from MAL interacted
with the treatment, both interacted with Eastern Bloc.
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Figures
Figure A.1: Municipalities in main sample
Note: 94 municipalities for which only some parts were annexed are dropped. Municipalities in Polish Zaolzie (i.e. the strip of
white municipalities to the right of the Munich Agreement line on the far right of the map) are also excluded from all analyses.
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Figure A.2: Allied bombings during World War II
This map shows confirmed Allied bombing sites during World War II, first relative to the Munich Agreement line and then
relative to relevant nearby territories (source: Theatre History of Operations Reports (THOR), 2019). Nearly all took place in
late 1944 or 1945. Note: this drops observations for which coordinates were not specified.
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Figure A.3: Balance tests, RD plots
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.3: Balance tests, RD plots (II)
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.3: Balance tests, RD plots (III)
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.3: Balance tests, RD plots (IV)
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.3: Balance tests, RD plots (V)
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.4: Other long-run effects, RD plots
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.5: Other short-run effects, RD plots
Trend lines are linear over the domain on each side of the Munich Agreement line. Data binned by 6 km intervals to produce
18 mean data points. All plots exclude Prague, Polish Zaolzie, and administrative units that overlap the Munich Agreement
line. Shaded areas represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure A.6: Migration out of the borderlands, 1950
Outmigration heat map for 1950-districts (earliest outmigration data in the post-expulsion period) relative to the Munich
Agreement line. Darker implies higher per capita outmigration.
Figure A.7: An “industrial graveyard”
Sites destroyed or abandoned in the 20th century (source: zanikleobce.cz).
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Figure A.8: Other localization patterns, 1930
Heatmaps of 1930 population density, share of employment in tranportation, mining and other extraction, textiles, general
manufacturing, and overall industry (clockwise from top left). Darker shades indicate larger shares. Note that transportation
and general manufacturing tend to be located wherever population is denser; mining, stone, and soil extraction are more
common in Northwest Bohemia as well as Eastern Moravia, which are both mineral rich and not necessarily densely populated;
and textile manufacturing is more common in Northern Moravia, in a mixture of densely and not-so-densely populated areas.
None appear to be discontinuous through the eventual Munich Agreement line.
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Figure A.9: Elevation (raster and zonal statistics)
Mountainous stretches along the Munich Agreement line are highlighted in blue. The second map also shows the elevation
zonal statistics upon which the elevation control in the analysis is based.
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Figure A.10: German language frontiers, post-1918
Figure A.11: “Concrete” sections of the language border, 1930
Non-concrete (i.e. mixed) stretches of the Munich Agreement line (MAL) are highlighted in blue. Based on their proximity to
these stretches, beige districts are henceforth dropped for the analysis in Table A.9, which seeks to compare the parts of the
sample for which the borderlands was more homogeneous (i.e. > 80% German) near the MAL, using the algorithm described
below Table A.9. Compare to Figure A.10, which shows village-level ethnic composition prior to the expulsion, from Wiskemann
(1938).
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Variable descriptions
• In borderlands: if the majority of a district or municipality’s area lies in the parts of
the Czech lands (i.e. the modern day Czech Republic) that were annexed by Germany
in 1938, then it is said to be in the borderlands (i.e. the Sudetenland), as opposed to
the interior (i.e. the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia). The main specifications
include any district or municipality in which > 95% of its area lie in either the border-
lands or the interior. Additional specifications relax this if that district was nonetheless
ethnically homogeneous in 1930. Calculated in ArcGIS.
• Distance from Munich Agreement line: a district or municipality’s centroid’s
minimum distance to the Munich Agreement line. Calculated in ArcGIS.
• % German, 1930/50: the percentage of the total district population identified as
being German on the census.
• % Roma, 1930: the percentage of the total judicial district population identified as
being Romani on the 1930 census.
• % Jewish (ethnic group), 1930: the percentage of the total judicial district popu-
lation identified as being Jewish in nationality on the 1930 census.
• % Jewish (religion), 1930: the percentage of the total judicial district population
identified as being Jewish in religion on the 1930 census.
• Ethnic fractionalization, 1930: takes into account the share of the population that
was German (g) or Czechoslovak (c) in judicial districts on the 1930 census. Other
ethnic groups in the Czech lands were of trivial size. Hence, this measure is given by
1− g2 − c2.
• Convictions per 100, 1923-27: the number of convicted offenders in Czech criminal
districts between 1923 and 1927 as a proportion of the total population in 1930. These
data merge several judicial districts into larger jurisdictions in the Brno, Zlin, and
Prague urban areas.
• % Taxpayers, 1933: the number of eligible taxpayers per 100 individuals in 1933
political districts, as reported in Statistika daneˇ d˚uchodove´ placene´ prˇ´ımo, daneˇ z
vysˇsˇ´ıho sluzˇne´ho, daneˇ rentove´ placene´ prˇ´ımo, vsˇeobecne´ a zvla´sˇtn´ı daneˇ vy´deˇlkove´ podle
prˇedpisu za rok 1933, a Czechoslovak taxation report published by the State Bureau of
Statistics in 1938. Not reported on its own for Praha-venkov (i.e. a suburban political
district near Prague).
• Income per capita (100 Kcˇs), 1933: average income per capita in 1933 political
districts in 100 Czechoslovak koruna, as reported in the same taxation report. Not
reported on its own for Praha-venkov, Ricany, and Jilove (i.e. all Prague suburban
political districts).
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• ln Population density, 1921-2011: the log of population counts per square kilometer
in a district or municipality as reported in each census. Note that for 2011, three
municipalities (Brezina, Brdy, and Modrava) designated for military purposes have
low population counts and therefore have negative values, though removing these does
not affect estimates.
• Labor force, 1921-2011: the total number of employed and unemployed. For 2011,
the census reports the number of employed only. I use the number of unemployed
from the same month as reported by the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
to derive the full labor force count.
• ln Labor force density, 1921-2011: the log of the above value divided by the square
kilometer size of a district or municipality as reported in each census. Note the same
three negative values here as in ln population density.
• Labor force participation rate, 1930/2011: the total labor force count divided by
the total population of a district or municipality, as reported in the census.
• Unemployment, 1933/2011: the number of registered unemployed as a share of the
total labor force. For 1933, the number of unemployed in a political district is taken
from the social insurance report, Nezameˇstnanost a podp˚urna´ pe´cˇe v Cˇeskoslovensku,
written by Minister of Social Welfare Jaromı´r Necˇas and published by the Social Insti-
tute of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1938. The 1930 labor force count from the census
is used as the denominator. For 2011, the number of unemployed in a municipality for
the month of March is scraped from the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
website. The 2011 labor force count described above is used as the denominator.
• % Agricultural sector, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or
municipality employed in agricultural work, fishing, hunting, or forestry as a share of
the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Secondary sector, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or munic-
ipality employed in the secondary sector (i.e. industry and construction) as a share of
the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Industry, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in the six industrial sectors below as a share of the total labor force, as
reported in the census. Note that in the 1961 census, this was reported as a percentage
instead of as the number of workers.
• % Mining and other extraction, 1930: the total number of workers in a district
or municipality employed in mineral, stone, and soil extraction as a share of the total
labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Metallurgy and metalwork, 1930: the total number of workers in a district or
municipality employed in metallurgy and metalworking as a share of the total labor
force, as reported in the census.
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• % Manufacturing, 1930: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in manufacturing of machinery, equipment, and transportation devices as a
share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Glasswork, 1930: the total number of workers in a district or municipality employed
in the production of glass and glass products as a share of the total labor force, as
reported in the census.
• % Textiles, 1930: the total number of workers in a district or municipality employed
in textile manufacturing as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Other industry, 1930: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in other industrial sectors (i.e. chemical, gas, water, and electric industries;
leather, clothing, and footwear manufacturing, lumber, paper, and printing industries;
and food and beverage production) as a share of the total labor force, as reported in
the census.
• % Construction, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in construction as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Service sector, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in the service sector (i.e. transport, business, and other service sectors below)
as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Transport sector, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or munici-
pality employed in the transport sector (i.e. post, storage and shipping, rail, and bus)
as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Business sector, 1921-2011: the total number of workers in a district or munic-
ipality employed in the business sector (i.e. finance and insurance as well as work in
trade and commerce) as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Finance and insurance, 1930/2011: the total number of workers in a district or
municipality employed in finance, accounting, and insurance as a share of the total
labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Trade, 1930: the total number of workers in a district or municipality employed
in trade and commerce (i.e. hospitality and food, auto trade and repair, and other
commerce) as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Hospitality and food services, 2011: the total number of workers in a district
or municipality employed in hotel and hospitality as well as food and catering services
as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Auto trade and repair, 2011: the total number of workers in a district or mu-
nicipality employed in auto retail trade and repair as a share of the total labor force,
as reported in the census.
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• % Public, 2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality employed
in public administration and defense as a share of the total labor force, as reported in
the census.
• % Communications, 2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in communications and other information industries as a share of the total
labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Education, 2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality employed
in education as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the census.
• % Healthcare, 2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality em-
ployed in social and healthcare as a share of the total labor force, as reported in the
census.
• % Other service, 1930/2011: the total number of workers in a district or municipality
employed in all other service industries as a share of the total labor force, as reported
in the census. For 1930, this includes public administrative and defense, education,
healthcare, and domestic services. For 2011, this includes real estate, administrative
and support fields, and scientific and technical activities.
• % Literate, 1921/30: the percentage of the population over the age of 10 that can
read and write, as reported in the census.
• % Primary education or less, 1961-2011: the percentage of the population over the
age of 15 that has at most primary education or less, as reported in the census.
• % Secondary education, 1961-2011: the percentage of the population over the age of
15 that has a secondary education (i.e. vocational, lower professional, or gymnasium,
with or without exams) but no more, as reported in the census.
• % Tertiary education, 1961-2011: the percentage of the population over the age of
15 that has a tertiary education (i.e. higher professional education, some college, a
bachelor degree, or more), as reported in the census.
• Education index, 1921-2011: uses prewar literacy and postwar post-primary educa-
tion data transformed into standard deviations from census year district means.
• General enrollment per 100, 5-14, 1947: the number of individuals in a political
district enrolled in general schools (i.e. schools which offer both primary schooling as
well as terminal lower secondary education) as a share of the total population between
the age of 5 and 14, as reported in the report, Zpra´vy sta´tn´ıho u´rˇadu statisticke´ho
republiky Cˇeskoslovenske´, published by the State Bureau of Statistics in 1948.
• General schools per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of general schools in a political
district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a general school, as reported
in the same statistical report.
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• General teachers per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of general school teachers in a
political district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a general school, as
reported in the same statistical report.
• Civic enrollment per 100, 10-14, 1947: the number of individuals in a political
district enrolled in civic schools (i.e. a form of lower secondary education that leads
into higher forms) as a share of the total population between the age of 10 and 14, as
reported in the same statistical report.
• Civic schools per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of civic schools in a political district
per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a civic school, as reported in the same
statistical report.
• Civic teachers per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of civic school teachers in a
political district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a civic school, as
reported in the same statistical report.
• Agricultural enrollment per 100, 15-19, 1947: the number of individuals in a
political district enrolled in agricultural folk schools (i.e. a common form of higher
secondary education that focuses on agricultural and related skills) as a share of the
total population between the age of 15 and 19, as reported in the same statistical
report.
• Agricultural folk schools per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of agricultural folk
schools in a political district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a
agricultural folk school, as reported in the same statistical report.
• Agricultural teachers per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of agricultural folk school
teachers in a political district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a
agricultural folk school, as reported in the same statistical report.
• Basic vocational enrollment per 100, 15-19, 1947: the number of individuals in
a political district enrolled in basic vocational schools (i.e. a common form of higher
secondary education that focuses on more technical applied skills) as a share of the
total population between the age of 15 and 19, as reported in the same statistical
report.
• Basic vocational schools per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of basic vocational
schools in a political district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in a basic
vocational school, as reported in the same statistical report.
• Basic vocational teachers per 100 pupils, 1947: the number of basic vocational
school teachers in a political district per 100 pupils that live there who are enrolled in
a basic vocational school, as reported in the same statistical report.
• College enrollment per 100, 15-24, 1947: the number of individuals in a political
district enrolled in colleges as a share of the total population between the age of 15
and 19, as reported in the same statistical report.
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• In migrants per capita, 1950-2011: the number of individuals who are immigrants
in a given year into a district, divided by the total population size of that district
in that year, as reported in official annual population journals, Pohyb obyvatelstva v
republice Cˇeskoslovenske´, available online from the Czech Statistical Office.
• Out migrants per capita, 1950-2011: the number of individuals who are emigrants
in a given year from a district, divided by the total population size of that district in
that year, as reported in the same statistical journal.
• Net migrants per capita, 1950-2011: the net of the previous two measures.
• Border segments: a variable whose value corresponds to the “segment” of the Munich
Agreement line to which a district or municipality is closest. This is derived as follows:
for 2001/11 municipalities, each of the three unique continuous stretches of the Munich
Agreement line – in Bohemia, Northern Moravia, and Southern Moravia – is divided
into 25, 13, and 12 segments, respectively, in ArcGIS, each about 50 km in length. For
1930/47 judicial districts, each is divided into 12, 6, and 6 segments, respectively, in
ArcGIS, each about 100 km in length. For 1930/47 political districts, each is divided
into 8, 4, and 4 segments, respectively, in ArcGIS, each about 150 km in length.
For some small sample sensitivity tests, I also generate a version with just 4 border
segments, corresponding to the three regions with Bohemia divided into Northern and
Southern sections.
• Prague: a dummy that equals 1 if a district or municipality corresponds to the city
of Prague.
• Polish Zaolzie: a dummy that equals 1 if a district or municipality lies in the strip
of land in the easternmost part of the Czech lands, which was annexed by Poland in
1938 and has historically been predominantly Polish-speaking.
• Eastern Bloc: a dummy that equals 1 if a municipality lies closer to Poland or the
former East Germany than to Austria or the former West Germany, as calculated in
ArcGIS.
• Longitude and latitude: measures of longitude and latitude for district and munic-
ipality centroids, calculated in ArcGIS using a WGS 1984 projection, each normalized
around the sample mean.
• Elevation (m): 1 arc sec elevation data are derived from Japan Aerospace Explo-
ration Agency’s Advanced Land Observing Satellite (2017) maps, with district- and
municipality-specific mean values estimated in ArcGIS using zonal statistics.
• Ruggedness (◦): 1 arc sec ruggedness data are derived from Japan Aerospace Explo-
ration Agency’s Advanced Land Observing Satellite (2017) maps, with district- and
municipality-specific mean values estimated in ArcGIS using zonal statistics.
• Temperature (◦C): 30 arc sec temperature data (1970-2000) are derived from World-
clim (2016) maps, with district- and municipality-specific mean values estimated in
ArcGIS using zonal statistics.
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• Precipitation (mm): 30 arc sec precipitation data (1970-2000) are derived from
Worldclim (2016) maps, with district- and municipality-specific mean values estimated
in ArcGIS using zonal statistics.
• River density (rivers (km)/km2): detailed GIS shapefiles of river networks provided
by Geofabrik (2017) are converted to a equidistant cylindrical projection in ArcGIS.
The “intercept” tool is used to determine in what districts and municipalities a given
river segment lies. I then sum the total length for all river segments within each
municipality. Using the district or municipality area calculated in ArcGIS from files
with a cylindrical equal area projection, I then calculate river density values.
• % Arable land, 1945: the number of square kilometers of arable land in 1945 political
districts divided by the total number of square kilometers, as reported in the report,
Zpra´vy sta´tn´ıho u´rˇadu statisticke´ho republiky Cˇeskoslovenske´, published by the State
Bureau of Statistics in 1947.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose
Vr(h) = Vr(u)⇔ ar K
λMr
h1+γmγr =
K
βMr
, (B.1)
where mr gives the number of productive workers in region r (relative to unproductive work-
ers in r as well as workers in region −r). Hence, any arbitrarily small positive perturbation
to mr will induce
ar
K
λMr
h1+γmγr >
K
βMr
, (B.2)
such that the remainder of workers shift to production iteratively, until the total share of
workers in r are all engaged in production and mr = Mr ≡ m∗r. I define the mr that solves
(B.1) to be:
m̂r ≡
(
λ
βarh1+γ
) 1
γ
,
above which all workers in region r prefer to specialize in production over unproductive
activities.
Because Mr ≥ mr by definition, it follows that Mr ≥ m̂r must hold for this equilibrium
to be feasible. If instead m̂r > Mr, then m̂r > mr always.
Proof of Remark 1
Proof. In a HPSE, m∗r = Mr, and
ar
K
λMr
h1+γMγr ≥
K
βMr
.
Suppose γ = 0. Then this condition becomes βarh ≥ λ, which is invariant to Mr. Hence,
when γ = 0, if a HPSE exists in region r for some population share Mr, then it also exists
for all M ′r.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let γ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose Mr > m̂r and m∗r = Mr in each region r, such that there is a
locally stable HPSE in each region. Then
M˙r = Mr(Vr(h)− V (h)) = Mr(1−Mr)(Vr(h)− V−r(h))
= Mr(1−Mr)(arK
λ
h1+γMγ−1r − a−r
K
λ
h1+γMγ−1−r ), (B.3)
where M−r = 1 −Mr. By inspection, Vr(h) is strictly decreasing in Mr for all Mr, with
limMr→0 Vr(h) =∞ and limMr→1 Vr(h) = ar Kλ h1+γ, while V−r(h) is strictly increasing in Mr
for all Mr, with limMr→0 V−r(h) = a−r
K
λ
h1+γ and limMr→1 V−r(h) = ∞. Hence, M˙r = 0 if
Vr(h) = V−r(h), where Vr(h) = V−r(h) if and only if
Mr =
a
1
1−γ
r
a
1
1−γ
r + a
1
1−γ
−r
≡M∗r ∈ (0, 1)
for regions r and −r 6= r, and ∂M˙r
∂Mr
|Mr=M∗r < 0. Hence, if m∗r = Mr and M∗r > m̂r in each
region r, then there is a locally stable HPLE, with a unique interior steady state population
M∗r ∈ (0, 1) when γ ∈ (0, 1).
(ii) Suppose there is a sufficiently large negative population shock in one region, say 2
(without loss of generality), such that (B.2) no longer holds and m∗2 = 0. However, suppose
M1 > m̂1 and m
∗
1 = M1 still. Then
M˙1 = M1(1 −M1)(V1(h) − V2(u)) = M1(1 −M1)
(
a1
K
λ
h1+γMγ−11 −
K
β(1−M1)
)
. (B.4)
By inspection, V1(h) is strictly decreasing in M1 for all M1, with limM1→0 V1(h) = ∞
and limM1→1 V1(h) = a1
K
λ
h1+γ, while V2(u) is strictly increasing in M2 for all M2, with
limM1→0 V2(u) = K/β and limM1→1 V2(u) = ∞. Hence, M˙1 = 0 if V1(h) = V2(u); V1(h) =
V2(u) for a unique M1 ≡ M∗∗1 ∈ (0, 1); and ∂M˙r∂M1 |Mr=M∗∗1 < 0. Hence, if m∗1 = M1, m∗2 = 0,
and M∗∗1 > m̂1, then there is a locally stable ALE, with a unique interior steady state
M∗∗1 ∈ (0, 1) when γ ∈ (0, 1).
Next, it is straightforward to show that the steady state population share in a productive
(unproductive) region will be greater (lower) in a ALE than in a HPLE: M∗∗1 > M
∗
1 and
M∗∗2 < M
∗
2 .
Suppose to the contrary that M∗∗1 ≤M∗1 . When M1 = M∗1 ,
a1
K
λ
h1+γM∗γ−11 = a2
K
λ
h1+γ(1−M∗1 )γ−1. (B.5)
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If M∗∗1 ≤M∗1 , then when M1 = M∗1 holding all else fixed,
a1
K
λ
h1+γM∗γ−11 ≤
K
β(1−M∗1 )
⇔ M˙1 < 0. (B.6)
Together (B.5) and (B.6) imply that when M1 = M
∗
1 , if M
∗∗
1 ≤M∗1 then
a2
K
λ
h1+γ(1−M∗1 )γ−1 ≤
K
β(1−M∗1 )
⇔M∗2 ≤ m̂2.
However, by Definition 2.2.3, M∗r > m̂r for all r in any locally stable HPLE. Hence, M
∗∗
1 >
M∗1 by contradiction, and M
∗∗
2 = 1−M∗∗1 < 1−M∗1 = M∗2 by symmetry.
To check comparative statics for M∗∗1 , implicitly differentiate V1(h) − V2(u) = 0 with
respect to each variable of interest. Doing so yields:
a1 :
1
λ
h1+γM∗∗γ−11 + (γ − 1)
∂M∗∗1
∂a1
a1
1
λ
h1+γM∗∗γ−21 =
∂M∗∗1
∂a1
1
β(1−M∗∗1 )2
,
h : (1 + γ)a1
1
λ
hγM∗∗γ−11 + (γ − 1)
∂M∗∗1
∂h
a1
1
λ
h1+γM∗∗γ−21 =
∂M∗∗1
∂h
1
β(1−M∗∗1 )2
,
λ : −a1 1
λ2
h1+γM∗∗γ−11 + (γ − 1)
∂M∗∗1
∂λ
a1
1
λ
h1+γM∗∗γ−21 =
∂M∗∗1
∂λ
1
β(1−M∗∗1 )2
,
β : (γ − 1)∂M
∗∗
1
∂β
a1
1
λ
h1+γM∗∗γ−21 = −
1
β2(1−M∗∗1 )
+
∂M∗∗1
∂β
1
β(1−M∗∗1 )2
,
which imply
∂M∗∗1
∂a1
,
∂M∗∗1
∂h
,
∂M∗∗1
∂β
> 0 and
∂M∗∗1
∂λ
< 0 when γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Remark 2
Proof. By Remark 1, population shocks cannot shift a region from one short-run equilibrium
to another when γ = 0. Hence, if the steady state population distribution M∗r is determined
by (B.3) or (B.4) prior to a population shock, then all else fixed, it will also be determined
by (B.3) or (B.4) after a shock, respectively, when γ = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) Suppose γ > 1, Mr > m̂r, and m
∗
r = Mr for all regions r. By inspection,
Vr(h) = ar
K
λ
h1+γMγ−1r is now strictly increasing in Mr for all Mr, with limMr→0 Vr(h) = 0
and limMr→1 Vr(h) = ar
K
λ
h1+γ, while V−r(h) = a−r Kλ h
1+γ(1 −Mr)γ−1 is strictly decreasing
in Mr for all Mr, with limMr→0 V−r(h) = a−r
K
λ
h1+γ and limMr→1 V−r(h) = 0. Assuming
positive parameters, M˙r = 0 at only one interior M
∗
r , when Vr(h) = V−r(h). However,
∂M˙r
∂Mr
|Mr=M∗r > 0. Hence, there are no locally stable HPLE.
Note that limMr→0 M˙r = limMr→1 M˙r = 0;
∂M˙r
∂Mr
|Mr→0 = Vr(h)|Mr→0 − V−r(h)|Mr→0 < 0;
and ∂M˙r
∂Mr
|Mr→1 = −Vr(h)|Mr→1 +V−r(h)|Mr→1 < 0, which both imply local stability. However,
these “black hole” outcomes each violate the necessary condition for a HPSE for one of the
regions −r that M−r ≥ m̂−r, such that m∗−r = 0 for that region and V−r 6= V−r(h). Hence,
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these cannot be long-run equilibria either.
(ii) Suppose instead that region 1 (without loss of generality) specializes in production while
region 2 specializes in unproductive activities: M1 > m̂1, m
∗
1 = M1, and m
∗
2 = 0. Then
M˙1 = M1(1 − M1)(V1(h) − V2(u)) = M1(1 − M1)
(
a1
K
λ
h1+γMγ−11 −
K
β(1−M1)
)
.
By inspection, V1(h) is strictly increasing in M1 for all M1, with limM1→0 V1(h) = 0 and
limM1→1 V1(h) = a1
K
λ
h1+γ, while V2(u) is strictly increasing inM1 for allM1, with limM1→0 V2(u) =
K/β and limM1→1 V2(u) =∞. Hence, assuming all positive parameters,
lim
M1→0
V2(u) > lim
M1→0
V1(h) and lim
M1→1
V2(u) > lim
M1→1
V1(h).
This implies that ∂M˙1
∂M1
|M1→0 = V1(h)|M1→0−V2(u)|M1→0 < 0 and ∂M˙1∂M1 |M1→1 = −V1(h)|M1→1 +
V2(u)|M1→1 > 0. Moreover, limM1→0 M˙1 = 0 and limM1→1 M˙1 = −K/β. Hence, black hole
outcomes remain unstable.
However, it can be shown that there are at most two interior ALE, with steady state
populations in the productive region, 1, of M∗1 and M
∗
1. First, M˙1 = 0 if and only if
a1
K
λ
h1+γMγ−11 −
K
β(1−M1) = 0⇔M
γ−1
1 (1−M1)−
λ
βa1h1+γ
= 0, (B.7)
which is never satisfied as M1 → 0 or M1 → 1.
Suppose Mγ−11 (1−M1) > λβa1h1+γ for some M1. Then there are two M1 that solve (B.7).
To see this, note that the right equation is strictly increasing from the origin if and only if
(γ − 1)Mγ−21 (1−M1) > Mγ−11 ⇔M1 <
γ − 1
γ
.
Otherwise, it is strictly decreasing until M1 = 1. Hence, if M
γ−1
1 (1 −M1) > λβa1h1+γ when
M1 =
γ−1
γ
, there is a lower root M1
∗ ∈ (0, γ−1
γ
) that solves (B.7) as well as an upper root
M1
∗ ∈ (γ−1
γ
, 1).
(iii) Recall that Mγ−11 (1 − M1) − λβa1h1+γ is increasing through its lower root M1∗, and
decreasing through its upper root, M1
∗
. It is straightforward to show that if Mγ−11 (1 −
M1) − λβa1h1+γ is increasing (decreasing) through one of its roots, a1Kλ h1+γM
γ−1
1 − Kβ(1−M1)
and in turn M˙1 must be increasing (decreasing) through that same root.
To show this, I evaluate the more general claim that if f(x)− q(x) is increasing (decreas-
ing) in x at the x∗ that solves f(x∗) = q(x∗), then g(x)[f(x)− q(x)] must also be increasing
(decreasing) in x at x∗ for all continuously differentiable f(x), q(x), and g(x) > 0. The
derivative of f(x)− q(x) with respect to x at x = x∗ is
[f ′(x)− q′(x)]|x=x∗ . (B.8)
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The derivative of g(x)[f(x)− q(x)] with respect to x at x = x∗ is
(g′(x)[f(x)− q(x)] + g(x)[f ′(x)− q′(x)])|x=x∗ = g(x)[f ′(x)− q′(x)]|x=x∗ ,
which has the same sign as (B.8) for all g(x) > 0. Let x = M1, f(·) = a1Kλ h1+γMγ−11 ,
q(·) = K
β(1−M1) and g(·) =
λ(1−M1)
a1h1+γK
. Hence, ∂M˙r
∂M1
|M1=M1∗ > 0 and ∂M˙r∂M1 |M1=M1∗ < 0.
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Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose an educated (e = 1), politically active (c = 1) citizen observes τθ = τ0,
revealing θ = 0. Her expected payoff from challenging the ruler (r = 1) is qσ(w + αh− α).
Otherwise, it is w + αh − α − τ0. The latter exceeds the former if and only if τ0 ≤ (1 −
qσ)(w + αh− α).
A predatory ruler’s expected payoff when e = 1, c = 1, and r = 1 is RI + (1 − q)σ(w +
αh−α)− 1. A predatory ruler’s expected payoff when e = 1 and c = 1 if he sets the highest
possible τ0 at which r
∗ = 0 is RI + (1− qσ)(w+ αh− α)− 1. The latter exceeds the former
for all σ < 1. Hence, a predatory ruler always prefers τ ∗0 = (1−qσ)(w+αh−α) ≡ τPA0 when
the citizen is educated (e = 1) and politically active (c = 1), where τPA0 < w + αh ≡ τPI0 ,
such that the citizen never mounts a political challenge (r∗ = 0) thereafter.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) Political club participation (c∗ = 1): Fix education policy at neutral (m0 = m1 =
0). Suppose the citizen observes public education provision (gθ = 1) and enrolls (e = 1).
Then pˆi(θ|θˆ) = 1. Suppose θ = 1. Her payoff from c = 1 is w + αh − α − τBE1 . Her payoff
from c = 0 is w+ αh− τBE1 . Hence, c∗ = 0 whenever θ = 1. Now suppose θ = 0. Her payoff
from c = 1 is qσ(w + αh − α). Her payoff from c = 0 is 0. Hence, c∗ = 1 whenever θ = 0.
Hence, when g0 = g1 = e = 1 and m0 = m1 = 0, c
∗ = 1 if and only if θ = 0.
Enrollment (e∗ = 1), Case 1: suppose the citizen knows that g0 = 0 and g1 = 1, such that
gθ = 1 implies ruler type. Then c
∗ = 0 whenever e = 1, such that her payoff from e = 1 after
observing gθ = 1 is w + αh −max{1 − RI , 0}. Her reservation payoff is w, where e∗ = 1 if
and only if the former exceeds the latter.
Case 2: suppose that the citizen knows that g0 = g1 = 1. Then c
∗ = 1 if and only if
θ = 0, such that her expected payoff from e = 1 is
Pr(θˆ = 0)pˆi(0|0)qσ(w + αh− α) + Pr(θˆ = 1)pˆi(1|1)(w + αh−max{1−RI , 0}),
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where e∗ = 1 if and only if this is greater than piw.
Public education provision (g∗0 = 1): By Lemma 1, a predatory ruler’s expected payoff from
g0 = 1 when e
∗ = 1 and c∗ = 1 if and only if θ = 0 is RI + (1 − qσ)(w + αh − α) − 1. His
reservation payoff is RI + w. Suppose g0 = 1.
RI + (1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1 ≥ RI + w ⇔ h ≥ 1 + α(1− qσ) + qσw
α(1− qσ) ≡ h.
Hence, there exists a value of h ≡ h above which g∗0 = 1 under these conditions.
A benevolent ruler’s expected payoff from g1 = 1 when e
∗ = 1 and c∗ = 1 if and only if
θ = 0 is w+αh−αE(c(mθ|θˆ)|θ = 1)−max{1−RI , 0}. His reservation payoff is w. Suppose
g1 = 1. Then
w + αh− αE(c(mθ|θˆ)|θ = 1)−max{1−RI , 0} ≥ w
⇔ h ≥ max{1−R
I , 0}+ αE(c(mθ|θˆ)|θ = 1)
α
≡ h.
Hence, there exists a value of h ≡ h above which g∗1 = 1 under these conditions.
By inspection, h > 1+α
α
≥ h for all RI ≥ 0. Hence, when m0 = m1 = 0, g∗1 = 1 is
necessary for g∗0 = 1 when e
∗ = 1 and c∗ = 1 if and only if θ = 0.
Confirming enrollment (e∗ = 1): By inspection, e∗ = 1 if h ≥ h. Hence, h ≥ h > h is
necessary and sufficient for a developmental schooling equilibrium [DSE] when m0 = m1 = 0.
(ii) ∂h
∂q
= σ(1+w)
α(1−qσ)2 > 0,
∂h
∂σ
= q(1+w)
α(1−qσ)2 > 0,
∂h
∂w
= qσ
α(1−qσ) > 0, and
∂h
∂α
= − 1+qσw
α2(1−qσ) < 0. The
derivative of h with respect to α is −(1− RI)α−2 < 0 if 1 > RI and 0 otherwise, while the
derivative of h with respect to RI is −α−1 < 0 if 1 > RI and 0 otherwise.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. (i) Political club participation (c∗ = 1): Now let education policy mθ be anything.
Suppose the citizen observes gθ = 1 and chooses e = 1.
Suppose the citizen then observes θˆ = 0, such that her expected payoff from c = 1 is
pˆi(0|0)qσ(w + αh− α) + pˆi(1|0)(w + αh− α−max{1−RI , 0}).
Her payoff from c = 0 is pˆi(1|0)(w+αh−max{1−RI , 0}). Fix m1 = 0, such that pˆi(1|0) = 0.
Hence, c∗ = 1 for all m0 when θˆ = 0 and m1 = 0.
Now suppose the citizen observes θˆ = 1. A citizen’s payoff from c = 1 is
pˆi(0|1)qσ(w + αh− α) + pˆi(1|1)(w + αh− α−max{1−RI , 0}).
Her payoff from c = 0 is pˆi(1|1)(w + αh − max{1 − RI , 0}). Again fix m1 = 0, but now
suppose m0 = 1. There exists a threshold of Pr(θˆ = 1|θ = 0,m0 = 1) = γ ≡ γ, where c∗ = 0
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when both θˆ = 1 and m1 = 0 if and only if
γ <
piα
(1− pi)qσ(w + αh− α) ≡ γ.
Hence, c∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0 when g0 = g1 = 1, m1 = 0 and m0 = 1, and e = 1,
conditional upon γ < γ.
(ii) Education policy (m∗0 = 1): Suppose g0 = 1, e
∗ = 1, and c∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0.
Again fix m1 = 0. Suppose m0 = 1. A predatory ruler’s expected payoff from g0 = 1 when
m0 = 1, conditional upon γ < γ, is
RI + γ(w + αh) + (1− γ)(1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1,
which is increasing in γ. Hence, m∗0 = 1 if m1 = 0, g0 = 1, e
∗ = 1, and c∗ = 1 if and only if
θˆ = 0.
Benevolent rulers never propagandize (m∗1 = 0): Suppose g0 = g1 = 1. Suppose m1 = 0.
The citizen’s expected payoff from e = 1 when m0 = 0, or when m0 = 1 but γ < γ, such
that c∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0, is
Pr(θˆ = 0)[pˆi(0|0)qσ(w + αh− α) + pˆi(1|0)(w + αh− α−max{1−RI , 0})]
+ Pr(θˆ = 1)pˆi(1|1)(w + αh−max{1−RI , 0})
Pr(θˆ = 0|θ = 1) = 0 if and only if m1 = 0. Deviating to m1 = 1, such that Pr(θˆ = 0|θ =
1) > 0, would increase the probability that the citizen chooses c∗ = 1 and bears the cost α
when θ = 1, decreasing her expected payoffs. Hence, m∗1 = 0 when g0 = g1 = 1 and either
m0 = 0 or m0 = 1 but γ < γ, such that c
∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0.
Now suppose γ ≥ γ. Recall that mθ = 0 is set by default, where mθ = 1 only if it is
strictly improving. If a benevolent ruler decides to stay at m1 = 0, then he knows that
c∗ = 1 for all θˆ if m0 = 1, or c∗ = 1 if and only if θ = 0 if m0 = 0. But conditional upon
m1 = 0, a citizen will always condition her choice of c on m0 = 0 as well, since she knows a
predatory ruler cannot improve his payoffs by setting m0 = 1 when m1 = 0. Thus m1 = 0
always yields a benevolent ruler’s best possible payoff, in which c∗ 6= 1 when θ = 1.
Hence, m∗1 = 0 in all schooling equilibrium [SE].
Public education provision (g∗0 = 1): Suppose g0 = 1. Recall that m
∗
0 = 1 if g0 = 1 when
γ < γ. A predatory ruler’s payoffs from g0 = 0 are R
I + w. Hence, he prefers to invest in
public education (g∗0 = 1) when γ < γ if and only if
RI + γ(w + αh) + (1− γ)(1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1 ≥ RI + w
⇔ γ ≥ 1− αh− 1
qσ(w + αh) + (1− qσ)α ≡ γ.
Suppose g1 = 1. Recall that γ ≤ 1. If γ ≥ γ, then γ ≤ 1. γ ≤ 1 if and only if h ≥ α−1.
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m∗1 = 0, so E(c(mθ|θˆ)|θ = 1) = 0, such that α−1 ≥ h, by Proposition 1.1. Thus, if h ≥ α−1,
then h ≥ h. Hence, γ ≥ γ is sufficient for h ≥ h. By Proposition 1.1, g∗1 = 1 if and only if
h ≥ h. Hence, g∗1 = 1 is necessary for g∗0 = 1 when m∗1 = 0, m∗0 = 1, e∗ = 1, and c∗ = 1 if
and only if θˆ = 0. Hence, γ ∈ [γ, γ) must hold in a biased schooling equilibrium [BSE].
Confirming enrollment (e∗ = 1): Suppose e = 1. Following Proposition 1.1, suppose c∗ = 1
if and only if θˆ = 0 and that g0 = g1 = 1, m0 = 1, and m1 = 0. Then the citizen’s expected
payoff from e = 1 is
Pr(θˆ = 0)pˆi(0|0)qσ(w + αh− α) + Pr(θˆ = 1)pˆi(1|1)(w + αh−max{1−RI , 0})
if and only if g0 = g1 = 1, for which h ≥ h is a necessary condition. Furthermore, by
inspection, h ≥ h implies that
Pr(θˆ = 0)pˆi(0|0)qσ(w + αh− α) + Pr(θˆ = 1)pˆi(1|1)(w + αh−max{1−RI , 0}) ≥ piw.
Hence, e∗ = 1 if and only if g1 = 1 when g0 = 1, m0 = 1, m1 = 0, and c∗ = 1 if and only if
θˆ = 0. Hence, γ ∈ [γ, γ) is necessary and sufficient for a BSE.
(iii) Hence, when γ ∈ [γ, γ), with probability (1− pi)γ, c∗ = 0 when θ = 0. To choose c∗ = 0
when θ = 0 is suboptimal ex post : if c∗ = 0 when θ = 0, τ ∗0 = τ
PI
0 .
(iv) ∂γ
∂q
= − piα
(1−pi)q2σ(w+αh−α) < 0,
∂γ
∂σ
= − piα
(1−pi)qσ2(w+αh−α) < 0,
∂γ
∂h
= − piα2
(1−pi)qσ(w+αh−α)2 <
0, ∂γ
∂w
= − piα
(1−pi)qσ(w+αh−α)2 < 0,
∂γ
∂α
= piw
(1−pi)qσ(w+αh−α)2 > 0,
∂γ
∂pi
= α
(1−pi)2qσ(w+αh−α) > 0,
∂γ
∂h
= − α(qσ(w+1)+(1−qσ)α)
(qσ(w+αh)+(1−qσ)α)2 < 0,
∂γ
∂α
= − 1+qσ(wh+h−1)
(qσ(w+αh)+(1−qσ)α)2 < 0,
∂γ
∂q
= σ(αh−1)(w+αh−α)
(qσ(w+αh)+(1−qσ)α)2 > 0,
∂γ
∂σ
= q(αh−1)(w+αh−α)
(qσ(w+αh)+(1−qσ)α)2 > 0, and
∂γ
∂w
= qσ(αh−1)
(qσ(w+αh)+(1−qσ)α)2 > 0, the last three of which hold
only when h > α−1.
Proof of Remark 1
Proof. (i) By Propositions 1.1 and 2.1-2, h ≥ h is necessary and sufficient for g∗1 = 1 and
therefore e∗ = 1, and γ < γ is necessary and sufficient for c∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0 when
m0 = 1 and m1 = 0, such that m
∗
0 = 1 when g0 = 1. However, by Proposition 2.2, γ < γ
implies g∗0 = 0, inducing a weak non-schooling equilibrium [WNE].
(ii) By Proposition 2.4, γ is strictly decreasing in h. γ|h=h = 0. Hence, max{γ, 0} = 0 when
h ≥ h. γ > 0. Hence, γ ≮ γ for all h ≥ h.
Proof of Remark 2
Proof. By Remark 1, γ < γ is sufficient for h < h, and γ < γ and γ < γ are necessary and
sufficient for a WNE. Hence, h ∈ [h, h) and γ < γ < γ are sufficient for a WNE. However,
if γ = γˆ ∈ [γ, γ), then a predatory ruler would prefer g∗0 = 1 and set m∗0 = 1, inducing a
BSE. Moreover, because γ > 0, γ > 0 if γ < γ. Thus when γ < γ, a citizen’s expected
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payoffs from e = 1 are strictly greater in a BSE than a WNE. Hence, when h ∈ [h, h) and
γ < γ < γ, γ = γˆ would strictly improve the citizen’s expected payoffs.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) Suppose g0 = g1 = 1, m0 = 1, m1 = 0, e = 1, and c = 1 for all θˆ. Then by
Proposition 2, c∗ = 1 for all θˆ if and only if γ ≥ γ. When γ ≥ γ, a predatory ruler’s payoff
when g0 = 1, m0 = 1, e
∗ = 1, and c∗ = 1 is RI + (1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1. His reservation
payoff is RI +w. By Proposition 1, it must be the case that h ≥ h if g∗0 = 1. By Proposition
1, h > h, such that if g∗0 = 1, then g
∗
1 = 1, and if g
∗
1 = 1, then e
∗ = 1.
However, recall that a ruler never deviates from mθ = 0 if he is indifferent. Suppose
m0 = 0. By Proposition 1.1, the citizen chooses c
∗ = 1 only if θ = 0. Then a predatory
ruler’s payoff when g0 = 1 but m0 = 0 is still R
I + (1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1. Hence, when
γ ≥ γ and h > h, m∗0 = 0, where g∗0 = g∗1 = 1, m∗1 = 0, e∗ = 1, and c∗ = 1 if and only if
θˆ = 0. Hence, h ≥ h and γ ≥ γ are necessary and sufficient for a DSE when m0 ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) Now let h ∈ [h, h), but suppose a predatory ruler chooses g0 = 1 and m0 = 1. Then
c∗ = 1 for all θˆ. However, since his payoff from m0 = 1 is the same as his payoff from m0 = 0
when γ ≥ γ, m∗0 6= 1. Suppose he instead sets m0 = 0. Then c∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0.
But by Proposition 1.1, g∗0 6= 1 when m0 = 0 and h < h. Hence, when γ ≥ γ but h ∈ [h, h),
g∗1 = 1 but g
∗
0 = 0 and m
∗
0 = 0, where m
∗
1 = 0, e
∗ = 1 if and only if gθ = 1 is observed,
and c∗ = 1 whenever e∗ = 1. Hence, h ∈ [h, h) and γ ≥ γ are necessary and sufficient for a
repressive non-schooling equilibrium [RNE] whenever m0 ∈ {0, 1}.
(iii) By Proposition 2.4, γ is strictly decreasing in h. Finally, γ|h=h = αpi(1−qσ)(1−pi)qσ(1+w) > 0.
Proof of Remark 3
Proof. By Proposition 3.1, if γ ≥ γ > γ, m∗0 = 0, such that a predatory ruler’s payoff from
g0 = 1 is R
I + (1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1. His payoff from g0 = 0 is RI + w. By Proposition
2, γ ∈ [γ, γ) is necessary and sufficient for a BSE, where his payoff is RI + γ(w+αh) + (1−
γ)(1 − qσ)(w + αh − α) − 1. The latter payoff is always strictly greater than either of the
first two when γ > max{γ, 0}, conditional upon γ < γ.
A ruler’s payoff in a BSE is strictly increasing in γ for all γ < γ. γ ≤ 1. If γ ≥ γ, then
it must be the case that γ ≤ 1. Hence, the payoff-maximizing γ ≡ γ˜∗ = limε→0 γ − ε < 1.
It follows from this and Remark 2 that this is also weakly payoff-improving for the citizen
when h ∈ [h, h).
Proof of Example 1
Proof. Let h ≥ h. By Propositions 1.1 and 2.2, e∗ = 1, m∗1 = 0, and g∗1 = 1. Fix γ = γ|h=h.
Suppose h = h, such that γ = γ. By Proposition 2.1, c∗ = 1 for all θˆ if m∗0 = 1. Otherwise
c∗ = 1 if and only if θˆ = 0. Then by Proposition 3.1, m∗0 = 0, such that a predatory ruler’s
payoff from g0 = 1 is R
I + (1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1.
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Now suppose h = h − η < h. By Proposition 2.4, γ < γ|h=h−η. Now m∗0 = 1 whenever
g0 = 1, such that a predatory ruler’s payoff from g0 = 1 is
RI + γ|h=h(w + α(h− η)) + (1− γ|h=h)(1− qσ)(w + α(h− η)− α)− 1
= RI +
αpi(1− qσ)(w + αh− αη)
(1− pi)qσ(1 + w) + (1− qσ)(w + αh− αη − α)
− αpi(1− qσ)
2(w + αh− αη − α)
(1− pi)qσ(1 + w) − 1.
Plugging in h, the latter is greater if and only if η < pi(qσ(1+w)+(1−qσ)α)
(1−qσ)qσ(piα+(1−pi)(1+w)) ≡ ηˆ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Preliminary information: Optimal taxes and rents (τ ∗0t, τ
∗
1t, R
∗
0t, R
∗
1t), and in turn r
∗
t ,
are the same as in the basic model for all t. When θ = 1, this follows from the citizen’s
myopia and the fact that if h ≥ h in period 1, then h2 > h. When θ = 0 and t = 2, this
follows from Lemma 1. When θ = 0 and t = 1, a predatory ruler’s tax choice τ01 must
account for the possibility that if r1 = 1, then he survives into period 2 with probability q.
However, if he survives, his t = 2 payoffs are the same as if r1 = 0. Let his second period
payoffs be V2. A predatory ruler’s expected payoff when e1 = 1 and c1 = 1 if he sets the
highest possible τ01 at which r
∗
1 = 0 is R
I + (1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1 + βV2.
(1− qσ)(w + αh− α) + βV2 > (1− q)[σ(w + αh− α) + βV2]
⇔ (1− σ)(w + αh− α) + qβV2 > 0.
Sustaining a BSE into period 2 (c∗2 = 1 if and only if θˆ2 = 0): Let h ≥ h. By Propositions
1.1 and 2.2, e∗t = 1, m
A∗
1t = 0, and g
∗
1t = 1 for t = 1 and therefore all t. A benevolent ruler
cannot benefit from weakening the productivity of education, such that mB∗1 = 0.
Suppose period 1 is a BSE: Let γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 0). h1 = h if mB0 = 0, such that, by
Propositions 2.1 and 2.4, c∗1 = 1 if and only if θˆ1 = 0 for all m
A
01 and m
B
0 .
Suppose mA01 = 1 and m
B
0 = 0. Without unproductive education, period 2 is a DSE: Let
γ ≥ γ(h2|mB0 = 0), where by Proposition 2.1,
γ(h2|mB0 = 0) ≡
pi2α
(1− pi2)qσ(w + αh+ α(1− δ)h− α) ,
such that c∗2 = 1 for all θˆ2 and thus m
A∗
02 = 0 if there is no unproductive education (m
B
0 = 0).
Now instead suppose that mB0 = 1, such that h1 = (1− ρ)h and h2 = h+ (1− δ)(1− ρ)h.
Suppose that mA02 = 1 but c2 = 0 when θˆ2 = 1. By Proposition 2.1, this is true if and only if
γ <
pi2α
(1− pi2)qσ(w + αh+ α(1− δ)(1− ρ)h− α) ≡ γ(h2|m
B
0 = 1).
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Rearranging, c∗2 = 1 if and only if θˆ2 = 0 when m
A
02 = 1 and m
B
0 = 1 if and only if
ρ > 1− pi2α− γ(1− pi2)qσ(w + αh− α)
γ(1− pi2)qσα(1− δ)h ≡ ρ.
ρ > ρ implies γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 1), since ρ > ρ implies γ < γ(h2|mB0 = 1), and h2 > h1 implies
γ(h2|mB0 = 1) < γ(h1|mB0 = 1) for all pi2 < pi1 by Proposition 2.4.
ρ > ρ also implies γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 0), since ρ > ρ implies ρ < 1 for all ρ < 1, and ρ < 1
implies γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 0). Finally, γ ≥ γ(h2|mB0 = 0) implies ρ ≥ 0.
Unproductive propaganda (mA∗01 = m
A∗
02 = m
B∗
0 = 1)? Suppose m
A
01 = m
A
02 = m
B
0 = 1. By
Propositions 2.1 and 3.1, a predatory ruler’s expected payoff in period 1 from mB0 = 1,
conditional upon γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 0), γ ≥ γ(h2|mB0 = 0), and ρ > ρ, is
RI + γ(w + α(1− ρ)h) + (1− γ)(1− qσ)(w + α(1− ρ)h− α)− 1 + β[RI + γ(w + αh
+ α(1− δ)(1− ρ)h) + (1− γ)(1− qσ)(w + αh+ α(1− δ)(1− ρ)h− α)− 1]. (C.1)
His expected payoff from mB0 = 0 in period 1 is
RI+γ(w+αh)+(1−γ)(1−qσ)(w+αh−α)−1+β(RI+(1−qσ)(w+αh+α(1−δ)h−α)−1).
(C.2)
The former is greater than the latter if and only if
ρ <
βγ(qσ(w + α(2− δ)h) + (1− qσ)α)
αh(1 + (1− δ)β)(1− (1− γ)qσ) ≡ ρ > 0.
Hence, when γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 0) but γ ≥ γ(h2|mB0 = 0), ρ ∈ (ρ, ρ) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for c∗t = 1 if and only if θˆt = 0 and m
A∗
0t = m
B∗
0 = 1 for all t, when
g0t = g
∗
1t = e
∗
t = 1 for all t, and m
γ∗
1t = m
B∗
1 = 0 for all t.
Finally, a predatory ruler’s expected payoff from g01 = g02 = 0 is
(1 + β)(RI + w). (C.3)
His expected payoff from g01 = 0 and g02 = 1, conditional upon γ < γ(h2 = h), is
RI + w + β(RI + γ(w + αh) + (1− γ)(1− qσ)(w + αh− α)− 1). (C.4)
When γ < γ(h2|mB0 = 0), then unproductive education is unneeded. Finally, recall that
if γ ≮ γ(h1|mB0 = 0), then ρ ≥ 1, such that ρ ≯ ρ. Hence, when γ < γ(h1|mB0 = 0),
γ ≥ γ(h2|mB0 = 0), h ≥ h, and (C.1) exceeds the greater of (C.3) and (C.4), ρ ∈ (ρ, ρ) is
necessary and sufficient for an unproductive biased schooling equilibrium [UBSE] in which
human capital accumulates, yet mA∗0t = 1 and c
∗
t = 1 if and only if θˆt = 0 for all t.
Finally, to confirm that this equilibrium space is nontrivial, set w = 0, β = 1, h = h, and
γ = γ(h2|mB0 = 0). Then ρ = 0. Then since ρ > 0, ρ > ρ. Moreover, (C.2) exceeds (C.4),
and (C.4) exceeds (C.3), such that (C.1) exceeds (C.2), (C.3), and (C.4) whenever ρ < ρ.
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(ii)
∂ρ
∂γ
= pi2
γ2(1−pi2)qσ(1−δ)h > 0,
∂ρ
∂h
= pi2α−γ(1−pi2)qσ(w−α)
γ(1−pi2)qσα(1−δ)h2 > 0,
∂ρ
∂γ
= β(1−qσ)(qσ(w+α(2−δ)h)+(1−qσ)α)
αh(1+(1−δ)β)(1−(1−γ)qσ)2 > 0, and
∂ρ
∂h
= − βγ(qσw+(1−qσ)α)
αh2(1+(1−δ)β)(1−(1−γ)qσ) < 0.
Discussion: the basic model with two citizens
A natural reframing of the model that is closer in spirit to Edmond (2013) is to have it
assume two citizens, i = a, b, each from an ex ante different social group. Citizens meet if
they both enroll in a public school, and, after observing a public curriculum θˆ, form a political
club when ca = cb = 1. In this formulation, propaganda prevents political mobilization by
undermining coordination, i.e. preventing a political network from being formed between
different social groups. For instance,
cb = 1 cb = 0
ca = 1
pˆi(0|θˆ)qσ(w + αh− α)
+pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− α− τBE1 ),
pˆi(0|θˆ)qσ(w + αh− α)
+pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− α− τBE1 )
pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− α− τBE1 ),
pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− τBE1 )
cb = 0
pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− τBE1 ),
pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− α− τBE1 )
pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− τBE1 ),
pˆi(1|θˆ)(w + αh− τBE1 )
gives the payoff matrix for each citizen’s political club decision when there are two citizens.
As in the basic set up, Pr(θˆ = 0|θ = 1) = 0, since a benevolent ruler never uses propaganda.
In turn, pˆi(1|0) = 0 and pˆi(0|0) = 1. Hence, when citizens observe θˆ = 0, the only Nash
equilibrium at that stage is c∗a = c
∗
b = 1.
Thus a predatory ruler on one hand wants to use propaganda because it will lower the
probability that citizens observe θˆ = 0 and raise the probability that they observe θˆ = 1,
at which point there are potentially two equilibria: one with c∗a = c
∗
b = 0 and one with
c∗a = c
∗
b = 1. However, propaganda (i.e. high γ) also increases pˆi(0|1) and decreases pˆi(1|1),
to the extent that the c∗a = c
∗
b = 0 equilibrium may disappear from the θˆ = 1 case as well.
Hence, the non-monotonic effect of propaganda.
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Parameter key
Summary of variables and parameters
Parameter Interpretation Description
θ ∈ {0, 1} The ruler’s type The ruler’s preference for policies that maximize
social welfare versus his own rents.
pi ∈ (0, 1) The citizen’s trust level The citizen’s prior belief that the ruler will max-
imize social welfare (i.e. Pr(θ = 1)).
gθ ∈ {0, 1} Public education provi-
sion
The ruler’s choice of whether to invest in public
education.
e ∈ {0, 1} Enrollment in school The citizen’s choice of whether to attend public
school.
w > 0 Non-productive income –
h > 1 Productivity effect of ed-
ucation
A measure of productivity growth under educa-
tion.
α > 0 Income effect of human
capital
–
τθ ≥ 0 Ruler’s choice of tax –
RI ≥ 0 Initial rents* The ruler’s rents at the start of the game.
Rθ ≥ 0 Final rents The ruler’s rents at the end of the game.
c ∈ {0, 1} Political club participa-
tion
The citizen’s choice of whether to join a political
club while enrolled in school.
r ∈ {0, 1} Mounting of a political
challenge
The citizen’s choice to contest a ruler’s choices
of τθ, conditional upon c = 1.
q ∈ (0, 1) Political power The probability that the citizen wins a political
challenge.
σ ∈ (0, 1) Rule of law The extent to which political challenges are re-
solved nonviolently (i.e. are non-destructive).
θˆ ∈ {0, 1} Curriculum Informs upon and mirrors the state and struc-
ture of the political environment, as defined by
the ruler’s type. A ruler-favorable curriculum is
θˆ = 1, regardless of θ.
mθ ∈ {0, 1} Ruler’s education policy The ruler’s choice of whether to embed propa-
ganda within (i.e. bias) the education system.
Neutral policy is mθ = 0. Biased policy is
mθ = 1.
γ ∈ (0, 1] State of the propaganda
technology
The extent to which propaganda is successfully
transmitted under a biased education policy.
Higher γ implies stronger technology.
ρ ∈ (0, 1) Unproductive education The extent to which propaganda decreases
the productivity of education in the extension
model’s first period.
*Model later assumes RI ≥ max{1− (1− q)σ(w + αh− α), 0}.
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Tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics (I: model 1, unbalanced)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PressConstraints 2448 4.710 2.253 0.5 9.4
Crisis 2448 0.061 0.240 0 1
Education expenditures (% Gov) 1457 14.832 4.750 4.771 37.687
lnEducation 1457 2.646 0.324 1.562 3.629
GDP per capita ($ 2010) 2442 11976.79 17214.42 186.919 91593.633
lnGDPpc 2442 8.301 1.589 5.231 11.425
Gov’t expenditures (% GDP) 2315 15.839 5.819 2.804 69.543
lnGovExpend 2315 2.695 0.377 1.031 4.242
Military expenditures (% GDP) 2256 2.170 2.295 0 39.607
lnMilitary 2223 0.464 0.973 -6.908 3.679
lnMilitary2 2256 1.021 0.473 0 3.704
Polity 2439 4.173 6.140 -10 10
Country 136 – – – –
Year 18 – – 1997 2014
Table C.1: Summary statistics (II: model 1, balanced)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
PressConstraints 1548 4.396 2.306 0.5 9.4
Crisis 1548 0.056 0.229 0 1
Education expenditures (% gov) 1157 14.837 4.388 4.771 37.687
lnEducation 1157 2.654 0.297 1.562 3.629
GDP per capita ($ 2010) 1545 14114.48 18503.57 205.07 91593.633
lnGDPpc 1545 8.511 1.600 5.323 11.425
Gov’t expenditures (% GDP) 1516 15.776 5.174 4.157 31.58
lnGovExpend 1516 2.699 0.358 1.425 3.453
Military expenditures (% GDP) 1464 2.045 1.881 0.001 16.157
lnMilitary 1464 0.376 1.072 -6.908 2.782
lnMilitary2 1464 0.996 0.448 0.001 2.842
Polity 1540 5.022 6.021 -10 10
Country 86 – – – –
Year 18 – – 1997 2014
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Table C.1: Summary statistics (III: model 2)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Aget 77056 26.345 5.995 18 43
PressConstraintsb=18 58758 4.291 1.957 0.5 9.9
PressConstraintsb=22 57985 4.235 1.972 0.5 9.9
EducationAttainment (EA) 74000 4.157 2.044 0 7
Education completion age 65335 20.356 7.612 1 99
Employed 76384 0.524 0.499 0 1
Immigrant 36337 0.033 0.180 0 1
IncomeLevelt 71618 3.784 2.257 0 9
International 27283 0.010 0.100 0 1
Noncitizen 28673 0.020 0.141 0 1
Number of children 76341 0.917 1.367 0 8
Participation (active) 69854 1.463 1.272 0 4
Participation (passive) 74846 2.578 1.673 0 6
Participation (demonstrate) 71748 0.675 0.712 0 2
Participation (petition) 71286 0.797 0.770 0 2
Participation (importance) 75743 1.301 0.978 0 3
Participation (interest) 75947 1.272 0.946 0 3
Polityt 77056 6.735 3.862 -6 10
Relationship status 76837 1.272 1.387 0 3
Sex 77023 0.514 0.500 0 1
Studentt 76384 0.187 0.390 0 1
Country 70 – – – –
Year 20 – – 1994 2014
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Table C.2: FH score as a propaganda proxy (I: correlations)
Dependent variable: Academic constraints
PressConstraints
0.086∗∗∗
(0.012)
–
0.072∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.077∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.078∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.073∗∗∗
(0.026)
Polity –
−0.028∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.006
(0.010)
−0.005
(0.011)
−0.021
(0.016)
−0.015
(0.011)
Observations 195 165 165 162 129 136
Exclude if missing Polity? No No No Yes No No
Exclude autocracies > 4? No No No No Yes No
Exclude “crisis” countries? No No No No Yes No
Table 3.1 countries only? No No No No No Yes
R2 0.20 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.26
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, with *** denoting significance at the 1% level. Independent variables are
the FH press constraint score (0 to 10) and the Polity IV POLITY2 score (-10 to 10), both averaged over 2011 to 2016. Coun-
tries missing POLITY2 scores for any of those years are excluded in column 4. Dependent variable is an academic constraints
indicator, which equals 1 if a country’s scholars have ever faced imprisonment, prosecution, or travel restrictions in the Scholars
at Risk (SAR) Network’s Incident Index from 2011 to October 2017. A country is considered a “crisis” country if it received a
-66, -77, or -88 POLITY score from 2011 to 2016. These are excluded from column 5, since countries in crisis may have weak
states that are unable to enact or enforce education policy. Countries with Polity IV Autocracy scores over 5 are also omitted
in column 5, since strong autocracies tend to be less transparent and therefore have fewer reported incidents.
Table C.2: FH score as a propaganda proxy (II: summary statistics)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
AcademicConstraints 195 0.287 0.454 0 1
PressConstraints 195 4.795 2.357 0.95 9.7
Polity 165 4.075 6.087 -10 10
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Table C.3: Model 1 with alternative military transformation
Dependent variable: Degree of press constraints and media censorship
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
lnEducation
2.028∗∗∗
(0.778)
1.881∗∗
(0.780)
2.542∗∗∗
(0.929)
2.522∗∗∗
(0.911)
lnEdu× lnGDPpc −0.268
∗∗∗
(0.098)
−0.251∗∗
(0.098)
−0.312∗∗∗
(0.117)
−0.309∗∗∗
(0.115)
lnGDPpc
0.339
(0.332)
0.274
(0.335)
0.418
(0.409)
0.398
(0.394)
Polity
−0.111∗∗∗
(0.022)
−0.104∗∗∗
(0.023)
−0.104∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.098∗∗∗
(0.026)
Crisis –
0.198∗
(0.108)
–
0.167
(0.123)
lnMilitary2
−0.047
(0.154)
−0.005
(0.175)
0.051
(0.178)
0.091
(0.202)
lnGovExpend –
−0.043
(0.210)
–
−0.200
(0.236)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balanced panel? No No Yes Yes
Mean imputation? No No No No
Observations 1379 1356 1101 1092
Countries 133 132 85 85
Adj. R2 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.21
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The variable lnMilitary2 corrects for deletion or exacerbation of zero or near-zero military expenditure values post-logarithm
by adding 1 to each value pre-logarithm.
Table C.4: Model 1, correlates of missing education data
Dependent variable: Correlates of missing education data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
lnGDPpc
−0.032∗∗∗
(0.006)
– – – –
−0.001
(0.008)
−0.204
(0.146)
Polity –
−0.011∗∗∗
(0.002)
– – –
−0.009∗∗∗
(0.002)
−0.004
(0.006)
Crisis – –
0.151∗∗∗
(0.042)
– –
−0.060
(0.051)
−0.024
(0.056)
lnMilitary – – –
0.031∗∗∗
(0.011)
–
0.022∗
(0.012)
−0.002
(0.059)
lnGovExpend – – – –
−0.045∗
(0.027)
−0.043
(0.034)
−0.063
(0.115)
Country fixed effects No No No No No No Yes
Year fixed effects No No No No No No Yes
Observations 2442 2439 2439 2223 2315 2134 2134
Adj. R2 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.19
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table C.5: Model 1 with categorical polity controls (= {−10,−9, ..., 10})
Dependent variable: Degree of press constraints and media censorship
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (2) (3)
lnEducation
1.784∗∗
(0.880)
1.723∗∗∗
(0.576)
1.729∗∗∗
(0.575)
1.699∗∗∗
(0.593)
1.493∗∗
(0.589)
1.642∗∗
(0.636)
2.207∗∗∗
(0.687)
lnEdu× lnGDPpc −0.234
∗∗
(0.111)
−0.219∗∗∗
(0.074)
−0.220∗∗∗
(0.074)
−0.219∗∗∗
(0.076)
−0.193∗∗
(0.075)
−0.208∗∗∗
(0.078)
−0.269∗∗∗
(0.089)
lnGDPpc
0.198
(0.367)
0.312
(0.298)
0.310
(0.298)
0.342
(0.293)
0.310
(0.295)
0.336
(0.267)
0.518
(0.338)
Crisis – –
0.044
(0.104)
0.087
(0.109)
0.073
(0.109)
0.035
(0.146)
0.050
(0.124)
lnMilitary – – –
−0.048
(0.094)
−0.049
(0.106)
−0.028
(0.083)
0.002
(0.116)
lnGovExpend – – – –
0.100
(0.199)
−0.076
(0.163)
−0.035
(0.229)
Polity controls? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balanced panel? No No No No No No Yes
Mean imputation? No No No No No Yes No
Observations 1455 1452 1452 1366 1343 2134 1092
Countries 136 136 136 132 131 132 85
Adj. R2 0.08 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.31
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Column 2 applies a country mean imputation procedure to the education expenditure data and controls for a dummy, which
takes a value of 1 when a value is missing.
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Table C.6: Model 1 with standardized explanatory variables
Dependent variable: Proxy for propaganda: press constraints and media censorship
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d)
lnEducation
−0.050
(0.043)
−0.055
(0.044)
−0.061
(0.046)
−0.056
(0.047)
lnEdu× lnGDPpc −0.124
∗∗∗
(0.047)
−0.125∗∗∗
(0.047)
−0.133∗∗∗
(0.050)
−0.124∗∗
(0.050)
lnGDPpc
−0.583
(0.450)
−0.621
(0.449)
−0.629
(0.455)
−0.625
(0.466)
Polity
−0.666∗∗∗
(0.122)
−0.645∗∗∗
(0.121)
−0.654∗∗∗
(0.136)
−0.637∗∗∗
(0.144)
Crisis –
0.176∗
(0.100)
0.189∗
(0.106)
0.194∗
(0.108)
lnMilitary – –
−0.025
(0.099)
0.008
(0.115)
lnGovExpend – – –
−0.017
(0.081)
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDPmin 0.190
∗∗
(0.088)
0.187∗∗
(0.085)
0.196∗∗
(0.091)
0.183∗
(0.094)
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDP10% 0.118
∗
(0.065)
0.114∗
(0.063)
0.118∗
(0.067)
0.110
(0.070)
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDP90% −0.231
∗∗
(0.092)
−0.238∗∗
(0.093)
−0.256∗∗
(0.098)
−0.237∗∗
(0.099)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balanced panel? No No Yes Yes
Mean imputation? No No No No
Observations 1452 1452 1366 1343
Countries 136 136 132 131
Adj. R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.22
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Coefficients and standard errors for all non-binary explanatory variables are standardized with mean zero. Rows labeled
lnEdu+ lnEdu× lnGDP report the combined effect (and standard errors) of lnEducation and lnEdu× lnGDPpc at different
levels (sample minimum, 10% and 90%) within the sample distribution of lnGDPpc.
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Table C.7: Model 2 with separated variables
Press constraints and political participation
Dependent variable: Interest Importance Demonstration Petition
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EducationAttainment
0.069∗∗∗
(0.021)
0.116∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.026
(0.027)
0.054∗∗
(0.021)
0.045∗∗
(0.022)
0.071∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.071∗∗∗
(0.018)
0.061∗∗∗
(0.019)
EA× Constraintsb −0.005
∗
(0.003)
−0.035∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.017∗∗
(0.007)
−0.001
(0.002)
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.004∗
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.006)
EA× Constraints2b –
0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)
–
0.002∗∗
(0.001)
–
0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
–
0.0004
(0.001)
EA× Polityt 0.001(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
0.003
(0.002)
0.003∗∗
(0.001)
0.002
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002∗
(0.001)
PressConstraintsb
0.002
(0.014)
0.157∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.003
(0.016)
0.088∗
(0.046)
0.009
(0.010)
0.076∗∗∗
(0.026)
0.011
(0.011)
0.007
(0.032)
PressConstraints2b –
−0.015∗∗∗
(0.004)
–
−0.008
(0.005)
–
−0.007∗∗
(0.003)
–
0.0003
(0.003)
Polityt
0.007
(0.015)
0.014
(0.012)
−0.009
(0.019)
0.003
(0.011)
0.022∗
(0.012)
0.025∗∗
(0.010)
0.006
(0.016)
0.016
(0.011)
Aget
0.024∗∗
(0.011)
0.023∗∗
(0.010)
0.033∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.027∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.004
(0.011)
−0.001
(0.009)
0.006
(0.009)
0.007
(0.008)
Age2t
−0.0002
(0.0002)
−0.0002
(0.0002)
−0.0004∗∗
(0.0002)
−0.0003∗
(0.0002)
0.00005
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.00003
(0.0002)
0.00001
(0.0001)
IncomeLevelt
0.021∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.018∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.011∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.004
(0.004)
0.004
(0.003)
0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
Studentt –
0.091∗∗∗
(0.020)
–
0.063∗∗∗
(0.014)
–
0.081∗∗∗
(0.020)
–
0.103∗∗∗
(0.019)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-students only? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Exclude immigrants? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude non-citizens? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32787 50123 32651 49952 31221 47637 30962 47229
Countries 65 70 65 70 65 70 65 70
Adj. R2 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.26 0.26
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Base year (b) is derived from the survey year (t), minus the respondent’s age (Aget), plus 18. All regressions control for sex,
relationship status, number of children, and employment status.
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Table C.8: Model 2 with alternative base age (b = 22)
Press constraints and political participation
Dependent variable: Passive participation Active participation
(1a) (1b) (1c) (2a) (2b) (2c)
EducationAttainment
0.066
(0.044)
0.151∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.149∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.123∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.152∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.148∗∗∗
(0.032)
EA× PressConstraintsb −0.003(0.006)
−0.054∗∗∗
(0.016)
−0.042∗∗
(0.017)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.021∗∗
(0.010)
−0.021∗∗
(0.009)
EA× PressConstraints2b –
0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
–
0.002∗
(0.001)
0.002∗
(0.001)
EA×Polityt 0.005
∗
(0.003)
0.006∗∗
(0.003)
0.004∗
(0.002)
0.001
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.002)
PressConstraintsb
0.034
(0.023)
0.234∗∗∗
(0.078)
0.208∗∗
(0.081)
0.016
(0.015)
0.087∗
(0.050)
0.080∗
(0.042)
PressConstraints2b –
−0.023∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.018∗∗
(0.008)
–
−0.008
(0.005)
−0.008∗
(0.004)
Polityt
−0.018
(0.024)
−0.019
(0.024)
0.012
(0.023)
0.026
(0.024)
0.025
(0.024)
0.041∗∗
(0.019)
Aget
0.065∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.062∗∗
(0.024)
0.052∗∗
(0.023)
0.031∗
(0.017)
0.031∗
(0.017)
0.021
(0.017)
Age2t
−0.001∗∗
(0.0004)
−0.001∗
(0.0004)
−0.001
(0.0004)
−0.0003
(0.0003)
−0.0003
(0.0003)
−0.0001
(0.0003)
IncomeLevelt
0.034∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.035∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.029∗∗∗
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.006)
0.001
(0.005)
Studentt – –
0.138∗∗∗
(0.051)
– –
0.158∗∗∗
(0.048)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-students only? Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Exclude immigrants? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude noncitizens? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Base age 22 22 22 22 22 22
Observations 38167 38167 49263 35951 35951 46336
Countries 65 65 70 65 65 70
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.23 0.23 0.23
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Base year (b) is derived from the survey year (t), minus the respondent’s age (Aget), plus 22. All regressions control for sex,
relationship status, number of children, and employment status.
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Table C.9: Model 2, evaluating immigrants and noncitizens
Is migration correlated with propaganda or educational attainment?
Dependent variable: Press constraints Educational attainment
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (2a) (2b) (2c) (2d)
Immigrant –
−0.036
(0.026)
– – –
−0.071
(0.108)
– –
Non-citizen – –
−0.025
(0.035)
– – –
−0.358∗∗
(0.157)
–
International – – –
−0.062
(0.042)
– – –
−0.448∗∗
(0.172)
Polityt
−0.216∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.141∗∗∗
(0.017)
−0.137∗∗∗
(0.017)
−0.136∗∗∗
(0.017)
−0.335∗∗∗
(0.012)
−0.183∗∗∗
(0.024)
−0.178∗∗∗
(0.030)
−0.173∗∗∗
(0.030)
Aget
−0.047
(0.050)
−0.199∗∗
(0.085)
−0.222∗∗
(0.091)
−0.227∗∗
(0.095)
0.390∗∗∗
(0.034)
0.411∗∗∗
(0.035)
0.394∗∗∗
(0.041)
0.387∗∗∗
(0.043)
Age2t
0.001
(0.001)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
0.004∗∗
(0.002)
−0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)
IncomeLevelt
0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.190∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.159∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.164∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.164∗∗∗
(0.013)
Female
−0.0003
(0.011)
−0.019
(0.015)
−0.024
(0.018)
−0.024
(0.018)
0.146∗∗∗
(0.052)
0.169∗∗∗
(0.059)
0.164∗∗
(0.069)
0.154∗∗
(0.072)
Relationship Status
0.004
(0.006)
0.013
(0.009)
0.013
(0.009)
0.016∗
(0.009)
−0.106∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.045∗∗
(0.018)
−0.030
(0.019)
−0.032
(0.020)
Number of Children
−0.001
(0.012)
−0.007
(0.019)
−0.006
(0.020)
−0.008
(0.020)
−0.220∗∗∗
(0.035)
−0.269∗∗∗
(0.029)
−0.280∗∗∗
(0.032)
−0.274∗∗∗
(0.033)
Employed
0.014
(0.020)
0.019
(0.028)
0.018
(0.030)
0.017
(0.031)
0.468∗∗∗
(0.066)
0.480∗∗∗
(0.061)
0.507∗∗∗
(0.070)
0.504∗∗∗
(0.071)
Student
−0.020
(0.020)
−0.070∗
(0.036)
−0.112∗∗
(0.044)
−0.116∗∗
(0.046)
1.256∗∗∗
(0.120)
1.339∗∗∗
(0.115)
1.327∗∗∗
(0.152)
1.290∗∗∗
(0.153)
Country-year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude immigrants? Yes No No No Yes No No No
Exclude non-citizens? Yes No No No Yes No No No
Base age (b) 18 18 18 18 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Observations 52551 26565 23624 22674 66327 33026 26698 25543
Countries 70 53 39 37 70 53 39 37
Adj. R2 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.31 0.28 0.29 0.28
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
International is a dummy that takes a value of 1 only if immigrant and non-citizen both take values of 1.
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Table C.9: Model 2, evaluating immigrants and noncitizens (II)
Does migration affect the mapping from schooling to participation?
Dependent variable: Passive participation
Immigrant
−0.102∗
(0.059)
−0.018
(0.145)
– – – –
Noncitizen – –
−0.210∗∗∗
(0.070)
−0.388∗∗∗
(0.138)
–
International – – – –
−0.305∗∗
(0.114)
−0.496∗∗
(0.204)
EducationAttainment
0.074∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.075∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.074∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.073∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.016)
0.067∗∗∗
(0.016)
EA×Immigrant – −0.018
(0.024)
– – – –
EA×Noncitizen – – – 0.043
(0.030)
–
EA×International – – – – – 0.045
(0.040)
IncomeLevelt
0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.026∗∗∗
(0.007)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.034∗∗∗
(0.009)
Polityt
−0.282∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.282∗∗∗
(0.011)
−0.276∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.276∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.275∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.275∗∗∗
(0.013)
Aget
0.064∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.064∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.049∗∗
(0.023)
0.049∗∗
(0.023)
0.050∗∗
(0.024)
0.050∗∗
(0.024)
Age2t
−0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003)
−0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003)
−0.001
(0.0004)
−0.001
(0.0004)
−0.001∗
(0.0004)
−0.001∗
(0.0004)
Sex
−0.289∗∗∗
(0.036)
−0.289∗∗∗
(0.036)
−0.303∗∗∗
(0.042)
−0.303∗∗∗
(0.042)
−0.300∗∗∗
(0.044)
−0.300∗∗∗
(0.044)
Relationship Status
0.013
(0.012)
0.013
(0.012)
0.020
(0.014)
0.020
(0.014)
0.021
(0.014)
0.020
(0.014)
Number of Children
0.0004
(0.012)
0.0004
(0.012)
0.001
(0.012)
0.002
(0.012)
0.001
(0.013)
0.001
(0.013)
Employed
0.006
(0.028)
0.006
(0.028)
−0.008
(0.035)
−0.008
(0.035)
−0.011
(0.035)
−0.011
(0.035)
Student
0.176∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.176∗∗∗
(0.045)
0.138∗∗
(0.054)
0.138∗∗
(0.054)
0.133∗∗
(0.057)
0.133∗∗
(0.057)
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32326 32326 26374 26374 25237 25237
Countries 53 53 39 39 37 37
Adj. R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
International is a dummy with a value of 1 only if immigrant and noncitizen both take values of 1.
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Table C.9: Model 2, evaluating immigrants and noncitizens (III)
Does migration affect the mapping from schooling to participation?
Dependent variable: Active participation
Immigrant
−0.175∗∗
(0.068)
−0.108
(0.136)
– – – –
Noncitizen – –
−0.268∗∗∗
(0.086)
−0.370∗∗
(0.175)
–
International – – – –
−0.299∗∗
(0.125)
−0.387∗
(0.206)
EducationAttainment
0.108∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.108∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.110∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.109∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.108∗∗∗
(0.011)
0.108∗∗∗
(0.011)
EA×Immigrant – −0.015
(0.022)
– – – –
EA×Noncitizen – – – 0.025
(0.027)
–
EA×International – – – – – 0.021
(0.032)
IncomeLevelt
0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.006)
0.001
(0.008)
0.001
(0.008)
0.002
(0.008)
0.002
(0.008)
Polityt
−0.050∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.050∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.049∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.009)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.010)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.009)
Aget
0.004
(0.012)
0.004
(0.012)
−0.007
(0.012)
−0.007
(0.012)
−0.008
(0.013)
−0.008
(0.013)
Age2t
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0001
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
0.0003
(0.0002)
Sex
−0.094∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.094∗∗∗
(0.025)
−0.067∗∗
(0.029)
−0.067∗∗
(0.029)
−0.076∗∗
(0.029)
−0.076∗∗
(0.029)
Relationship Status
−0.027∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.027∗∗∗
(0.007)
−0.021∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.022∗∗∗
(0.008)
−0.022∗∗
(0.008)
−0.022∗∗
(0.008)
Number of Children
0.008
(0.007)
0.008
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
0.004
(0.007)
Employed
0.102∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.102∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.123∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.123∗∗∗
(0.028)
0.121∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.121∗∗∗
(0.029)
Student
0.169∗∗∗
(0.050)
0.169∗∗∗
(0.050)
0.174∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.174∗∗∗
(0.062)
0.165∗∗
(0.062)
0.165∗∗
(0.062)
Country-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 30100 30100 25530 25530 24407 24407
Countries 52 52 39 39 37 37
Adj. R2 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.20
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
International is a dummy with a value of 1 only if immigrant and noncitizen both take values of 1.
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Table C.10: Model 2 with standardized explanatory variables
Press constraints and political participation
Dependent variable: Passive participation Active participation
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b)
EducationAttainment
0.183∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.180∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.138∗∗∗
(0.029)
0.134∗∗∗
(0.024)
0.225∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.223∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.212∗∗∗
(0.017)
0.198∗∗∗
(0.017)
EA× Constraintsb −0.048
∗∗
(0.020)
−0.032
(0.022)
−0.040∗
(0.021)
−0.044∗∗
(0.020)
−0.034∗∗∗
(0.013)
−0.023
(0.017)
−0.025
(0.017)
−0.018
(0.016)
EA× Constraints2b – –
0.043∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.038∗∗∗
(0.011)
– –
0.012
(0.009)
0.014∗
(0.008)
EA×Polityt – 0.030(0.024)
0.033
(0.023)
0.035∗∗
(0.017)
–
0.022
(0.026)
0.023
(0.026)
0.023
(0.019)
PressConstraintsb
−0.056
(0.035)
−0.052
(0.035)
−0.029
(0.037)
0.010
(0.038)
−0.003
(0.018)
−0.001
(0.017)
−0.008
(0.023)
0.019
(0.021)
PressConstraints2b – –
−0.015
(0.021)
−0.012
(0.016)
– –
−0.007
(0.012)
0.009
(0.009)
Polityt
0.043
(0.107)
0.047
(0.106)
0.055
(0.108)
0.167∗
(0.084)
0.138
(0.103)
0.141
(0.104)
0.145
(0.103)
0.202∗∗∗
(0.072)
Aget
0.133∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.135∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.133∗∗∗
(0.025)
0.130∗∗∗
(0.023)
0.078∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.079∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.079∗∗∗
(0.013)
0.070∗∗∗
(0.015)
Age2t
−0.023∗
(0.013)
−0.023∗
(0.013)
−0.022∗
(0.012)
−0.022∗
(0.011)
0.003
(0.011)
0.003
(0.011)
0.003
(0.011)
0.004
(0.010)
IncomeLevelt
0.071∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.070∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.071∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.056∗∗∗
(0.012)
0.005
(0.015)
0.004
(0.015)
0.005
(0.015)
0.006
(0.011)
Studentt – – –
0.158∗∗∗
(0.030)
– – –
0.192∗∗∗
(0.034)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Non-students only? Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Exclude immigrants? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude non-citizens? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 32432 32432 32432 49552 30546 30546 30546 46492
Countries 65 65 65 70 65 65 65 70
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22
Standard errors are clustered by country, with ***, **, and * denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Base year (b) is derived from the survey year (t), minus the respondent’s age (Aget), plus 18. All regressions control for sex,
relationship status, number of children, and employment status. Coefficients and standard errors for all non-binary explanatory
variables are standardized with mean zero.
170
Variable descriptions
• PressConstraints: from Freedom House’s (FH) Freedom of the Press index (1997-
2014), rescaled to be from 0 to 10.
• PressConstraintsb: same as above, with a countries’ value (1993-2014) assigned to a
WVS respondent’s base age (i.e. 18 or 22). This was done by
1. Determining the amount of years that have passed since a respondent was base
age, given a respondent’s age at time of survey (or removing from sample if missing
an age).
2. Subtracting that amount of time from the survey year to derive the year in which
that respondent was base age.
3. Assigning the country-year Freedom Score measures to those years (or removing
from sample if pre-1993).
Note: Since North Macedonia is missing a score for 1993 but otherwise had quite stable
scores, its 1994 value was used for 1993.
• Crisis: derived from Polity IV’s POLITY2 index; I give a value of 1 for any year it
denoted a country as being engaged in “interregnum” or “transition”; a value of 1 for
the respective years before and after any given “interregnum,” “transition,” or “foreign
interruption” began; and a value of 1 for any year immediately preceding or following
a change in its POLITY2 score of a magnitude larger than 5. Note that POLITY2
leaves years during a “foreign interruption” as missing values.
• EducationAttainment (EA): from the World Values Survey’s (WVS) X025 (1994-
2014), meaning highest education level, where 0 =incomplete primary, 1 =complete
primary, 2 = incomplete vocational secondary, 3 =complete vocational secondary,
4 =incomplete preparatory secondary, 5 =complete preparatory secondary, 6 =some
university, 7 =full university.
• Education completion age: from WVS’s X023 (1994-2014), meaning expected com-
pletion age, ranging from 1 to 99, with negative values treated as missing. See comment
on “non-students only” below for relevance.
• Education expenditures (% gov) and lnEducation: from the World Bank’s (WB)
World Development Indicators (WBI) database (1997-2014). Logged for normality.
• Employment and student status: derived from WVS’s X028 (1994-2014), meaning
current employment status. Missing observations are treated as missing for all vari-
ables. Those who answered “full time,” “part time,” or “self-employed” given a value
of 1 for the employed variable; those who answered “student” given a 1 for the student
variable.
– Some who identified as students marked a younger-than-current-age education
completion age, while some who answered that they expect to complete their
education at an older-than-current-age did not identity as students.
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– In pursuit of the most possible certainty, regressions marked yes to “non-students
only” include only those who said they were not a student and that they were at
the age of or older than their education completion age. Regressions marked no
to “non-students only” are all-inclusive with respect to these variables.
• GDP per capita ($ 2010) and lnGDPpc: from the WB WDI (1997-2014). Logged
for normality.
• Gov’t expenditures (% GDP) and lnGovExpend: from the WB WDI database
(1997-2014), measuring total government consumption expenditures. Logged for nor-
mality.
• Immigrant, noncitizen, and international: all derived from WVS (1994-2014).
– Immigrant : derived from G017 (“born in this country”), G018 (“when came to
country”), and G027A (“immigrant”). Anyone who answered yes on G017, any-
thing on G018, and/or yes on G027A was given a value of 1 for the immigrant
variable. Missing observations remained missing. A small number of observations
marked that they were both an immigrant and born in their current country; I
marked those as missing, given the indeterminacy.
– Noncitizen: derived from G005 (“citizen of country”) and G027B (“citizen”).
Anyone who answered yes to either was given a value of 1 for the noncitizen
variable. Missing observations remained missing.
– International : designed to denote individuals who likely were not educated in their
current country. Anyone given a 1 for both the immigrant and noncitizen variables
was given a 1. Missing observations for either variable are considered missing for
the international variable. However, in pursuit of most possible certainty, main
regressions exclude all immigrants and noncitizens.
• IncomeLevelt: from WVS’s X047 (1994-2014), denoting income deciles from 0 to 9
(i.e. low to high), with negative values treated as missing.
• Military expenditures (% GDP), lnMilitary, and lnMilitary2: : from the WB
WDI database (1997-2014). Logged for normality. lnMilitary2 corrects for exacer-
bation or deletion of zero or near-zero expenditure values post-logarithm by adding 1
prior.
• Other individual-level data (Aget, sex, number of children, and relationship
status): from WVS’s X003, X001, X011, and X007 (1994-2014), respectively.
– All missing or negative Aget observations removed from sample, as it is a key
variable. Because of the necessary lower bounds on observing propaganda and
data limitations going further back in time, ages range from 18 to 43.
– Individuals are given a 1 if female and 0 if male, with negative values treated as
missing.
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– Number of children ranges from 0 to 8 (i.e. 8 or more), with negative values
treated as missing.
– A relationship variable was derived from X007, wherein individuals were given
a 0 if they answered “single/never married”; a 1 if they answered “divorced,”
“separated,” or “widowed”; a 2 if they answered “living together as married”;
and a 3 if they answered “married.” Negative values treated as missing.
• Participation (active): composite measure of WVS’s E025 and E027 (1994-2014), in
which individuals are given a 0 if they answer that they “would never” sign a petition
or attend a lawful demonstration, a 1 if they answer that they “might,” and a 2 if they
answer that they “have,” for a total score ranging from 0 to 4. Negative or missing
observations removed from sample.
• Participation (passive): composite measure of WVS’s A004 and E023 (1994-2014),
in which individuals are given a 0 if they state that politics is “not at all” important
or interesting, a 1 if they answer “not very” important or interesting, a 2 if they
answer “somewhat” important or interesting, and 3 if they answer “very” important
or interesting, for a total score ranging from 0 to 6. Negative or missing observations
removed from sample.
• Polity/Polityt: from Polity IV’s POLITY2 index measuring net democracy, ranging
from −10 to 10, with 10 being the most democratic (on net).
• AcademicConstraints: equals 1 if a country’s scholars have ever faced imprisonment,
prosecution, or travel restrictions in the Scholars at Risk (SAR) Network’s Incident
Index from 2011 through October 2017.
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Countries: model 1 (1997-2014)*
Albania; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; Bangladesh;
Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Bu-
rundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad;
Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Democratic
Republic of the Congo; Denmark; Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Sal-
vador; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany;
Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Hungary; India; Indonesia;
Iran; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kuwait; Kyrgyzs-
tan; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Lithuania; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia;
Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia;
Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama;
Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of Congo; Romania; Rus-
sia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; Solomon
Islands; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Tan-
zania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; United
Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia
Countries: model 2 (1994-2014)**
Albania (1998, 2002); Algeria (2002, 2013); Argentina (1995, 1999); Australia (1995, 2005, 2012);
Bangladesh (1996, 2002); Armenia (1997, 2011); Brazil (2006, 2014); Bulgaria (1997, 2005); Burk-
ina Faso (2007); Canada (2000, 2006); Chile (1996, 2000, 2006, 2011); Colombia (1998, 2012);
Cyprus (2006, 2011); Czech Republic (1998); Dominican Republic (1996); Ecuador (2013); El
Salvator (1999); Ethiopia (2007); Estonia (1996, 2011); Finland (1996, 2005); France (2006); Geor-
gia (2009, 2014); Germany (1997, 2006, 2013); Ghana (2007, 2012); Guatemala (2004); Hungary
(2009); India (1995, 2001, 2006, 2014); Indonesia (2001, 2006); Italy (2005); Japan (2000, 2005,
2010); Lebanon (2013); Kyrgyzstan (2003, 2011); Latvia (1996); Lithuania (1997); North Macedo-
nia (1998); Malaysia (2006, 2012); Mali (2007); Mexico (1995, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2012); Moldova
(1996, 2002, 2006); Netherlands (2006, 2012); New Zealand (1998, 2004, 2011); Nigeria (1995,
2000, 2011); Norway (1996, 2007); Pakistan (1997, 2001, 2012); Peru (1996, 2001, 2006, 2012);
Philippines (2001, 2012); Poland (2005, 2012); Romania (1998, 2005, 2012); Russia (1995, 2006,
2011); Singapore (2002, 2012); Slovakia (1998); Slovenia (2005, 2011); South Africa (1996, 2001,
2006, 2013); South Korea (1996, 2001, 2005, 2010); Spain (1995, 2000, 2007, 2011); Sweden (1996,
2006, 2011); Switzerland (1996, 2007); Taiwan (1994, 1996, 2012); Tanzania (2001); Thailand (2007,
2013); Trinidad and Tobago (2006, 2011); Turkey (1996, 2001, 2007, 2011); Uganda (2001); Ukraine
(1996, 2006, 2011); United Kingdom (1998, 2005); United States (1995, 1999, 2011); Uruguay (1996,
2006, 2011); Venezuela (1996, 2000); Yemen (2014); Zambia (2007)
*Countries in both unbalanced and balanced panel specifications appear in bold.
**There are no observations from 2008.
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